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
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HISTORY OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE
NETHERLANDS

BY

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Professor of Dutch History in the University of Leyden

PART IV.

FREDERICK HENRY JOHN DE WITT WILLIAM III.

TRANSLATED BY OSCAR A. BIERSTADT

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
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PREFACE

THE historian of the "golden age" of the Netherlands has a pleasant task to perform, because the glory of posterity has never risen higher than in this time, especially in the second half of the century. But this task is difficult, for great is the number of the works that have appeared on this attractive epoch, and hard it is to hold fast the thread of the narrative amid the many important events occurring in every department of the national life. The author hopes he has overcome this difficulty without allowing too ample a space to any portion of the history of the people, so far as possible without being swayed by his personal preference for persons and systems.

It would not greatly surprise him, however, if the critics, as has previously happened, were again to complain that in this volume also of the history of the *people* of the Netherlands too much place has perhaps been given to the *political* history of the people. That poor political history! Formerly it was everything, the everywhere recognised mistress; now it is put under a ban and thrown into an obscure corner, and unjustly. It may not be denied that the interest of the public at present is directed more to other expressions of the life of the people, but this does not signify that those other expressions of old took a so much more considerable place in the popular life itself, in the daily thoughts of the nation. Any one acquainted with the most-read pamphlets of

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... opinion in religious matters, an
changes of material prosperity. It would b
attribute too great an influence to a tempora
cion, to interest in material questions, in t
history of the people in general, just as it i
wrong view to pay attention chiefly to the v
of working men who now rejoice in great in
The author believes he has been faithful to the
developed by him in the introduction to his firs
according to which he assigns to the political hi
eminent place belonging to it in the life of th
without forgetting that it does not alone const
history of the people, but that a larger space
wanted to other utterances of the popular life t
formerly the case in general historical works. C
ay differ as to how ample this space should be.
nt of its demands depends often upon personal
ews. No difference of ideas can exist with re
e subject itself, if one is only guided by the
nts of a purely scientific consideration, not
itical or social opinion of the day.

The author hopes some years longer to continu
upon the task set for himself and to bring i
, encouraged by the great interest and coö
h he has so far encountered with gratitude.

P.

DN, September 26, 1901.



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HISTORY OF THE DUTCH PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

THE FIRST YEARS AFTER THE TRUCE

HOW little power the new government possessed was manifest both in foreign and domestic affairs during the first years after the renewal of the war. Relations with France, England, Sweden, Denmark, the German princes, and the Hanse towns were anything but satisfactory. The United Netherlands, honoured and feared under Oldenbarnevelt's sway by all Europe, were still desired as an ally and respected as an enemy on account of their 50,000 disciplined troops and 100 war ships, but these advantages were not boldly used. The prince and his advisers did not show themselves equal to their task.

The Huguenots of La Rochelle begged the help of the States against their government, but although Maurice and the preachers sympathised with them, their emissaries were not publicly received in the States-General, and assistance was neither given nor positively refused them. The tone of Maurice and Du Maurier in their interviews on the relation of the States to France remained sharp and unfriendly, and the remembrance of Oldenbarnevelt raised an insuperable barrier between them, but hostility did not go beyond bitter words and

... her husband. Failing in this, she
recourse to another way, and on March 22, 1621
led in getting her husband out of his prison,
known, in a chest used for conveying books.
woman was a match for a thousand men.
ped prisoner did not stop in the Southern Ne
s, where he would have been received with
s, but hastened to Paris. Here he met with a co
ption, and was entertained by the best society
of uncommon importance and a celebrated scho
king granted him a yearly pension of 3600 li
took him under his patronage, when the Estate
ind, indignant at the publication "with privileg
sing" of the masterly *Justification of the Lau
nment of Holland and West Friesland*, strictly p
d this book and proscribed its author. The wo
ated into Latin, French, and German, placed
earliest light before all Europe the culpable act
against the fallen party. It was an arraignment
ctors of 1618 and 1619, and did more than a
writing to confirm an unfavourable opinion of th
t towards Oldenbarnevelt and his followers. I
count it imbibbered De Groot's enemies and ma
urn to the fatherland impossible. This book a
ers found their way into the United Netherlar
ie help of Du Maurier, but the States did n
to complain of this any more than of the prot
stowed in France on many other fugitive Rom

there formed against the interests of the East India Company.

Weak was the attitude towards England, which took a high stand on account of Coen's treatment of the English in India, and repeatedly threatened to capture the returning East Indiamen. An effort was made not to anger Sweden by too close an alliance with Denmark, and at the same time Denmark was kept as friendly as possible. The same feeble policy was adopted towards the German cities and princes. There was giving and promising on one side, taking and refusing on the other, and so nobody was really satisfied.

The war was waged also in listless fashion. When Spinola laid siege to Jülich, relief was so slow in coming that its commander, Pithan, had to surrender in February, 1622. Prince Maurice took the field but remained inactive. It seemed as if there was a disposition to prolong the Truce upon any favourable terms, in accordance with Oldenbarnevelt's policy, and the partisans of peace took heart in south and north. The death of both the king of Spain and Archduke Albert in 1621 impeded the enemy's plans.

Unconquerable energy was shown by the merchants, however, who went on developing the world's commerce, although the war now compelled them again to arm themselves against the enemy and to send their ships to sea well equipped for action. Beside the East India Company a West India Company came into existence by charter of June 3, 1621. Both corporations were not simply commercial associations, but political institutions as well, designed not alone for gain, but also to injure the enemy and to stop the source of his power.¹

Such an institution was the West India Company from its beginning. The indefatigable Usselincx, himself a stern Calvinist and enemy of all "heretics and erring

¹ Van Rees, *Staatshuishoudkunde in Nederland*, ii., p. 122.

... in the matter
new company and its charter. He could not ev
rry out all his ideas. He desired a limitation
ower of the directors over the shareholders, be
ore complete accounts, the planting of colonies
en closely bound to the mother country, the pro
civilisation and Christianity among the native
pecially a regular supervision by the state of the
the merchants "who have gain for their north s
eed for a compass, and who would believe the sh
eping to its right course, if it were almost wreck
ofit." Little heed was given his grievances, a
npany was modelled after the East India Cor
ough indeed the "participants" in the new assoc
l rather more to say, and the state possessed mo
nce through its deputies in the governing bo
Nineteen and through its approval required for
operations. The company obtained a monopo
western coast of Africa as far as the Cape, an
erica and the islands east of New Guinea dur
od of twenty-four years.

is plain from the entire organisation of the com
it was formed for spoils and privateering. A
riptions, open to any one within or without
ed Netherlands, did not come in very fast, sinc
holders of the East India Company, the mode
new company, were far from satisfied with the
of their charter. The States-General made
to promote...

phlets were put out in support of the affair. By the summer of 1623 seven millions were at last raised.

Disapproving of the scheme as settled upon, Usselincx would have nothing more to do with the business, to which he had devoted his life and fortune, and he now entered the service of Sweden in the hope of realising there his great plans. He secured from Gustavus Adolphus the charter for a company constituted according to his notions, but it never came into being owing to want of funds and the circumstances of Sweden after the king's death in 1632. Discouraged, he returned finally to his fatherland, where, at over eighty years of age, he died poor and forgotten about the middle of the century, persisting until his last days in writing and speaking for his cherished ideas, the accomplishment of which was contrary to the spirit of his time.

The formation of the new company was viewed with displeasure in England, as the scene of its activity was to be in the very regions recommended by Raleigh and his friends to the English merchants and already visited by them. King James was always complaining of the harm done to English interests in the East Indies by Coen and his followers who, despite the treaty of union, continued as much as possible to keep the English out of affairs in the Archipelago. There was mutual distrust, quarrelling everywhere between officials on both sides, a seemingly endless strife. Meanwhile Coen went energetically to work. Energy was necessary in the Indies of those days. The uncivilised natives of the Indian isles, exasperated by the unbridled avarice of the Netherlanders, English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, hunted down like wild beasts, robbed of their possessions, and driven from their homes, revenged themselves upon their oppressors whenever they could. How Coen and his men considered and treated the natives is horribly evident from his relation¹

¹ Tiele, *Bouwstoffen*, i., p. 272.

... of the population we
starved to death; and the survivors—some
hundred men, women, and children—were transported
to Java, where the poor unfortunates perished in
this group of islands had to be repopulated—a
testimony to the methods of the Netherlanders in
their commerce and supremacy in the Indies.
The picture Coen himself gives of the “bad life”
of the Netherlanders around him, of their drunkenness,
immorality, and greed, shows us how great was the need
of a hand like his to rule over these rough men.
The women sent out to the Indies by the company
as prostitutes, the “scum of the land,” were not much
better than the men. Unquestionably many noble deeds
were done by the Netherlanders in India during these years,
but the most characteristic was often the conduct of those carrying the
Dutch flag over the Indian lands and seas; admiral
Van Heemskerck was exhibited in managing the affairs of the
East India Company; but the dark side of it all must be indicated
and should not be forgotten that, in accomplishing so
much by way of praise, much occurred which cannot be
forgotten of to-day. Coen's own doings prove that a
man in a time of blood and iron may go beyond what
is usually able. No brave acts, no ability in governing
in a long war, no brilliant success can quite atone for
the wrongs inflicted upon the unfortunate natives of
the East Indian Islands. Where the governor-general acted
the subordinate naturally followed his example.

most barbarous times, when the question of right was simply one of might, when the worst sides of human nature were openly displayed.

These things were differently regarded in Europe than in India, particularly by the weaker party, in this case the English. At the request of King James a new embassy from the Netherlands appeared in England at the end of 1621. Sommelsdijk against his wishes was appointed head of it. The tone of the discussions was anything but mild. The king in the earliest interviews made the most odious remarks about the Dutch merchants and fishermen, "bloodsuckers of my kingdom," as he called them. There was negotiation and wrangling for more than a year, until an agreement was reached concerning Indian affairs. Peace was now hoped for in these quarters, and a considerable indemnity was granted to the English for their losses.

The war with Spain became more serious in the second year. With the support of the States the expelled Bohemian king kept one army in the Palatinate under the Count of Mansfeld and another in Westphalia under Duke Christian of Brunswick. The king soon went to the Palatinate for a last attempt to recover his hereditary land. But this attempt failed also, and the unfortunate prince disbanded all his troops. The armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick, thus made independent and still numbering 25,000 men, threatened to move into France to aid the Huguenots. The States and the prince succeeded by the promise of subsidies in persuading Mansfeld to turn to the Netherlands and to act with their army in opposing Spinola's designs.

The plans of the Spanish general had begun to excite alarm in the border provinces of the States. These plans resulted from the changed condition of the Spanish monarchy and the southern provinces after the deaths of Philip III. and the archduke. The world-monarchy of

the European complications. In the insignificant Lerma the young king had con-
anagement of affairs to Don Gaspar de Guzma
: Olivares, an able statesman, whose dearest
bring Spain back to the policy of Philip II.
ive her closely allied with the German Hapsbu
e papal see. Although weaker ~~than~~ formerly
ould still give her antagonists enough to do. Thi
quired a more intimate union between Spain :
fferent portions of the monarchy, including th
etherlands. Archduchess Isabella, now a c.
dow, showed no inclination to make her territo
eparate realm; she contented herself with the o
verness of the land; and she consented to ha
ites of the various provinces take the oath of alle
her nephew, Philip IV., as duke and count, this
occurring in 1623.' The war was now to be
ied from Spain. Spinola received his orders ar
ncial means to execute them.

short raid by Prince Frederick Henry, who wi
lry laid the Brabant country as far as the ga
sels, Mechlin, and Louvain under contributi
spring, excited dismay in the south, but Dr
yssel, and Gelderland were so open to the
tribute had to be paid him in various district
l sides reports were rife of a secret understand
Catholic noblemen and peasants with the Spa
: were also complaints of

much to be desired, all the more so because the prince, suffering from a severe disease of the liver, could display but slight vigour.

Suddenly Spinola laid siege in July to the important fortress of Bergen op Zoom, but it held out well and blocked the "Spanish hosts." Fortunately Mansfeld's army, early in September, had penetrated to Tilburg, and the prince was able to approach the endangered fortress, so that Spinola had to raise the siege, which had lasted three months, and to quit the neighbourhood of the city so valiantly defended by its governor, Ryhove, to the great joy of the whole country. This success was of benefit to Zealand and Holland and inspired a song of triumph by Starter. It was now hoped that King James would earnestly adopt his son-in-law's cause and take Mansfeld into his service, but this did not happen. The States also were not anxious to keep the German general's force through the winter and sent it into East Friesland, whose count urged the evacuation of his fortresses, but now saw his land overrun by Mansfeld's wild bands. For more than half a year Mansfeld's troops levied tribute upon the little country and Oldenburg, and the count of East Friesland, almost a prisoner in one of his castles,¹ considered it lucky that the garrisons of the States protected his chief fortified places. Mansfeld refused to leave until 300,000 guilders had been given him to pay his debts. In the autumn the States loaned this sum to the Estates of East Friesland in return for a bond signed by the latter and making the country dependent upon the United Netherlands.

An attempt by Maurice in December to capture Antwerp by surprise failed on account of the weather. The Netherlanders were little satisfied with the weak attitude of the prince, who was known to be secretly negotiating with the enemy, Juffer Tserclaes constantly travelling

¹ Aitzema, i., p. 131.

... Groenevelt's fall. THIS
content with Maurice was somewhat allayed
discovery of a shameful plot against his life. Sc
cited Remonstrant preachers, rural functionar
ivate individuals with the financial aid of Olde
it's sons and his nephew, Van der Dussen, fo
in to put the prince out of the way by hiring un
is sailors to murder him during one of his
its to his mistress at Ryswick. These seame
sting the business which had only been ob
posed to them as something for the welfare
ntry, went to the prince for further informati
s revealed the plot in January. Search was a
le for the conspirators. Most of them were arr
few, including Stoutenburg and Van der D
ped and sought the protection of the archdu
een, among whom were Reinier van Groen
enbarnevelt's eldest son, and Slatius, the Re
it pamphleteer, lost their lives upon the sca
ring a righteous punishment for their cri
npt. Groenevelt could not be saved, thoug
ed repentance and his proud mother begged f

urice seems to have felt increasing dejection a
course of affairs, and he longed for rest and p
efforts made anew from the southern provin
him to serious negotiations for a truce found
nwilling than before, partly because Holland
melanie

ately repulsed. It was plain enough that without allies the war would, in the long run, be too much of an undertaking for the States, an old truth confirmed again by facts and calling attention—as in the days of Prince William—to France and England, the only allies worthy of earnest consideration, and yet offering scanty hopes.

England was less than ever to be depended upon, now the old king seemed about to attain his long-cherished purpose, and his son Charles, having departed for Madrid, was received so cordially at the Spanish court that his marriage to a Spanish infanta looked settled. The attitude of England towards the Netherlands, moreover, had always been so ambiguous that no close alliance was thought of between them. This was rather to be expected with France. The possibility that England, by a league with Spain, might either obtain the Netherlands or help put the hereditary enemy in possession of them appeared so threatening to France that the French government, immediately after the report of Charles's success¹ at Madrid, reverted to the policy of Henry IV. and promised a renewal of subsidies to the States, if they would cease negotiating with Spain for a new truce and would not support the Huguenots or rebellious noblemen in France.

It was resolved in the Netherlands to send an embassy to France. A better understanding thus prepared with France caused a renewal of the old alliance to be expected shortly, although the friend of the States for many years, Jeannin, had died in 1622. It was apparent that the French administration was inspired with a new spirit. Cardinal de Richelieu, the greatest political genius of the seventeenth century, entered the royal council in April, 1624, and soon ruled the course of affairs in France. His domestic policy sought to uphold the king's power, his foreign policy aimed at the humiliation of the house

¹ Ranke, *Frans. Gesch.*, ii., p. 200.

... not on good terms with Prince Maurice
statesmen surrounding him. The ambassador
stood this himself, and before he was "thrown
window," he sent in his resignation which was
accepted. In April, 1624, he left the province
return. He was replaced by the Catholic d'Es-
gent of the new policy that was to make Fra-
Michelieu's guidance play so great a part in Eu-

The condition of the United Provinces was
somewhat brilliant in 1624. The eastern sections,
on one side by the Spanish garrisons and Tilly's
his troops, ravaged on the other by the fierce
Brunswick and Mansfeld and by undisciplined
deserters from the Spaniards, were unfortunate.
The Veluwe, Drenthe, and Overijssel were la-
stribution in February by Spanish forces.
Snow, and frost did uncommon damage in the
North were the gleams of light also in European
though the English marriage at Madrid was be-
fore the autumn, England continued unfriendly
to the States, which did their best to keep James
from acceding to his demands. Coen's
return from India to the fatherland offered some oppor-
tunity for a better understanding.

The disappointment of the English govern-
ment of the Spanish matrimonial plans was
that it soon showed a more friendly countenance
to the Dutch. Carleton, still representing his

Joachimi went to England¹ at the request of the English administration, and in July, 1624, a treaty was arranged, by which England agreed, as in 1585, to assist the United Netherlands with 6000 men, while the money expended was to be paid back on the conclusion of peace or a long truce, although no cautionary towns were to be placed in English hands. About the same time an embassy to France made a treaty of subsidy for three years at Compiègne with Louis XIII., the treaty like that of 1608 promising reciprocal aid in case of war, and the States agreeing to conclude no peace or truce without the king's intervention. The subsidy was to be 1,200,000 livres for the first year, 1,000,000 for the two following years, and the provinces were to repay the money within three years after the making of peace or truce. The States in case of war were to help France with the half of this amount or with troops and war-ships, whenever their situation allowed. Commercial dissensions were settled as well as possible. This was a plain indication of the course France intended to follow.

The summer of 1624 thus brought a fine chance of improving matters. France and England again stood towards the States in the same relation as before the Truce, and the friendship between these two powers seemed lastingly confirmed, when the Prince of Wales, the later Charles I., married Henrietta Maria, the French king's sister. So close appeared the bond connecting the two powers and the United Netherlands that even the quarrels between English and Netherlanders in India, the news of which just reached Europe before the conclusion of the treaties of alliance, could not disturb the harmony for the time being. There was hope of a renewal of the Triple Alliance of 1596. If this came about, Spain's misfortune was boundless, the freedom of

¹ Arend, Van Rees, and Brill, iii., 4, 10.

... settled there an
ese to take possession of the fort. The go
Moluccas, Henry van Speult, by means c
tained first from a few Japanese, then from
Englishmen, confessions which appeared
affair beyond doubt, although objection n
made to the regularity of his method c
Governor and council condemned the g
death, and the sentence was immediatly
upon twenty, half of them being Englishmen
ing Towerson, the agent at Ambon, and s
chants and officials of the English company
of the condemned Englishmen were spared t
the property of their company, and later rece
at Batavia.' This trial, as soon as it was
England, aroused the most violent indignati
governor-general and directors of the Dutch
Company also regarded Van Speult's action,
illegal, as very imprudent on account of his
and irregularities. Carleton protested stre
August against the treatment inflicted upo
subjects and opposed the sending out again o
mortal enemy of the English, as governor-ge
demanded an investigation by the States-Ge
hment of the Dutch officials, compensati
damages done the English company, and pe
cordance with the treaty of 1619 to build
Moluccas. His tone was so sharp that the c
... ..

England making reprisals on the returning East India-men. At last the States-General were obliged to summon Van Speult and the other judges home to give an account of their conduct. Furthermore they did their best to meet the wishes of the English with regard to the general situation in India.

Coen was meanwhile engaged in persuading the directors to adopt the measures recommended by him for India. He wanted economy and better government, encouragement of the immigration of Europeans, development of commerce with China, promotion of free trade and free cultivation of land and products. These principles conflicted with the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by the company, but Coen's knowledge of Indian affairs and his persuasive eloquence so influenced the directors that before the end of 1623 a beginning was made with the introduction of a system which was to establish Indian commerce upon other foundations. Naturally Coen was desired to execute his own ideas, and the office of governor-general was again offered to him in October, 1624. He wished for delay in order to be married, then sickness detained him further, giving Carleton an opportunity to protest against his appointment, so that the directors held him back, when he was ready to embark in the spring of 1625, and the States-General forbade his departure from fear of complications with England. The champions of monopoly seized the chance to thwart Coen's plans. Supported by the States-General and Carleton, they succeeded in winning over the not very zealous directors to let the scheme rest for a time, and when Coen in 1627 finally set out, he was half a year later prohibited from doing anything about free trade as proposed. This deprived the energetic governor of the opportunity of reforming the management in the Indies according to his ideas and therefore played into the hands of the English.

...members
...and these, while Mansfeld was
...prepared to renew the war
...and Christian of Brunsw.
...again, the States-General
...not only to defend their own ter-
...as in Maurice's best ye-
...the West Indies, where Admiral W-
...vice-admiral, Piet Heyn, in the
...company took possession of San Sal-
...promising. From the East Indi-
...the increasing power of the Nether-
...Archipelago.

But Spain also was strongly armed and
after the discomfiture of the armies of
prince in Germany. Spinola was station-
able force in Brabant and menaced the
the States. Moreover, the prince was not
as of old and was now more averse than ev-
operations in the open field, this feeling be-
the army. There began to be doubts of
the commanders, and they were suspected
tion quietly to enjoy their good pay, of
war after the delights of the Truce, which
caused the soldiery to degenerate, not
troops of the States remained inactive, in
August, with 18,000 men, laid siege to Bre-
been strongly fortified by Maurice and was
model fortification.

armed citizens. The prince really took the field at this report, but now also not much was accomplished, although he had almost 30,000 men and 200 pieces of ordnance.¹ The army, gathered near Nimwegen, soon moved across the rivers apparently to relieve Breda, but in fact to support a new attack upon Antwerp, where there was only a small garrison. Repeated attempts to surprise the place failed, and the prince finally confined himself to harassing Spinola in the neighbourhood of Breda in order to force him to break off the siege. The city itself seemed well enough supplied with troops, artillery, and provisions to resist the enemy for a long time. But Spinola drew close around Breda, could not be enticed from his positions, and so strengthened himself by inundations and earthworks or forts that the prince's measures to drive him away had little result. Then the prince in the middle of November returned to The Hague, peevish and discouraged, suffering severely from the disease of the liver which had so long been undermining his constitution, leaving the command of the troops to his brother and Count Ernest Casimir. So came the spring of 1625. The troops of the States had much sickness on account of the continuous rains and were impeded by storms in their efforts at relief. Mansfeld's arrival from England with nearly 20,000 men brought no change, for the prince's illness gradually grew worse and paralysed all action on the side of the States.

At the end of March, 1625, this sickness became so serious that the prince, more and more emaciated and feeble, feeling his end approach, and wishing to assure the future of the state, summoned his brother from the camp to The Hague. He advised this brother, who was over forty years old and still unmarried, in the interest of the country and his family, to marry as speedily as

¹ Van der Capellen, i., p. 312.

The First Years after the Truce 19

surprises, worn out by illness, he saw finally
decline and his star setting amid general

had a liaison with Margaret of Mechlin,
of the court of Princess Louise, and by her
sons, William and Louis, whose names became
known and were mentioned in his will. Two
sons and three daughters he regarded as illegitimate.
The "irregular life" of the great general is not the darkest
upon his memory. Far more injurious to his repu-
tation was his cruelty towards Oldenbarnevelt, a moral
and political mistake which had the most fearful conse-
quences for his house and country. Even his inestimable
services to the land and the fame of his military operations
cannot efface this stain, cannot stop "the springs of this
murder," as Vondel sings, and posterity remembers
mournfully how two great minds, whose coöperation had
once wrought so much good, were separated at the end of
life by bitter enmity. But posterity at the same time
honours in Maurice the great soldier, the excellent mathe-
matician, the talented creator of the army which became
in his and his brother's hands the efficient instrument
for assuring the independence of the Netherlands first
achieved by their father.

¹ Van de Kemp, *Maurits van Nassau*, iv., p. 165, 171, 394, 400.



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in and admiral-general at once, and without the separate provinces, which rightly dissatisfied the provinces; but the arbitrary action of the States under the circumstances and with the army.

The new "dominant personage" differed in many respects from his predecessor. Frederick Henry, inheriting diplomatic talent from his father, and courteous manners from both mother and father, had learned much about war from his brother, of whom he was a great admirer. From the campaign of 1600 he was fully initiated into the great general's military plans and ideas, and had been formed entirely in his school. Carefully educated under his excellent mother's guidance and by the intelligent Uytenbogaert, he had broader views than his brother, and an eye for other than military affairs. His intellectual culture was not so exceptional as some of his panegyrists would have us believe, but he manifested interest in art and literature, so far as the camp and politics allowed him time. We possess military memoirs planned and revised by him, if not written by his hand. Cautious and slow in carrying out his projects—"I must sleep over it," he was accustomed to say—he was mild in his judgment of others, without the passion of party, noble toward his enemies, generous toward those he deemed worthy of his friendship and confidence. His diplomatic utterances and art of concealing his true meaning sometimes conveyed the impression of hypocrisy. His wife was a gifted woman, although she cannot be exonerated from a love of power and pelf, from a certain inclination to intrigue. The birth, on May 26, 1626, of their son, who was to bear the name of William, was celebrated as an event of national importance, and Vondel's *Geboortclock* of the young prince seemed to ring out over the cradle of a royal child. Both had a taste for outward splendour, for a brilliant court. Their environment showed a great difference from the

son with the abodes of sovereigns else princely pomp, unusual in Holland, was played until some years later, after won fame and wealth by his glorious sieges.

The beginning of his stadtholdership was The large army designed for the relief of failed to drive the strongly intrenched S had soon to withdraw, while Mansfeld's encamped in the territory of Jülich. Bre capitulate in May, 1625, its garrison march honours of war. The sensation produced by important fortress was profound, as is many porary pamphlets and other writings. The thought of an agreement with Spain, and peared not averse to it.

Hope for the future was raised by the death of James, who expired some days before M succeeded by Spain's bitter enemy, Charles. ordinary embassy on the occasion of the death ambassador of the States, Joachimi, Caron' intended to induce England to engage in a Sommelsdijk, still at the head of foreign negotiations and with Buckingham brought autumn an offensive and defensive alliance. cial dissensions being thrust aside. Buckingham appeared at The Hague to broaden the great European league.

against the emperor by subsidies from England and the States and by a fleet. But Charles's want of money, his trouble with Parliament and the nation, and the unreliability of his advisers turned great expectations into disappointment.

More was to be looked for from France under the powerful Richelieu, now inclined to help the Netherlands against Spain. Frederick Henry and Sommelsdijk set their hopes on this country. During 1625 a close alliance with France was prepared by aiding the contest of its government against the Huguenots of La Rochelle. Maurice had reluctantly agreed to France's desire to borrow or buy twelve Dutch ships, while twenty others under Haultain, destined to fight the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, might first be employed against La Rochelle. Haultain was actually left before the harbour of the Huguenots, and in November Sommelsdijk himself went to Paris to bring this delicate matter to a happy ending. Just then Haultain received orders to return to the Flemish coast on account of the condition of his ships. The States were rejoiced to find a reason for stopping the unpopular action of the fleet against the Huguenots. Besides arranging affairs with the Huguenots, Sommelsdijk had also to persuade France to join the great alliance. Richelieu seemed not unwilling, if the Huguenots would submit. The mediation of Sommelsdijk and the English envoys aided not a little to induce the Huguenots of La Rochelle in February, 1626, to conclude a disadvantageous treaty with their king. Now the way was open for France to enter the league against the house of Hapsburg. But Richelieu showed slight desire to engage in a great European war and negotiated secretly with Spain until a pacific agreement was speedily reached. An alliance between France and the Netherlands soon appeared impossible, and Sommelsdijk left Paris in April without attaining his object. The Huguenots had been sacrificed without receiving the price

tions, and Parliament was not disposed by strong support to make the war really possible. Money could only be secured for it with difficulty, not even by selling the jewels of the royal family, upon which Charles was unable to get a loan at Amsterdam. Under these circumstances, England's part in the war was chiefly to privateering upon not very extensive operations. All efforts to obtain money failed. The English would have nothing to do with the frivolous policy of Charles and his policy. A combined expedition of English and Dutch ships to the Spanish coast, undertaken to intercept the Spanish silver fleet from the West Indies, did not accomplish its purpose; an attack upon the coast was a complete failure; and a new Netherland fleet was very slowly equipped in the spring of 1626. The want of money, lack of money, bad management, and domestic dissensions. In Friesland dissensions prevented the regular collection of the taxes, and Zeeland declared its inability to pay the excessive imposts. The suspension of revenue from these two provinces naturally had a bad effect upon the progress of the war both by sea and by land.

In 1626, as in 1625, little of importance was accomplished on either side. Spain and the archdukes had to contend with want of money, and the Dutch and Germany so held their attention that there was no prospect of great operations in the Netherlands after the capture of Breda. The enemy was content with laying tribute upon the

marching to and fro on the Rhine ended the campaign in anything but a brilliant fashion.

There was much talk of secret negotiations, of a possible renewal of the Truce. The prince was supposed to desire peace, while it was known that the archduchess would not be in the least averse to it, and that only Spain's refusal to recognise the independence of the north remained the great obstacle. Nothing was effected beyond a liberal exchange of prisoners, which gave opportunity for mutual courtesies.

The successes won by the imperial arms against Denmark made the States fear for their eastern frontiers, when the Protestant cause seemed lost after the defeats of Mansfeld at Dessau and of King Christian IV. at Lutter, and after the death of Prince Christian of Brunswick. Northern Germany lay open to the imperial forces, and at any moment Tilly or Wallenstein was expected to move towards the Netherlands. Friesland and Groningen urgently demanded protection by more troops. Spinola's activity in Flanders, where he began threatening Sluis, and the boldness of the Dunkirk privateers caused uneasiness also in Zeeland. This made the border provinces more than ever disposed to keep their engagements and regularly to pay up their contributions, which brought some improvement in the prospect for the following year.

While foreign affairs thus took a critical turn, it was anything but quiet in the country itself. The Remonstrants placed all their hopes upon Frederick Henry. Knowing his slight sympathy for the other party, they expected everything from him after his advancement, while their opponents were far from assured about his intentions with regard to religion. But the cautious prince was too much of a statesman to lend himself to thorough measures in favour of the weaker party, knowing well that he would thereby rouse the opposition of the

acceptance for the idea of mutual t
while not to change existing conditi
Remonstrants were disappointed by
prince. Their chiefs, including still
De Groot, sharply expressed themse
“politic” reserve and “fair words.”

The prince, however, advanced sl
wards his object. Everywhere he su
ate elements, suppressed the zealots,
conciliation, undisturbed by reproaches fr
other. Through his friend Van der M
with the leaders of the Remonstrants
and moderated them. The fate of
quickly improved after his accessio
Gouda, Alkmaar, and Hoorn, where
numerous, and at other places also the
conventicles, though not abrogated,
antiquated and treated as a dead letter.
dam this course was adopted to the
some of the ministers who thundered
against the cursed adherents of Armini
in pamphlets about the “exorbitancie
saries. The policy of the States towa
came in for reprehension. Was it not
put down these poor fellow-believers
Were they not bringing down the ange
themselves by aiding the “papist” in
“ “ “

to the States a remonstrance "concerning the great insolence of the Arminians." Grevinchoven, Uyttenbogaert, Paschier de Fijne, and other Remonstrants did not lag behind with answers to these attacks. Joost van Vondel's *Palamedes*, in which political allusions to circumstances of the time were rightly discovered, excited violent indignation and led to persecution of the poet. Coster's *Iphigenia* with its sharp assault upon "foolish popery" awakened new interest. Vondel's satires angered the opposite party more than ever. The tumult against the Remonstrants at Amsterdam in 1626 showed how serious the movement threatened to become, how the populace might be stirred up by vehement words from the preachers and by the growing boldness of the Remonstrants. But Frederick Henry adhered firmly to his conciliatory policy, and the municipal governments supported him and each other in making ready for an "amnesty" and in opposing such popular movements.

Although the majority of the Estates of Holland was still called Contra-remonstrant, its words and deeds showed that it was far from the ardour of 1618. Nothing was done beyond preparing for a new publication of the ordinances relating to religion, but there was some hesitation about this, and in the summer of 1627 it was merely resolved to urge the municipal governments and judges to observe them as perpetual edicts, a course of action which did not content the zealots and was not pleasing to the Remonstrants. In Utrecht the edicts were enforced, but in Holland the magistrates of some cities refused more or less roundly to proceed against the disobedient.

The third year of Frederick Henry's administration had begun, and very little was as yet accomplished in the war. Now, however, the prince seemed to have something great in mind. At the end of July he laid siege to Grol, from which place the Spaniards had for years ravaged the district of Zutphen, and which Maurice had twice at-

way before the thought of the great
"Holland's pilot," would now steer the
safe havens." The fear of secret negoti-
vanished, now that the States had once
offensive, now that "William's valiant
turn avenged his father's blood. The
year before had announced the birth
saluted the victor, and for many as for the
henceforth in the darkness of the great
disturbance "no guiding star but the light
from his helmet's crest."

Self-reliance was encouraged. This was
because England and France could be de-
than ever, now that the capricious policy
his favourites had brought about a war be-
powers, which lasted over two years and
the cause of the Huguenots in France had
conquest of La Rochelle and when Buck-
seemed about to release England from
statecraft. The States suffered some inju-
coming so close to them. The condition
Baltic was anything but favourable to Ne-
ests, especially when Wallenstein, the em-
general, after his victories over Denmark
ing an imperial navy to the great uneasin-
well as of the States. The war between Sw-
still continued. Tilly's troops approach-

The States made efforts to reconcile both France and England and Sweden and Poland. The latter was finally successful in 1629, having been undertaken by a brilliant embassy, the soul of which was Andries Bicker, burgomaster of Amsterdam. Earlier peace between Denmark and the emperor enabled the latter to concentrate his forces in the west. The ambassadors, Randwijk and Pauw sent to England, Sommelsdijk and Vosbergen to France, were less fortunate, and friendly relations were not promoted by the departure first of d'Espesses, who had had personally disagreeable experiences at The Hague, later of Carleton, who returned to his home after a sojourn of fourteen years.

Carleton's departure furnished an opportunity of making one desired change. Although the ~~cautionary towns~~ were restored and the money advanced had been paid off, the English ambassador still had a seat in the council of state. Now it was intimated to the English government that Carleton's successor would not be admitted to the council. This seemed to the council of state a favourable time to increase its influence in the government. Asked by the States-General how a new levy of 10,000 men was to be raised, it resolved in March of 1628 to appeal to the provinces in a missive complaining of the course of affairs. The confusion in the finances, causing an unsatisfactory condition of army, fortifications, and fleet, was rightly ascribed to a lack of coöperation in the government. The council saw a remedy for the evils in the enlargement of its own power over against that of the States-General. The prince advised against sending this communication, but the council carried out its plan after a month's delay. A serious contest was threatened, but the States-General quickly settled it by denying the competence of the council in the matter, although a willingness was expressed to consider the points in question. The ecclesiastical troubles in Amsterdam waxed so violent that the prince thought it

... and he departed, w
government again connived at the ass
monstrants, and the prince, approving c
towards the end of the year a garrison
to the city. Some of the agitators w
and fined, but the ministers were not y
all led to a sharp war of pamphlets-
booklets," wrote Uyttenbogaert — to
even to popular tumults. Amsterdam
disturbed. A "massacre or some other
not impossible, but the Amsterdam gov
firm. There were now and then viole
Estates of Holland, and the Calvinistic
ened to withhold their votes, if their fi
cuted, but the prince managed finally to
although the zealots had the council f
on their side. The latter's temporary
succeeded him at his death in Septem
X Cats, pensionary of Dordrecht, stood o
Contra-remonstrants, but he was not a
and the prince easily persuaded him of
X moderation. The ministers continued to
spoke of the return of their exiled par
strict enforcement of the edicts. Then a
dam magistrates determined to expel f
X most turbulent of the preachers. Smout

wards led out of the city. The Amsterdam affair was debated in the Estates of Holland during the entire spring, and finally the majority resolved to refer it to the synod of North Holland. But Amsterdam refused to have this "political" matter settled by an ecclesiastical authority. Then the prince intervened and had the resolution repealed, but not until the end of the year was the decision intrusted to him by the Estates, when he arranged that the church council was not to be troubled by municipal representatives for a year and Smout was to remain out of Amsterdam and keep his salary. The prince's garrison made it possible for the government of Amsterdam to preserve order amid these disturbances.¹

The result of these dissensions had a great influence upon the condition of the Remonstrants here and elsewhere. Two seditious Contra-remonstrant ministers were expelled from Rotterdam in 1630. So matters went in other places. Favoured by the magistrates, the Remonstrants were soon holding meetings everywhere, no attention being paid to the prohibitory edicts. Hundreds of them came together without fear of the murmuring multitude or of the Calvinistic town councils, which even at The Hague dared not prevent these meetings. "Moderation, moderation!" was the prince's usual reply, when he was requested to use his military power to enforce the ecclesiastical laws. "Go gently!" was his constant admonition to the magistrates. When in September, 1630, an appeal was made to the States-General by the violent Contra-remonstrants, their cause seemed lost. Of the seven provinces, Friesland and Gelderland alone favoured prompt execution of the edicts, and by the influence of the prince and of Holland the appeal was buried without debate.

With the beginning of 1631 it may be said that an end came to agitation about ecclesiastical affairs. Pamphlets

¹ Wagenaar, xi., p. 86.

to promote the revival of the edicts. For the Remonstrants proved advantageous to others such as the Mennonites and Lutherans. Heretics of Arminius they had suffered with them they now enjoyed greater favour was due to the prince, to fear of ecclesiastical domination, to the cause of the Remonstrants, to the moderate disposition of the population. The preachers still imprisoned at Loevesburg escaped, removing this memory of the year 1618. Many exiles, with the connivance of the authorities, returned to their fatherland.

De Groot and Uytenbogaert had obtained a privilege. Ten years De Groot had spent in a castle near Senlis, studying and writing. In straitened circumstances upon his French travels were produced some of the works, with which he was distinguished in science, and there he brought out new editions of his earlier writings. Before Maurice's death had succeeded in getting back the half of her property coming to her. During a time she saw signs of a better future, and flattered her husband with the possibility of returning to the Netherlands of restoration to honour and office, when Henry should be at the head of affairs. After Maurice's death about to happen. After Maurice's death his brothers in the Netherlands

able *Justification* learned this to his sorrow. Episcopius and Uyttenbogaert ventured in 1626, Grevinchoven in the following year, to return secretly to Rotterdam, still the chief seat of the Remonstrants. At first they had to hide from their enemies, but circumstances improved a few years later. The exiles showed themselves in public, preached to their fellow-believers, wrote pamphlets, and led in the struggle for freedom of conscience. Their work was the organisation of the seminary for Remonstrant preachers, which was finally established at Amsterdam in 1634. Episcopius became its first professor.

For De Groot there was no place in his fatherland so long as he proudly demanded to be rehabilitated in honour and in his office of pensionary. At last he determined to go openly to Holland, whence his wife had brought him encouraging reports. In the autumn of 1631 he arrived at Rotterdam far from secretly, making indeed some display. This indiscreet attitude had evil consequences. His enemies bestirred themselves, his friends supported him only lukewarmly, and the majority in the States offered a reward of 2000 guilders for his arrest. He concealed himself at Amsterdam, but steadfastly refused to sue for pardon, "neither the half, nor the fourth, nor the eighth part of a pardon; he wanted to forgive those who had done him harm." Whatever Hooft, Vossius, and other friends said or did, he declined it all, and in April of 1632 he angrily quitted his country, migrating now to Hamburg. Two years later Oxenstierna, chancellor of Sweden, took him into Swedish service. While Episcopius quietly devoted his last years to study, while Uyttenbogaert looked after the interests of his church at The Hague until his death in 1644, De Groot as Swedish ambassador at Paris spent ten years full of honours and political business, a life not suited to his nature, and ending with an undesired honourable discharge. His demise at Rostock, in 1645, during a journey from Sweden, has caused discus-

never forget his fatherland, that he
one of her most talented sons, when the
wicked dissensions ruining his life had gr

Amid turmoil and rumours of war the ma
of the population in all the provinces had in
The two companies, pillars of Dutch con
and west, were uncommonly flourishing.
with the English for supremacy in East In
victory had been won under the strong gu
who in 1627 again took over the post of g
from his weaker substitute De Carpentier
formed in 1619 between the English and I
dia Companies had given rise to so much
question," as "with a shrewish woman,"¹
ties regarded its disruption as a relief. Th
soon settled and doing business on their se
in Bantam, and they removed their offices
where Coen made all trade impossible f
operation with the English company was a

De Carpentier had prudently managed
Ambon affair, had organised education, finan
and had endeavoured to settle the difficu
native princes. Relations became so stra
kingdom of Mataram that an attack upo
expected. Before a year Coen had to o
Javanese fleet, soon supported by forces on

general, statesman, and merchant ever known in the Indies died unexpectedly from an intestinal malady (September 21). The council of India chose for his successor Jacques Specx, and he repulsed the enemy again. Thus the position of the Netherlanders in Java was permanently settled, and when in 1632 Hendrik Brouwer was sent out as a new governor-general, under whom the excellent director-general Anthony van Diemen was to manage affairs, attention could be devoted to the improvement of the government. Much needed to be improved. A large number of "useless servants" did the company more hurt than good and sought in every way to make their fortunes. The officials were more assiduous for their personal profit than for that of the company, and the chambers in the fatherland were much to blame for this, because they sent out all sorts of people to India, either to get rid of them or to give them a chance to acquire wealth. The connection between the different offices left considerable to be desired. Brouwer's instructions directed him to look after these matters, but the company's niggardliness in the payment of its officials, the eagerness to receive the richest possible returns with the least possible outlay, and the pressure of *patria* upon the Indian government impeded the reform of the administration.

The dividends paid to the stockholders were extraordinary, and one readily understands that complaints of too low dividends ceased after 1625, when it is considered that in that year 20% was paid, in the following 12½%, in 1628 double, in 1630 17½%, in 1632 as the normal dividend for the future 12½%, the latter figure being generally exceeded in the following years, and sometimes doubled.¹ The shares stood far above 300 per cent. and were speculated in at Amsterdam. Great wealth was thus accumulated in Holland and Zeeland. The prize money also, the

¹ See list of dividends in Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick*, *Beil.* vi.

... 40 large East
... thousands of sailors an
...
... important were the resu
... East India Company, could bo
... Its first fleets sailed und
... 1603 towards South Americ
... ships with 500 cannon, 1600 s
... achieved a great success in the
... Salvador in Brazil, the seat of the
... where the vice-admiral, Pieter
... tinguished himself uncommonly
... went out annually and brought
... of the Spanish and Portuguese
... African and American coasts and
... in the harbours of the fatherland
... fleets. In two years 80 ships wit
... 9000 soldiers and sailors were sent
... Bahia was conquered again in 1
... guese armada, and the fleets sail
... following year did not succeed i
... gaining permanent possession of
... Pernambuco and Porto Rico were
... many a richly laden galleon was t
... woods were thus brought to the fa
... tities. In 1627 alone 55 large a
... captured from the enemy, and in th
... squadrons steered toward the west

pecially destined to intercept the "silver fleet," sailing every year from Cuba to Spain. This had long been the dream of many a mariner, excited by tales of the fabulous wealth conveyed by the galleons from the Spanish possessions of America and Asia. Piet Heyn had 31 ships with 700 cannon and nearly 4000 soldiers and sailors. Cruising along the northern coast of Cuba he met on September 8th the coveted fleet, consisting of 15 large vessels, of which a part was immediately seized by his shallows while another part, fleeing into the bay of Matanzas, fell into his hands with slight loss. Fabulous indeed were the captured treasures of silver, gold, pearls, indigo, sugar, Campeachy wood, and costly furs, which sold in the Netherlands for no less than fifteen million guilders. The rejoicing over the news was boundless, and Heyn himself showed some vexation at the excessive praises bestowed upon him for this easy victory, after his previous and more important exploits had been greeted with much less enthusiasm. But the capture of the "silver fleet" is what keeps his name alive with posterity. The company was enabled by this rich booty to distribute to its stockholders the unprecedented dividend of fifty per cent., double what it had ever before paid. Brazil was not forgotten, and in 1630 Admiral Loncq succeeded in conquering Olinda and the Recife of Pernambuco, the former being evacuated after a defeat.

The settlement on the Hudson River in North America, taken over from some merchants by the company, began to yield considerable profits, especially by its trade in timber, beaver and otter skins, which in 1630 brought in over 68,000 guilders,¹ not a very important figure in itself but growing in significance when it is remembered how small an amount of money had to be invested in the wilderness. The management of the colony of New Netherland by the

¹ De Laet, *Kort verhaal van de diensten en nuttigheden, etc.*, p. 26; Van Rees, *Staatshuishoudkunde*, ii., p. 332.

...with the purpose to trade in their
...the... supervision of the c
...to... to... themse
...Small trading colonies were estab
...on the "wild coast" of Guinea, first i
...the Wiapoco and the Berbice.¹ T
...coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone
...little factories and a fort.

The chief concern of the company
be taken from the enemy by priva
ditions. Colonisation stood quite in
neither stockholders nor directors sa
profit in it as in privateering or milita
the enemy. This immediate profit wa
depends without the formation of a
financial management had fatal cor
the company was struggling with a la
it had to resort to loans, while aid from
more of promises than of actual pay
company had advanced large sums to
the difficult situation of 1629. Not
the dividends and great expeditions
riched many in the country.

Less considerable were the profi
Company. At first the prices secur
brought "golden days" to the sh

opped. The whale fishery was a lottery. In the failure of this company was to be expected. The student of conditions in the Netherlands about 1630 would give attention not so much to the gains of the great companies as to the progress of commerce and industry in general. The chief source of prosperity lay in the activity prevailing everywhere, in the rich returns from commerce which made of the Netherlanders the merchantmen for all Europe. It was calculated that the navigation on the Baltic, on the Mediterranean Sea, and the great fishery, each in itself, brought several times more profit than the commerce of the East Indies. The competition of neighbours, of France, England, and Hamburg, was already felt, but fortunately the trade was kept. This carrying trade in Dutch ships went on even between foreign ports. An effort was made to have the United Netherlands become more and more a "free warehouse" for goods imported from abroad and to be sold abroad, a sort of "canal" for the transportation of merchandise. So it was necessary to have the burdens upon commerce as light as possible. There was always fear of the rivalry of Antwerp or the Flemish cities, which carried on a trade by land with northern France, of such neutral places as Hamburg and Bremen, which profited by the exclusion of the Dutch from Spain and Portugal and traded also with Calais, Rouen, and Muscovy. Freedom of trade was the watchword of most Dutch merchants, and they opposed the formation of monopolistic companies for commerce with Muscovy, Africa, Australia, and the Levant.

It is almost impracticable to give reliable statistics of the Netherlandish commerce of those days. We are restricted to general accounts of the prosperity of commercial cities and merchants by contemporaries, sometimes guilty of exaggeration. These testimonies, unanimous from native and foreigner, friend and foe, leave no doubt that the last years of the long war mark the highest point in the development

ing the walls of the cities with
prosperity.

Much depended upon the
safety of the sea was a quest
merce and the fishery, and this
by the sea-power of the Nether
between other countries when
traded, between France and En
during their war from 1627 to 16
and Denmark, watching one an
ousy. Difficulties with England
concerning the search of Dut
furnished all sorts of grievan
and foreign dangers prevented th
these years from asserting its old
*Maris.*¹

The greatest damage was inflic
kirk. After the end of the Truce
peared in the North Sea with
supported by Spinola. War ships
out in the Flemish ports, while the
protected by Fort Mardijk and a
sade in the sea.² The idea speed
kirk a centre of commerce as well
"twelve apostles," as the twelve
out there were called. had to fo

Frederick Henry's Beginning 41

Company of Commerce there in October, 1624, with twenty-four ships was to revive the trade in the "obedient provinces" of the Netherlands from the Spanish ports, while in 1625 all intercourse between these provinces and the "rebels" was prohibited. The States took measures to protect commerce and fishery by war ships and privateers, and merchantmen faring to the Mediterranean were commanded to go only in regular fleets of from thirty to forty sail.

In the following years both sides fought bravely on the sea, and their hostility was embittered by the custom of "foot-washing," the barbarous cruelty of throwing overboard the beaten enemy without any form of trial. The names of Mooi Lambert and Houtebeen, Swartenhondt and Alteras, Joost de Moor, and Marinus de Hollare are enrolled in the history of the contest against the men of Dunkirk and the Spaniards in these years of the apprenticeship of Tromp, Van Galen, De Ruyter, Jan and Cornelis Evertsen, and many another hero of the sea, who acquired in this fierce piratical war the seamanship, with which they later astonished the world. The fast ships of Dunkirk robbed the richly laden merchantmen, plundered and murdered the fishermen on the Scottish coasts, and sailed into the rivers for booty. Their spoils were ten times as great as those of the Zealanders and Hollanders. Even war ships were captured by them, hundreds of ordinary merchant vessels fell into their hands, and Enkhuizen lost a hundred fishing boats in one year.

The reason of such unfavourable results for the States lay in the speed of the Dunkirk "frigates" and in the much greater number of Dutch merchantmen. It was not to be denied also that the management of naval affairs was far less vigorous with the States than with the enemy. Another cause of the decline of the Dutch seapower was the heavy expenses of the war by land, to which more attention was given in Frederick Henry's first

... the standard of the captain
... in the service of the West
... lieutenant-admiral of 1
... on the right course.
... the Dutch fleet began at once
... improvements. The "Delfshave
... unfortunately did not long rule
... months after his promotion he pe
... with Dunkirk ships on the Flemis
... mariner, whose reforms laid the fo
... sea-power of the States, was enton
... Rotterdam. His death was a seve
... land, and in that same year the D
... sixty ships.

All sorts of plans were formed fo
... strength. In 1631 Amsterdam, Hoo
... Medemblik, and Harlingen propose
... tecting the Baltic commerce. The r
... on the sea by means of a private fl
... ered in 1629. Some Amsterdam m
... a great insurance company which w
... sixty war ships for the protection o
... merchantmen having to pay a certai
... This ingenious plan was never carr
... merchants objected to the tax it
... commerce. The cities mentioned .

of the fleet, the prince's power as admiral-general was considerably extended. Though this all brought some improvement, the damage done by the Dunkirk privateers remained very great, and complaints continued of the insufficiency of the sea-power despite its brave deeds. Maassluis alone, from 1631 to 1637, mourned the loss of two hundred fishing vessels, and hundreds of fishermen and sailors met death in the North Sea or languished in Flemish prisons. Not a village by the sea but had to complain of heavy losses, and Dunkirk flourished by its millions in spoils. The long-dreaded attack of the Spanish-Dunkirk fleet on Zeeland, in September, 1631, when this province was assailed by a new armada of about one hundred ships and a large army, showed plainly how much the enemy's strength had increased. But Hollaré's brilliant victory over this fleet proved that Zeeland's water-wolves were still able to defend their inheritance against a superior force. A satisfactory regulation of naval matters could not, however, be indefinitely postponed.

Military affairs during these years were in a much better condition. That Prince Frederick Henry saw his first duty in carrying on the war by land was not surprising in his brother's pupil amid the great dangers still threatening the United Netherlands from the Spanish side. People living forty years later experienced what neglect of defence on land meant. Spinola at first had charge of matters in the south, but at the end of 1627 he was recalled to Spain on account of the loss of Grol, as was thought, and he served the Spanish cause afterwards in the war against France in Italy, where in 1630 after the unsuccessful siege of Casale he died insane. The great general's departure caused uneasiness in the southern provinces, because no one could fill his place there, neither the brave but frivolous Count Henry van den Bergh, his successor in the army, nor the unskilful cardinal-diplomat, Alfonso de la Cueva, marquis de Bedmar, Spanish ambassador at the Brussels court,

army at sea, which consist
Spaniards. The able Pieter Ro
privy council of Brussels, now
erlandish affairs at Madrid, for
rule of governing the Netherlan
was quite ready to help carry ou
Spanish administration aroused d
lands, and the unpopular Bedmar
the Marquis d' Aytona, an abler m
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which in Granvelle's time had been
of the uprising, might again make
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the malcontents and, while appear
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nation was shown to help the mor
not act more energetically for the
lands. The insignificant attacks up
South Beveland in 1628 could s

oubtedly due to the prevailing want of money.¹ In the spring of 1629 Frederick Henry collected a large force for an assault on Bois-le-Duc. This important fortress, strong by its situation amidst marshes, had, besides about 5000 citizens, a garrison of 3000 foot soldiers and some hundreds of horsemen under the lord of Grobbendonck, while the Spanish army under Van den Bergh was stationed near Wesel and threatened Gelderland. The prince's army was equal to the task. No less than 24,000 infantry under Ernest Casimir, Wolfert van Brederode, the two Veres, the count of Châtillon, Coligny's grandson, and others, and 4000 cavalry under Stakenbroek and the young duke of Bouillon, brother of the later famous Turenne, were gathered in April upon the heath of Mook and started before the end of the month for Bois-le-Duc.² Hundreds of peasants aided the soldiers in quickly throwing up intrenchments. These were about all the troops at the prince's disposal, and the eastern frontier lay open to the enemy's attack. The money and supplies required by so large a force could only be procured with great difficulty, and Holland was above all importuned for advances.

Soon it was reported that preparations must be made against an attack by the enemy. The prince raised 6000 mercenaries in Holland, who with a few thousand newly arrived Scotchmen and what could be recruited or spared from before Bois-le-Duc formed an army of observation numbering perhaps 20,000 men. The enemy made desperate efforts to take the field, but week after week went by, while the prince remained before Bois-le-Duc, drawing off the rivers, the Dommel and the Aa, into new channels, constructing great works of attack and defence, and ever approaching nearer to the beleaguered city. By the end of June Van den Bergh with 30,000 men and over 6000 cavalry endeavoured without success to relieve the place. His

¹ *Mémoires de Frédéric-Henri* (Amsterdam, 1733), p. 50.

² De Bordes, *De verdediging van Nederland in 1629* (Utrecht, 1856).

forces, hoping by a vigorous defence to prevent the fall of the city.

The prince had to detach several regiments to the borderland. First Count William of Nassau sent with some thousands of men to the defence of Naarden, then Count Van Styrum to the defence of Lingen, Caïro, crossed the Yssel, and Westervoort after repelling the attack of the Englishmen. Van Styrum's defence failed completely in consequence of the want of provisions.

A panic was caused by this failure, and Van Styrum's troops to reinforce the defence of Amersfoort. Treason was committed at Amersfoort. But the prince and the States General were not alarmed. The former remained undisturbed at the Hague, the latter would not hear of giving up the city. Provisions were taken from Denmark, and English and Scotch battalions were sent to the defence of Amersfoort, and troops were borrowed from the West India Company, and militia were sent from Holland. The defence of Utrecht. Soon Count Nassau moved to Arnhem at the head of over 20,000 men. The defence of the endangered city was entrusted to the prince and the States General.

Gelderland fled from country to town; many families departed from the towns to Holland; some villages were burned by the Spaniards; others offered the enemy substantial contributions. The days of Parma seemed to be returned.

In length, early in August, came from the Rhine the expected imperial army, over 14,000 infantry and about 10,000 cavalry, under Count Montecuculi; later 10,000 more under Count John of Nassau.¹ Van den Bergh moved over the Veluwe towards Amersfoort, a weak town with a weak government, and so poorly garrisoned that it could not or would not offer a long resistance. The Estates of Utrecht, like those of Gelderland intent upon their own salvation, now began to waver. Then the States-General, with the council of state, moved their sittings to the post of danger and settled down at Utrecht on August 15th. But the prince did not stir from Bois-le-Duc, even when Amersfoort surrendered on the 14th, after being surrounded for one day, which led to the arrest of the commander and two burgomasters of the town. By its brave attitude the town of Hattem warded off an attack of the enemy.

Almost all Utrecht was inundated, and it resembled a lake, where "salt and fresh waves foam and dash over cattle and stable"; the smaller towns were provided with earthworks; all the troops obtainable were dispatched to threatened points. Not for an instant did the States-General and the Estates of Holland lose heart. It was otherwise in the now endangered Utrecht, where Johan Wolfert van Brederode had command. The panic there was not to be calmed; people took to flight, concealed or sent away their money and valuables; and the measures

¹ This was a grandson of Count John, Prince William's brother. He had formerly been in the service of the States, but, fancying himself wronged, he had become a Catholic on his marriage with a princess of Ligne and entered the emperor's service. Later he joined the Spanish army. John Maurice (the Brazilian) was his brother.

... the behaviour of s
anxiety. And to all was to be
of money. Things looked wo
with friendly letters sought to
some towns of Gelderland and
cuculi awakened terror everywh

Suddenly came the rescue.
rich, Otto van Gent, lord of Die
eye upon Wesel, the important
Rhine, supporting the enemy's
communications with Brabant,
supplies. On August 19th Van G.
Ernest's troops and with the help
succeeded in surprising it, an ev
sinking spirits of many and greatly
The chance that Holland would b
consent to negotiate now disapp
chance, with which Van den Bergh
had been very slight, for Hollan
resist to the last and, if needs b
province under water. The army b
furthermore relied upon, since in ca
then was the siege to be raised—it c
the enemy. A few days later M
Amersfoort, and before the end of t
Van den Bergh behind the Yssel.
twelve to thirteen thousand men, :
bridge of boats over the Yssel at
the 1000

the best expedient for the southern provinces in the possibility of conquering the northern provinces or leading Spain to a real peace based upon the influence of the north. Relations had existed since 1608 between the States and the Brussels government concerning the exchange of prisoners, and the prince was free to use the services of the well-known Juffer van der Claes. Her going and coming excited suspicion in the spring of 1629. The fear was apparent that the prince might be induced by personal advantages to work for a truce. Offers were then actually made of a truce for twenty-four years. They were repeated in September by Van Marquette, who was negotiating for the exchange of Rozendaal on behalf of the infanta. The States-General resolved to hold these offers until the fall of Bois-le-Duc should be decided.

Cautiously but with increasing success the prince had continued the arduous work of the siege, by means of water mills draining the marshy ground for his trenches and dikes. When the moat of the city was at length reached and a great breach had been made in the wall by the explosion of the mines laid by the prince, Grobbenonck began to negotiate. At this joyful news the States-General moved from Utrecht to Bommel and from there to the camp at Vucht in order to deliberate with the prince about the terms of the capitulation which was signed September 14th. Stipulations favourable to the enemy were due to the prince, who sought to temper the zeal of the Calvinists, and thus gave another proof of his moderation in ecclesiastical matters, even with regard to the Catholics.

The fall of Bois-le-Duc and the surprise of Wesel, celebrated in a day of thanksgiving appointed by the States-General, gave a breathing time after the anxiety of the summer. Further military preparations were discontinued, and only a watch was kept on the enemy in the

inquiry of the States as to
determined to get the opinion
matter, and to do something more.
In October, John of Nassau, fed
by Ernest Casimir, withdrew to

The danger was now over, and
was broken up before the end of
well deserved were the honour
and his cousin, the leaders of the
received on November 3d at The
chariot of victory." But the States
of Holland, and a considerable part
had helped to save the country
the greatest dangers, and the price
this.' The rejoicing was universal.
"Here is, here is the war's end,"
completed the work."

This year's trials made it impossible
field during the next year. The
little, and the only fact of importance
of Count John of Nassau in a
Negotiations for peace resulted in
ful West India Company desired
from the spoils of the enemy; And
and the northern provinces and
inclination to

The **ships** were raised again, and although the prince was **not** favourable to the affair¹ and thus incurred much **opposition**, it became manifest that the States did not **wish** to consider it. A treaty of exchange was concluded **in** April, 1630, but the talk of a truce ceased. War **was** more to decide, and the prince insisted that it **should** be vigorously and offensively waged. He re- **turned** true to his old principles: a lasting peace, if **necessary** a long truce, or otherwise war for the destruc- **tion** of the enemy, if possible with the help of France, **which** seemed ready to join the States in the contest **against** the Hapsburg monarchies.

For 1631 the States planned something great: the con- **quest** of Dunkirk, an undertaking similar to that of **Maurice** in 1600. Frederick Henry was aware of the **difficulties** of such an expedition, but resolved to venture **upon** it. The army was brought together at Emmerich **from** the eastern garrisons, and 10,000 infantry and 3000 **cavalry** took ship for IJzendijke, whence they moved **towards** Ghent and Bruges. The approach of a Spanish **army** so alarmed the deputies of the States-General, who **were** with the prince, that they represented to him how **dangerous** a farther advance would be, and begged him **to** give up the expedition, which he reluctantly did. The **army** returned to Brabant.

Scarcely had it arrived there when rumours became rife **of** great preparations of the enemy at Antwerp. A fleet **was** gathering for an attack upon Zealand, which had **no** enemy within its borders for more than half a **century**. Some twelve or fifteen war ships were hastily **collected** in Zealand's waters, but they had to retreat when **the** hostile *armada* finally appeared, September 8th. Great **were** the expectations of the Spaniards and Netherlanders **from** the south from this last effort. There were 35 large **ships** and about 50 smaller ones, all armed and carrying **Wagenaar**, xi., p. 111; Aitzema, i., p. 899; *Res. Holl.*, Dec. 11, 1629.

... of assailing Briel. The
aground, just as the fleet of Ze
Hollare, came upon the scene v
evening of September 12th, re
soldiers sent out from Bergen o
naval battle followed on the Sla
night by the light of the moon
came up—another romantic p
Zealand. The enemy was total
mostly destroyed or run ashor
men perished miserably in the
prisoners, including many office
entire fleet of transports were c
last time that Spanish troops ap
provinces.

The general state of affairs in
changed to the advantage of th
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
Denmark in Germany and landed
1630. Brilliantly led by their
advanced ever farther into Ge
imperial army at Leipsic, and pr
Palatinate and Bavaria. The king
cherished hope of his restoration
the Palatinate, and in the spring of
to the Swedish camp with a out

agreed, in the summer of 1630, to a new treaty of subsidy, promising one million livres annually, provided the States, within seven years, would conclude no peace or truce with Spain without asking the advice of the king, quite different from the requirement of his consent as a condition. The States could not depend so much upon England as upon the closer relations with France. Even the failure of Richelieu's secret attempts to bring the principality of Orange under French influence by bribing the prince's governor there, the lord of Valkenburg, who was killed on the occasion of his forcible displacement by Johan de Knuyt, the prince's councillor,—even this very doubtful attitude of the French government could not disturb the joint opposition to Spain. Together France and the States supported the Swedish king with subsidies. The interests of both were directed against the Spanish Netherlands, whence Richelieu's numerous foes thwarted his plans at court, and where his greatest enemy, the queen-mother, Marie de Médicis, had found a refuge. In 1631 there was much consultation between the French ambassador Beaugy, the prince, and the States-General.

The condition of the Spanish provinces was especially favourable to united action there. The loss of Bois-le-Duc had augmented the misery in the south, and the longing for a cessation of hostilities was ardent after the defeat on the Slaak. In December, 1631, the artist Rubens visited The Hague on a secret mission from the infanta without success. Discontent in the south waxed greater, particularly among the nobility, angered by the Spanish influence, by the preference shown the government's favourites, by the appointment of the marquis de Santa Cruz as commander of the army instead of Count Henry van den Bergh. About the latter were grouped many noblemen: the princes of Espinoy and Barbançon, the duke of Bournonville, the count of Egmont, and others.

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a Catholic republic, corres
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Richelieu was interested
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England, and he did not wan
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when he heard that Gerbier
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In February, 1632, one of
René de Renesse, count of
president of the council of finan
for money, and now sought t
treason, went to Bokhoven ne
visited his friend, Count Henry v
Afterwards he sojourned at Rys
panied perhaps by others, some sa
self. These mysterious journa

conspirators as the signal for insurrection. Warfusée negotiated at Ryswick and The Hague with the prince, the council pensionary Pauw, and the French ambassador Beaugy. The plan was for Frederick Henry from the north and a French army from the south to make a simultaneous attack. Operating with the nobles, the Spaniards were to be driven out, and the country was to be divided. The two noblemen and their friends were to be rewarded with money, estates, and offices. Richelieu was hardly prepared to proceed so far. The States-General and the prince were more eager to engage in the enterprise. They made their army ready to march in the spring, ostensibly directing it against Antwerp, and sent the council pensionary with 100,000 guilders for each of the two counts to Venloo, where he delivered the money to them. Everything had been done so secretly that the Brussels government had no suspicions. The chance of conquering the southern provinces seemed better than ever before.

At the end of May the prince assembled his army at Nimwegen,¹ from where he moved on June 1st along the Meuse towards Venloo with over 20,000 men, while his cousin, Count William of Nassau, with a small division descended the Meuse and fell upon Flanders, capturing some forts near Antwerp. A manifesto of the States-General called upon the people of the south to expel the Spaniards, promising help and maintenance of privileges and of the old religion. Venloo, deserted by Bergh on the prince's approach, capitulated on these conditions after two days. The vanguard under Count Ernest Casimir pushed on to Roermond which surrendered on the 6th. The loss of Ernest Casimir was here mourned,

¹See concerning the campaign: De Boer, *Het verraad van Hendrik van den Bergh en de veldtocht langs de Maas*, in *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, xiii., pp. 17, 88, 145; De Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden*, p. 21.

to revolt against Spain. The
out an army, their troops havi
against Gustavus Adolphus, re
of affairs. There was yet time
ments into Maestricht.

Little or nothing came of
southern provinces. Aerschot
and the others dared do nothing
the conspirators, including Egm
to France. The people were qu
excitement prevailed here and th
were uttered. Nothing was hear
rebellion of the French nobles a
supported by Spanish money and
Richelieu have his hands full. Th
the upper Rhine to the Netherla
administration preserved order, th
ing according to circumstances, a
popularity.

Meanwhile the siege of Maestr
disappointment was felt also by
efforts of Bergh to gather an arm
failed, so that in fear of his life h
July and withdrew to Aix-la-Cl
found no support, whereupon he
search of troops. but 12

the beleaguered fortress, which valiantly defended itself. Frederick Henry renewed before Maestricht the works by which he had captured Bois-le-Duc. The labyrinth of earthen ramparts, lines and sconces, redoubts and moats, traverses and hornworks, approaches and galleries of mines in and about the prince's camp awakened the admiration of contemporaries. He succeeded in holding Santa Cruz on the left bank of the Meuse and thus in separating him from the approaching imperial army under the celebrated Pappenheim, which really excited great uneasiness in the Dutch camp, where there was fear of being cut off from the fatherland. The prince continued his works calmly, called back Count William from Flanders, and fortified himself. Early in August Pappenheim reached the neighbourhood of Maestricht and soon joined Santa Cruz, so that the enemy had 40,000 men, and on the 18th made an attack in force, aided by a sortie of the garrison from Maestricht. Both combats resulted in favour of the Dutch, though they suffered severe losses, Robert de Vere, earl of Oxford, being among the killed. Two days later the prince had the city stormed through the breach made by his mines. Attack followed attack, but the brave garrison held its own and repulsed the Dutch. The citizens, afraid of being conquered and plundered by storm, now insisted upon surrender, so the governor, De Lede, consented on the 22d to a capitulation. Honourable withdrawal for the garrison, freedom for the Catholic religion, and retention of ecclesiastical property by the possessors, were the principal conditions. Some days later Pappenheim with his army returned to Cologne, Santa Cruz with his to Brabant. The Dutch army remained for a time in and near Maestricht, smaller forts and castles being captured without much trouble, and the neighbouring rich coal-mines being seized by the prince for the States-General.

... the panic was
listened to Aerschot's counsels and
most heroic remedy. Early in Se
General assembled at Brussels amic
caused by the loss of Maestricht.

All sorts of efforts were in the
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into new negotiations for a treat
Gerbier had come to Liege and Mae:
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peace. These negotiations seemed
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ready to renew the Truce upon the b
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States, which would have the Flemish
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against Spain.

So far the people of the south were
fear of the army at Maestricht, althoug
were decomp

At the end of September the prince communicated in writing to the States-General at The Hague the terms discussed with the southern gentlemen. The matter was referred to the provincial Estates of the north, and thus several precious weeks were lost, while later in the general deliberation there was opposition encountered from Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen, and from the preachers and merchants who had disapproved also of the Truce in 1609. The prince waxed impatient, because peace could no longer be compelled under terror of arms, now that his army had suffered much from sickness and was growing weaker. The southern deputies urged patience upon him and concessions upon the infants. They declared to the latter that peace was necessary at any price and entreated her to yield to the demands of the northerners. Finally came the report that the general body by a majority of votes had determined to take up the negotiations, but it was desired to conduct them not at Maestricht but in The Hague.

This decision displeased the prince, who was continually incited by the noble conspirators to risk an invasion on his own authority. It was obviously due to the antagonism of the war party, backed up by the French and Swedish ambassadors, and partly perhaps to bribery. The opportunity for an invasion of Brabant was lost by all this postponement, and early in November the prince marched northwards with his army, capturing Orsoy on the way. November 24th he reached the Binnenhof, greeted on his victorious return with great marks of respect and rejoicing, with ringing of bells and booming of cannon—a well-deserved honour after the brilliant campaign.

CHAPT

THE PRINCE AT THE H

THE glorious victories of
greatest influence upon
and upon his authority in af
Frederick Henry, decorated w.
of the conquered fortresses, oc
United Netherlands the place o
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Maurice's last years. His son
received in 1630 the honorary a
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the post years before his stadth
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William, the right of successi
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"His Excellency," already of
Highness" and entitled by the S
Prince," had for a New Year's p
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same, and in 1639 they fixed officially their own designation—"High Mightinesses," previously in use. The title of "Noble and Mighty Lords" was reserved for the council of state and the provincial Estates; inferior titles were devised for other governing boards. The nobility of Holland offered the prince the dignity of "First Nobleman," the presidency of their body, which gave him great influence in the States, where he had a seat since 1612 as lord of Naaldwijk, hereditary marshal of Holland, and where he won further consideration by the purchase of the lordship of's Gravenzande. The same year, in which the prince began wearing his title of Highness, Prince William, aged eleven, was solemnly named for captain and admiral-general in case of his father's death, and shortly afterwards the young prince was granted a seat in the council of state.

With all these honours the princely house of Orange rose high above all other families in the state, above also their Nassau relatives in Friesland. Count Ernest Casimir had obtained the survivance there for his son, Henry Casimir, who succeeded him at his death before Roermond. Groningen and Drenthe also elected the young Nassau count their stadtholder, evidently in order "to divide the authority somewhat." In both provinces Count Henry had to accept restrictions, because Frederick Henry's attitude showed his willingness to receive the stadtholderships of his cousin even under limitations. When Count Henry Casimir died in 1640, the prince again did his best to secure the succession to these stadtholderships. The rapidity, with which Count William Frederick of Nassau, younger brother of the deceased, went to work in Friesland, rescued this stadtholdership at least for the Frisian branch. In Groningen and Drenthe the prince succeeded better, and after some discussion the succession here was given to the young prince. William Frederick and his people were greatly displeased, and the

... marriage was arranged
the oldest daughter of the
Médicis, mother of the Eng
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Shortly afterwards the young
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A proposed marriage of the
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was already related to the Orange family. This house of Orange, springing from a German countship, now ranked with the electoral families; the English marriage gave it even higher claims; and the splendour of the state, at whose head it stood, placed it with the most powerful princely houses of Europe. The taste displayed in adorning the princely palaces at the Binnenhof and elsewhere enhanced the brilliancy of the prince's environment. The literary taste there was of a lower standard. None of the geniuses of the time saw themselves particularly distinguished at court, although Frederick Henry was pleased to have literary men do him honour. The sometimes witty, always clever verses, with which the prince's secretary, Constantijn Huygens, amused the court, and the erotic, moralising effusions of the council pensionary Cats, which found access there, were unquestionably not the noblest Dutch poetry of those days.

The princely court of The Hague was, about 1640, one of the most brilliant in Europe, a school for courtiers and young princes, as the army of the States had been from the commencement of the century a school for generals and officers of high and low rank. German, French, English, Swedish, and Danish noblemen sent their sons here to learn what a nobleman ought to know. The number of officers frequenting the court *en équipage guerrier* was once estimated at no less than two thousand. Despite the etiquette maintained by Amalia of Solms, the tone amid such military surroundings was freer and rougher than at the French or English court. The soldatesque airs of the officers, the frivolity of the young nobles and aristocratic dames, the lavish display, the sumptuous banquets, gave to everything a dazzling but not always spotless splendour. Well known are the brilliant festivals, theatrical performances, concerts, masquerades, tournaments, balls, hunts, games, and

1642, when a magnificent
great hall of the Binnenhof
England. The church-court
prince to complain and to
by him with the observation
all honest recreations; the
banquets; that dancing was
against which there was no
The prince and his wife and
name unstained in the midst
same cannot be said of the y

The Hague had two other
prince. One was the court c
could be met Dutch respecta
with the broad ruff and th
gravely in public places," the
officials assembled around the
of the States. The other was
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formed a *cour des Grâces*, doir
science. But both these circled
the glory of the prince's surr

His power was constantly
war affairs the prince exercis
and admiral-general without
States-General. The deputie
panying him in the field were
C. 34

This was effected by making the council pensionary in charge of foreign affairs dependent upon him. The old and friendly Duyck and after him submissive and careless Jacob Cats were easily won. It was not so with the able and independent Adriaan Pauw, in whom some feared a new Oldenbarnevelt. So troublesome was he to the prince that the latter temporarily took him from his important post in 1634 by sending him in the embassy to France for the conclusion of a close alliance. Only after his resignation (March, 1636) could he return, when his successor, Jacob Cats, was fully established as council pensionary. Cats was a conscientious man, a not undeserving poet, a sober, practical, and moderate character, but not very independent; furthermore timid and far from disinterested, a willing tool in the hand of the prince, whom he greatly admired. A more dangerous intriguer was his son-in-law, Cornelis Musch, from 1628 successor of the elder Aerssens as clerk of the States-General and consequently one of the most influential statesmen in the United Provinces. He, too, was the prince's willing servant, and he was much attached to his office on account of the financial advantages it brought him. Musch was undoubtedly one of the most avaricious officials of the States at this time, when it was the custom to accept presents for favours. Opposition to him became general at the end of the prince's rule, as his actions drew attention too openly. The two other "ministers" of state, the treasurer-general, Johan van Goch, later Govert Brasser, and the secretary of the council of state, Maurits Huygens, brother of the prince's secretary, were known as faithful and able functionaries who would throw no serious obstacles in the prince's way.

Foreign affairs came still more into the prince's hands through the institution of the "Secret Work." After Oldenbarnevelt's death they were managed by Maurice in conjunction with influential members of the States-

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they practically acquiesced in hi
So he contented himself. like his

the form of government so long as the war lasted. When that was ended, it might seem desirable to make some alteration, if not in the position of the prince of Orange, at least in the mutual relations of the provinces politically and financially, and perhaps in their governments. In these years the prince and the States had to contend with many a domestic difficulty, like those of former days, the consequence of unsatisfactory relations between the various political powers. Financial troubles were numerous. The finances of Holland were in the best condition, for in 1632, after years of investigation, it had revised its antiquated land tax and adopted a new assessment proportioned to the rental of houses and lands. Now it could justly demand that the other provinces should do their duty, so that the receiver-general, Doubleth, on account of arrears, would not always be compelled to ask Holland for money, or to make the purveyors of the army and fortifications wait for their pay. Millions were appropriated annually from 1626 for the ordinary expenses of the war, but Holland alone duly met its obligations, paying most of the interest on the general debt as well as for the army. The other provinces could only be brought with great difficulty to tax their inhabitants as heavily as were those of Holland. They remained always slow in paying the sums agreed upon, so that the council of state more than once declared it saw no way of avoiding the total ruin of the finances and of the country but to decree "execution" of the recalcitrant provinces, either by arrest of the inhabitants, or by quartering of troops, because "extreme disorders and confusion can only be remedied by extreme and hard means."

The disputes between Groningen and the Ommelands were repeatedly submitted to the States-General, but no matter how fair their decision might be, both parties would not accept it. Gelderland was also menaced with differences between the quarters of the province concern-

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appeared sufficient to bring order. This action of the council of state, upon whose members the prince could rely, allowed him to do what he pleased, and was not agreeable to the States-General. The relation between the States-General and the council of state became somewhat strained at times. Holland, in 1643, insisted that the provinces should give sharper instructions to their representatives in the States-General. This was evidently directed against the prince, who managed usually to gain great influence over the gentlemen long resident at The Hague and active in various governing bodies. The prince opposed this move successfully in several provinces.

Restrictions proved of slight avail so long as the prince kept a vigorous hold upon the reins of government. As he grew older and became more of a sufferer from the gout superinduced by years of service in the field, his influence declined. About 1643 it was apparent that he was no longer as strong as formerly. Holland, under Pauw's lead, raised its proud head higher and struggled free from the grasp of the powerful stadtholder. Fearful of the rapidly approaching future, when the old prince should have passed away, and the young one should rule in his stead, it resolved upon measures for supporting the authority of the States against the tendency to monarchy. The movement of 1643 for fixing the instructions was a notable sign of the times. And this sign stood not alone. Holland, and in Holland Amsterdam, had long watched the dangerous increase of the prince's power and looked with suspicion upon every step that seemed to bring the state nearer to the dreaded monarchical government, which would deprive the States of authority and its advantages. Moreover, a monarchical government meant a foreign policy devoted not so much to the promotion of commerce as to dynastic interests and to the whims of princes; it was risking a repetition of what had caused

the supreme authority of
in the power he exercised
sea. He had long kept the
usually had at his disposal
nearly twice as large as the
Mercenaries were often en-
towns. The fortresses were
army in the field, notwith-
prince and the council of
fortunately not in a condition
the conquest of fortified places
United Provinces.

Vigorous measures were
affairs on the sea. Premiums
ships had contributed some-
commerce. The "new beggars"
fitted out chiefly at Flushing
were for some years the terror
The power so liberally bestowed
"cabinet" in maritime matters
expected effect. The prince's
condition" of the admiral and
tion depends on the lowest of
her husband's captivity. Hu-
men became victims of the Dutch
the barbarous custom

1634, but the merchants opposed it tooth and nail on account of the expense, and the project was postponed from year to year and given up in 1640. General dissatisfaction forced Admiral van Dorp and Vice-admiral Liefhebber to resign. The prince now determined to put no noblemen but experienced "tars" at the head of the fleet and appointed Marten Harpertzoon Tromp as lieutenant-admiral and Witte Corneliszoon de With as vice-admiral. Complaints, however, did not cease. Whenever Tromp took his fleet into port for repairs or provisions, thirty or forty Dunkirk ships appeared on the coasts of Holland and Zeeland. The prince and his deputies were constantly reminded of the sad state of affairs on the sea. Holland threatened to withhold its payments for troops, if maritime matters were not better managed. The great companies had to provide strong convoys, and the rates of marine insurance rose.

At last recourse was had again to the promise of premiums for privateers from a fund of 200,000 guilders a year. Private parties in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the small cities of North Holland and Zeeland undertook with a government subsidy to send out privateers, but they were too few to suppress altogether the pirates. Despite Tromp's alertness and bravery, displayed year after year on the Flemish coast and in the English Channel, many a ship fell into the hands of the men of Dunkirk, and many were the fights with the bold enemy. The new resources, with which the equipment of privateers was encouraged in 1645, made them increase in number, so that safety upon the sea could be attained to some extent. But the circumstance, that private enterprise accomplished what the fleet of the state could not do, caused serious complaints of the prince's conduct of naval affairs and corroborated the assertion that the war on the land was and remained the chief concern of the prince.

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greater, their presence was
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influential leaders of Holland.
advantage for Spain in the
house of Orange for the actual
Provinces, and Spain used
premaey in endeavouring to
conclude an acceptable treaty.
Under these circumstances th
able peace gradually dawned upon
evident exhaustion caused the
make efforts to bring

peace as advantageous as possible to both allies; or that which sought to use Spain's discouragement in winning it over to a separate peace, which in any case would secure the independence of the northern provinces, actually existing for a long time, with the possession of the conquests thus far made in Europe, Asia, and America.



CHAPTE

THE UNITED NETHER

TESTIMONY as to the c
Netherlands about 1640 i
and in the history of the Dutch
"the golden age." A petition o.
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flowing more abundantly both in
other parts of the world then know
voyages of Abel Tasman in 164
"South Land," as a newly discov
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Zealand, Van Diemen's Land, and
enterprises of this celebrated nativ
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the Dutch whalers penetrated t
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The chief purpose of th

discoveries to be held back, so that the finds in Australia remained for years the secret of the company. Commerce with Japan, established by Jacob Specx and François Caron and about 1634 successfully carried on at the factory of Hirado, was in 1641 confined by the disaffected Japanese to the small island of Deshima and surrounded with humiliating restrictions, but with the complete exclusion of the Portuguese, the last European competitors, the coveted monopoly of Japanese trade was secured for the East India Company. In 1635 the profit of this trade, silver being the chief article of export, amounted to over one million guilders,¹ but the year 1640 showed no profit. Commerce with China and Farther India also did not furnish the expected gains. The company settled down upon Formosa, where a Dutch colony was planted about 1640. This became an important point for trade with China in silk, lacquer work, precious metals, carpets, etc., just as Ceylon did for Indian wares. The latter large and rich island, still under Portuguese rule and so valuable for commerce with Hither India, received more attention under the governor-general, Anthony van Diemen. From 1636 the company's fleets often called there, and the Dutch factories increased in number, until two years later a small fleet commanded by the energetic Westerwolt with the co-operation of Rajah Singha, the ruler of Kandy, attacked the Portuguese and after a struggle of two years got possession of their principal settlements. The most consideration was bestowed upon the Indian Archipelago. After the short administration of Jacques Specx, arrived Hendrik Brouwer at Batavia in September, 1632, as governor-general of the company. Brouwer endeavoured to please the directors by reducing expenditures in India and by furnishing as rich a revenue as possible to the

¹See Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederl. Ostind. Kompagnie zu Japan* (Berlin, 1897), p. 226.

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company. The Netherlander
rulers of India.

Van Diemen, who desired, I
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commercial realm, and its splendour attracted all eyes, thanks to the two great governors who had resided there and established an impressive tradition of power. The circumstances of Van Diemen's rule were less favourable than those Coen had contended with, but he had vanquished them as fortunately. Batavia was better fortified and built, and with every year it resembled more a European city transported to the tropics. But the population, chiefly Javanese and Chinese, with some European officials and soldiers and a small number of freemen, was still of the same character. The freemen had come out for the sole purpose of making their fortune, to earn much money in a short time and then to return with their wealth to Europe. There was a lack of good European colonists, and so long as the condition of the motherland remained so flourishing, little improvement could be expected. No inclination to permanent emigration was shown in the United Netherlands. Free emigrants could not sustain the competition of the company and the Chinese. The slender pay of the officials did not better the European population in India, a mixture of rough and energetic or physically and morally degenerate elements, which could hardly inspire respect for the name of the Netherlanders, although it might make that name feared.

Rich revenues and large dividends with small expenditures in India and Europe—that was and continued to be the watchword of the directors. They could well be satisfied with Van Diemen in this respect. The anxiously awaited return of the richly freighted East Indiamen seldom occasioned disappointment in his days. He sent back millions. The dividends amounted generally to 25, in 1642 even to 50 per cent., the latter being paid with an eye to the approaching expiration, for the second time, of the company's charter. Prosperity was manifested by the rise of the shares to 500 per cent. It was desired to make

new salary and granted supervision of the administration every four years. In this the company paid 1½ m of the West India Company.

Far less favourable was the Company, which saw its position sharp contest with the Portuguese conquest of Olinda by Lourenço de Albuquerque on the sections of the Brazilian coast and Pernambuco as the chief money and trouble, especially Colonel Artachowsky, a Pole and the real founder of the Dutch Count John Maurice of Nassau many grandsons, and covered by commander, was appointed here in 1637 for five years.¹ He went with nearly 3000 men and 12 ships at the government upon a firm foundation. In all respects an excellent governor of St. George del Mina on the fortification of Curacao taken through the seizure of Angola and St. Thomas. Africa was to furnish negroes for Brazilian plantations.

progressed along with the extension of the company's authority, so that the governor ventured to undertake the siege of San Salvador, the Portuguese capital. By his advice free trade was allowed between Brazil and the United Netherlands, while the company kept its monopoly only for slaves, munitions of war, and Brazil wood. The intolerance of the Calvinistic ministers towards the Catholic and Jewish inhabitants of Portuguese descent excited among them great dissatisfaction with the Dutch rule. The company supported feebly the governor's plans, and the Portuguese strained every nerve to defend the last of their possessions. The failure of the siege of San Salvador, the dissensions between John Maurice and the Nineteen and between the governor and his lieutenant Artischowsky, the lax way in which the financially embarrassed company carried on the war against the enemy's large fleets, all made this new colony totter and finally fall. Bravely did the governor fight against fate. In January, 1640, his little fleet won a brilliant victory over twice as large an armada before the Rio Grande, and this was followed by another attack upon San Salvador.

Portugal's rising against Spain at the end of 1640 influenced greatly affairs in Brazil, but not in favour of the authority of the West India Company. The liberation of the motherland inspired the Brazilian Portuguese with hope. Negotiations with free Portugal led in June, 1641, to peace. A truce of ten years was agreed upon for the colonies, each party retaining the possessions then held by it, and in Europe joint war was to be waged against Spain. The company's stock dropped immediately from 128 to 114 per cent. and could not long be maintained at that height. Hostilities in Brazil between Portuguese and Dutch ceased for a time, but the uneasiness among the Portuguese population of territory possessed by the Dutch so increased that the 5000 men

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General assisted the company
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to rescue everything possible c
now reduced to Recife with
De With arrived before Recife
too late to recover what was l
suffered defeat after defeat. '
the Dutch flag would disappea

The company's lack of

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was not much better off. The trade there in salt, tobacco, cotton, sugar, and logwood afforded some profit, but this was of no more importance than that in New Netherland, where the number of colonists gradually increased, partly by immigration from neighbouring English colonies, but where the colony's development was impeded by outbreaks of war with the Indians. Success attended at first the introduction here of the patroon system (1629), providing an opportunity for wealthy patroons to improve some regions as fiefs of the company, but dissensions between the patroons and the company and Indian wars interfered with these enterprises.¹ The opening of free trade with New Netherland in 1639, which greatly promoted the settlement of emigrants there, and the succession in 1646 of the vigorous governor, Peter Stuyvesant, brought better times. There was slight profit from the African conquests, now that the company was losing Brazil and its slave-market. The decline of Spanish commerce with the Antilles almost put an end to the privateering which had been in former years the company's greatest source of revenue. So this commercial corporation could only prolong its existence with difficulty. The dividends and stock of the company dropped, the former to about 5 per cent., the latter to far below par—an eloquent proof of its decline, a sure omen of its fall.

The Northern Company was no more profitable than the West India Company. Convulsively it held fast to its monopoly of the whale fishery, and in 1633 secured its renewal for eight years to the end of 1642. But heavy expenses, the uncertainty of the catch, foreign and domestic competition, and disputes within the company itself did it great injury. The Estates of Holland

¹See O'Callaghan, *History of New Netherland* (New York, 1846); de Roever, *Kiliaan van Rensselaer en zijne kolonie Rensselaerswijk*, in *Oud-Holland*, viii., p. 32 et seq.

The Baltic trade was more
hundreds of Dutch ships
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Gabriel Marcelis, Elias Trip,
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exporters, bankers, and agent
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Sweden in the time of Gustavi
death in 1632, during the r
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that the Dutch were ready to show their teeth to the Danes. Negotiations at Copenhagen, The Hague, and elsewhere, a prominent part in them being taken by the representative of the States at Elsinore, Van Cracauw, could not end the threatening complications, when Sweden in 1644 entered upon the long-prepared war against Denmark.

The government of the States tried to mediate between the two powers, while Frederick Henry felt slight inclination for Sweden's sake to go to war with Denmark, whose king, Christian IV., was the relative and ally of Charles of England, young Prince William's father-in-law. In accordance with the treaty of 1640 Sweden desired the help of the States against the proud Dane, who on his side used all means to convince the States of the importance of a free passage through the Sound and consequently of a friendly attitude towards Denmark. The spring of 1644 was spent in negotiations. Not until July could the Baltic fleet of 700 vessels leave the Vlie under the protection of 40 war ships commanded by Admiral Witte de With. The merchants complained that the year was advancing, their cargoes were spoiling, and estimated their loss at 100,000 guilders a day, while now on account of the lateness of the season they could only make two voyages out and back. These figures show how important the Baltic trade was and how necessary to Dutch commerce was the restoration of peace in the north.

At first more sympathy towards Sweden was shown by the people of the Netherlands, who had long regarded the Danes as enemies. Both parties provided themselves in the Dutch ports with ships, troops, and munitions of war, the Danes with the help of Marcelis, the Swedes with the coöperation of De Geer and Trip, who sent out to the Danish coast a whole fleet of 30 ships manned by Dutch sailors under the Dutch admiral, Maarten Thijssen.

...celebrated. When
Linderoth had to evacuate Jutland
again out of the Vlie at the end
of the year, passed through the Sound
Danish fleet, united with the naval
under command of the Swedish admiral
victory over the Danes near the
Thiessen was raised to the Swedish
name of Anckarhjelm, entered the
and did much to reform the Swedish
fleet of the States under De Witt
ing in the Skager-Rack, while the
endeavouring to mediate in Sweden
Danes in their distress were ready to
but the Swedes demanded joint action
as provided by treaty, and threatened
the matter alone.

Now the commercial interests of Hol-
land came into conflict with Frederick He-
land saw a chance of doing away with
commerce from the Sound toll. The
ing by a new war in the north to
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ought his leading motive in alliance
Spain, Holland, and in Holland A

proposed to let the fleet cruise in the Sound only as a threat. The contest between the two views lasted in the provincial assemblies and in the States-General until the spring of 1645. Finally a sort of compromise was concluded, by which Holland promised to keep the engagements with France, while the prince no longer opposed a strong naval demonstration in the Baltic. On April 19, 1645, the States-General resolved in compliance with Sweden's request to send a fleet of 50 ships with 5,000 men to the Baltic "for the protection of commerce." Even in Holland actual war with Denmark was not desired, but it was hoped that this demonstration would force it to yield before the country was too deeply committed with Sweden.

At the head of the "armada" the fight-loving De With sailed in the middle of June, 1645, towards the Sound, escorting 300 merchantmen and intending, in case of war, to unite with the Swedish fleet against the Danes. The weaker Danish naval force at Copenhagen did not prevent his entrance into the Baltic, and amid the salutes of the rejoicing Swedes the entire fleet of 350 vessels sailed majestically in order of battle through the Sound, while there was no thought of paying toll, and the Danes looked on from their forts, armed to the teeth and enraged at this unprecedented violation of Danish rights, but not daring to attack the powerful enemy. On reaching the Baltic De With allowed the merchantmen to go their way. He remained in the Sound and cruised threateningly before Copenhagen, possessing "the keys" of the strait. Under his protection the Dutch ships sailed unmolested to and fro through the Sound during the whole season.

The aggressive but cautious action of De With and the Dutch envoys accomplished their purpose. Soon the Danes showed themselves ready to yield, and concluded on August 23d with the ambassadors of the States the

the Danish kingdom were no domestic wares; the passage to be obstructed; and Dutch to be taxed as if in Dutch shipdam and Holland was in 1 attained. That complete freedom not be secured was due to the fear of the growing pretervenality of some officials of the States induced by money to inform the far the Netherlands would go, Danes were accurately acquainted the ambassadors of the States.

Peace in the north was reBrömsebro concluded on the same Sweden and Denmark through emissaries of the States. Denmark large part of its Swedish possessions the States. It had to cede only and Oesel to its adversary, but remained Danish. The Swedish favourable result of the war to the vigorous aid, might have procured ally. It was not desired to make and there was satisfaction with keys of the Sound.

Denmark had been their enemy. De With did not return to the fatherland until the Baltic merchantmen had finished their voyages for the year. Thus he prevented all imposition of the toll to the vexation of the Danes, to whom he did not make his presence especially agreeable, annoying them by his sarcasm and referring in his letter of farewell to "the services" which he had rendered the Danes "in this season," although they had been "very uneasy over his sojourn." His tone showed what the United Netherlands might do in the Baltic and how their "steel blade" could dominate everything there. The commercial interests in the Baltic were out of danger, and the Dutch merchants could contemplate with pride the results obtained.

The Levant commerce about 1640 was less important than the "mother commerce" on the Baltic, but it was growing, thanks to the efforts of the able "orator" at the Turkish court, Cornelis Haga, who defended Dutch interests there with great talent during 28 years, until 1639. No ambassador stood in such high estimation with the Porte as Haga.¹ He procured all sorts of privileges in the east for Christians in general and for the Protestants in particular, and even persuaded the sultan to grant his Greek subjects a certain liberty of worship. The studies in the oriental languages of Erpenius, Golius, Warner, and others were favoured by the Turks. This good understanding between the States and Turkey was of more help to commerce than that with declining Venice which could not hold the Barbary pirates in check and paid badly the subsidies for the war against Spain stipulated by the treaty of 1619 with the States. There were relations with Morocco, and a Moroccan agent resided at The Hague. Occasionally negotiations took place with Algiers and Tunis, usually concerning the release of captured seamen and sometimes under the influence of

¹ Vreede, *Geschied. der ned. Diplomatie*, ii., 1., p. 401.

...individual merchants w
the formation by Amsterdam
Directors of the Levant comme
Mediterranean Sea," followed
other Dutch cities. Never was
equipped with a monopoly, fo
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Indies were really closed to it.
lowed the salaried directors to
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So the Levant commerce was not
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alone we are told that in 1627 fro
sailed regularly past Gibraltar. I
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important must have been the
endure such losses.

With this commerce extending
the carrying trade to neighbour
Scotland, France, Germany, Denm
being developed. In 1625 half of
Hamburg sailed to the Netherla
vessels in 1642 plying between H-

Bremen was established in 1647. The once important commerce with Spain and Portugal and the southern Netherlands gradually declined. The liberation of Portugal from 1641 allowed this country again to be included in the Dutch carrying trade. The river commerce along the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt, likewise transacted with licenses, brought great profits and employed hundreds of small vessels.

It is difficult to determine how much advantage the inhabitants derived from all this commerce, equipment and sailing of ships. Among the few figures extant those concerning the increase of revenue from the convoys and licenses attract our attention. In 1628 this revenue amounted to over $1\frac{1}{2}$, in 1642 to over $2\frac{1}{2}$ million guilders, while in Amsterdam alone the amount rose from 800,000 to 1,200,000 guilders.¹ As the convoys and licenses produced usually 2 per cent. of the value of the goods, this would bring the imports and exports around 1640 to about 100 millions, which assuredly is much too little. When we learn that at Hoorn in the winter of 1618 no less than 200 ships were lying in the harbour, mostly belonging to the town and employed only for foreign commerce, while 100 ships of Hoorn were wintering elsewhere, we do not wonder at hearing commerce praised as the chief source of prosperity in the Netherlands.

That industry was likewise flourishing needs no demonstration. The fisheries, however, experienced hard times on account of the depredations of the Dunkirk rovers in the North Sea. For weeks in succession the fishermen dared not leave the coasts of Holland and Zealand, or, if they did, they were exposed to severe losses, to imprisonment in the dungeons of Dunkirk, or to heavy ransoms. The herring and haberdine fishery, estimated to feed

¹Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtsch. Entwicklungsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1890), p. 12 et seq.

... from about 1580 in vario
the settlement of many exii
Flanders, Artois, Hainaut,
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linens of Haarlem temporari
Competition caused recourse
when goods were manufactur
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woollen, and linen industry wa
1640, though not yet carried o
vigorous development of industri
of population in the industrial
the pestilences that swept away
One of the most important sou
textile industry of these days is
all the Dutch "cloth-drapers,"
business was the most consi
with respect to the workers nec
weavers, pickers, spinners, car
as well as with respect to

foreign fabrics, which was opposed by Amsterdam as harmful to the cloth and woollen commerce—a proof of the favour always shown in the United Netherlands to commerce above industry.

About 1630 it was especially the fine cloth and woollen industries, the *passementerie*, and Gobelin work that began to develop with the general increase of wealth and luxury. The same cause helped the progress of the diamond industry in Amsterdam, of the goldsmith's and silversmith's art in many cities, and of the manufacture of tiles at Delft and other places. The memory of the great Amsterdam jewellers, the Rensselaers, the Van Welys, and others, who furnished the courts, the richest noblemen and merchants of Europe with jewelry, pearls, diamonds, and other precious stones, the description of the brilliant productions of the Amsterdam diamond-polishers of this period may testify to the perfection of these branches of industry, as the beautiful gold and silver plate preserved from the melting pot in some old families and museums offers striking proof of former artistic skill. Best known are the tiles from this flourishing epoch of pottery, made chiefly at Delft, but speedily imitated in other cities.¹ Thus industry collaborated with commerce in throwing great wealth into the lap of the Netherlanders.

This wealth gave occasion to terrible abuses. The success of the great companies brought out many a commercial undertaking which resulted in heavy losses to the shareholders. The impulse to risk much in order to gain much, the pernicious spirit of speculation, claimed many victims in these times. After long dealing with the commerce in grain, oil and whalebone, Indian spices, and other articles subject to great fluctuations in price, speculation in Holland found in the autumn of 1636 a new field in the tulip trade. It took advantage of the fashion of raising bulbs and blossoms for the gardens of town and

¹ See Havard, *Les faïences de Delft*.

citizens. These "chambers"
poor, hoping rapidly to become
prices attained by the bulbs
following summer but hardly
Hundreds, thousands of guilders
growing bulbs, plants of the
transactions amounted to over
of money were made upon
suddenly came a decline early in
people of all ranks, men and
citizens, peasants and tradesmen
who had deserted their work to
traffic in bulbs. At Leyden, Haarlem,
Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam much
finally many a household was broken
was ruined, more than figures
sudden fall an effort was made to
ing that upon delivery only 10
agreed upon after November 1st
But this afforded no relief, since
large amounts and were without
had counted upon great profits,
erty saw themselves robbed of their
business" that reduced thousands
Estates of Holland and various

Thus ended miserably in April, 1637, the tulipomania amid the curses of hundreds who were bitterly disappointed or had anticipated their great expectations of wealth after the manner of the milkmaid in La Fontaine's fable.

This excrescence on Dutch commercial genius was not the only bad result of the great development of commerce and industry in the "golden age" of the United Netherlands. The evils of a society so eager for money, of such a mercantile state as the United Netherlands, became manifest in the predominant influence of material over spiritual interests, in bribery among the rulers and the ruled, in shameless smuggling, in the close limitation of the circle of governing families with an eye to the advantages to be obtained from the administration. The *mercator sapiens* was not particular as to how he accumulated wealth, did not scruple to sell ships to the enemy, and would have ventured "into hell" until "his sails caught fire," if any money was to be made there. The venality of the Dutch diplomatists was proverbial abroad, and people at home knew the best way of securing attention to their interests, so that fraud and thievery were the order of the day. Shameful irregularities in the management of naval affairs could not be averted by the punishment of the most prominent offenders; many captains of war ships were no less guilty of financial abuses than many captains and higher officers in the army. As to their illegal gains, the directors of the companies were in as bad odour as the officers of justice in city and country charged with the enforcement of the laws. Indifference under the mantle of toleration coined money from the lax execution of the placards against the Roman Catholics.

With the increasing prosperity of the richer citizens there is to be noted a relatively great poverty among the tradesmen, more inequality in the distribution of wealth

There were complaints of the
country. The treasuries of
sums for the benefit of their nu
is estimated that charity was t
seventh of Amsterdam's popul
Leyden. Facts like these sho
great wealth of many the abje
number was characteristic of th

Although the material life in
"golden age" thus left someth
and science it was a period of t
Painting was undoubtedly forem
days of the great "prince of pai
world has not yet seen, whose fan
Dutch geniuses. About 1648 F
zenith of his talent, and posterit
upon the radiant light of the "N
charming picture of beautiful S
faces of the "Syndics of the C
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a striking portrait and artistic
master. With this greatest of t
light, the history of the time men
siderable than any other nation c
painters, all excellent in one c
characterised by the union of

and giving utterance to the thoughts that haunted the souls of simple burghers, struck by the beauty in their environment or drawing from the fulness of their fancy?

In what a small territory they flourished! A circle, of which Dordrecht, Delft, Haarlem, Amsterdam, and Utrecht are the chief points, embraces the region where most of them lived. They were not divided into local schools, although now and then the influence of a great genius made itself felt in one place. Jan Lievens and Gerard Dou, Rembrandt's contemporaries and under his influence the founders of the celebrated guild of St. Luke at Leyden, settled in Rembrandt's native city which had not entirely lost the tradition of its Lucas van Leyden. The elder Frans Hals, next to Rembrandt the first of the portrait painters, formed at Haarlem an Adriaan van Ostade and an Adriaan Brouwer, the inimitable depictees of Holland's joyous peasant life. Men of independent talent like Bartholomeus van der Helst, the famous painter of regent-pieces, worked at Amsterdam besides the great master and the numerous pupils, whom he developed there from 1631 and who continued his renown and tradition until the end of the century. At Haarlem lived the excellent landscape painters, Jan van Goyen and Salomon van Ruysdael, experts in the colours and shadows of Holland's dunes and fields. Aelbert Cuyp settled in Dordrecht and immortalised the broad river, the canals and houses of the picturesque town as Cornelis Saftleven of Rotterdam did the pastures of South Holland abounding in cattle. The skilful portrait painter, Michiel van Mierevelt, resided in Delft; Johannes van Ravesteyn was active in the same branch at The Hague; Utrecht had Abraham Bloemaert, the landscape and historical painter under Italian influence, the head of a large school of imitators of Caravaggio. There were, in addition, painters of still life like

... as Groningen and
Middelburg.

Many of these painters were
and engravers, and their work
kind. The medallist art, the
silversmith, was approaching it
found in Jacob van Campen,
Stalpert, Pieter Post, worthy
architects of about 1600. So
besides Artus Quellinus, the y
sentative in Pieter de Keyser.

The love of art existed in
handsome gables and carpe
magistrates and merchants, the
of cities, numberless drawings
elegant patterns for silversmit
weavers and embroiderers, and
evidence even now of the ripe d
Renaissance. Art had penetrat
life and formed an indispensable
than was the case in any other
furniture of the simply arrang
chant with its marble steps and
ornamented bindings of books
women in the household, art sh
day dress, living and

Sweelinck, were alike distinguished in music, many artists belonged to the old church or rose from the lowest ranks of the people.

There was also vigorous life in literature at this time. Vondel reigned as first of the poets and enriched Dutch literature with the mature works of his powerful genius. Besides the strictly classical drama and epic he cultivated the lyric art of daily life, the elegy, the cutting satire; he used historical motives from his own time and did not disdain occasional poems for weddings or family feasts. Successful in all branches of literature, he was a sorcerer of language as Rembrandt was with the brush. After his conversion to Catholicism in 1641, "wearied with vain wandering," and some years earlier, in the days of doubt and hesitation, he delighted in biblical and theological subjects and drew inspiration from them for new masterpieces. His change of religion estranged him temporarily from many of his earlier friends and hurt his popularity. Hooft, Cats, and Huygens, all three higher in rank than the dealer in hostelry, but his inferiors in talent, appealed better to the Protestant majority. Hooft, the learned bailiff of Muiden, whose later life did not fulfil the poetical promise of his youth, was not generally successful in hitting the popular taste, although the prose of his *Historien* proves him an artist in words. More popular was Huygens who, even in jest, handled the language like a perfect virtuoso, but his many-sided mind and extensive learning, his keen reason and merry satire could not, as a rule, atone for his poverty in genuine poetic feeling. Cats, the erotic-moralising council pensionary, the popular poet of the fatherland, was the most successful, and he put into rhyme the happenings of daily life, the lyrics, epics, and dramas of the domestic hearth, of rural life, of the coach of matrimony, being a poet only in form, without elevation or passion, abounding in commonplace morality and didactic respect-

"elegant neatness" was pra
manszoon Crul, a follower o
Vondel's school—Anslo, Bra
ical Jonctys and Broekhuize
pendent minds, with Coster
reckoned Pels and the young
in opposition to the classical t
the impulse to a new romant
Titus in 1641.

X
In 1622 Coster had been of
building and seemed to yield
orthodox preachers, while the
their separate Chamber and the
Coster survived for many years
cians over their bitter enemies.
Smout and Trigland the rhetori
in the performance of their dr
united in one "Amsterdam Ch
1637 of a great "temple of art"
itself was very important to t
centre in the "city theatre"
1638, with Vondel's *Gijsbrecht*
really the end of the old rhet
sional actors now took more the
the rhetorical chambers, and th
performances of English

more modern conception of art than could be developed in the chambers of the rhetoricians so attached to ancient forms.

Prose, hitherto cultivated solely as a means of edification or pastime, now began to develop into an artistic form upon the foundation laid by Marnix and Coornhert.¹ Such popular books as *Amadis de Gawwele*, the *Vier Heemskinderen*, and the old collections of anecdotes were now superseded by romances patterned after those of foreign lands, like the *Batavische Arcadia of 1637*, the work of Johan van Heemskerck. Greater, more original, and more national was Hooft's work, *Nederlandsche Historien*, the production of his maturity inspired by the glory of the fatherland and by Tacitus's classical writings, whose concise style was imitated after long years of study and preparation, to which the *Life of Henry the Great* and the translation of the whole of Tacitus give evidence. Until Hooft's death in 1647, the centre of literary life was his castle of Muiden, where the bailiff received with courtly hospitality his numerous visitors of all ranks, where first Roemer Visscher and his friends, representatives of the old Holland, later the finest Dutch intellects of the newer time showed themselves: the learned Casper van Baerle, the cultivated Laurens Reael, clever Gerard Vossius, many-sided Van der Burgh, the even more versatile Constantijn Huygens, the prince's adviser in artistic and literary affairs, his brother-in-law De Wilhelm, the daughters of the "round Roemer," their song-loving friend Francisca Duarte, De Groot's brother-in-law Nicolaas van Reigersbergen, the Doubleths, Plemp, Daniel Mostert, Brosterhuyzen, Hooft's brother-in-law Joost Baeck, Vondel, Cats, Coster, Sweelinck, all welcome guests in this circle. Even the princes of Orange visited there the bailiff. Like Hooft's residence to the neighbouring Amsterdam, Huygens's beautiful

¹ Kalf, *Litteratuur en toneel te Amsterdam*, p. 14.

new Attica," as the Nether
There flourished the ce
whose most brilliant repres
father of Dionysius, Matth
renowned in the republic
dam in 1631 to increase th
and Episcopus of the ne
school." Salmasius, coming
ing the traditions of his co
place at Leyden with the frie
famous philologist, Daniel F
part the absence of the mo
scholars, an exile from his
Boxhornius with the German
the study of history; Jan de
l'Empereur and Golius devel
languages; the many-sided
Germany, the mathematician V
Burgersdijck, the theologian
Heereboort, and many othe
attracted there numerous stu
lished works there which ca
entire learned world; their Le
for the erudition of all natio
firm flourished in Amsterda
Hague. In C

where Gronovius taught; in Harderwijk, in Franeker at the Frisian university celebrated for its excellent jurists, learned studies flourished, and hundreds of foreigners—French, English, Scotch, Germans, Swedes—sat with the sons of the land at the feet of the Dutch scholars in all these institutions of higher education. Outside of them men like the rector Beeckman and the philosopher Van Beverwijck at Dordrecht, like the versatile Catholic priest Marius and the rabbi Menasseh ben Israel at Amsterdam augmented the reputation of the country.

A great influence upon scientific life in Holland proceeded from the sojourn of René Descartes, who from 1629 to 1649 sought refuge there from the persecutions of his orthodox Catholic enemies in France and rest for his philosophical work. Soon he became the centre of a philosophical and scientific movement which was widely extended among the leading Dutch circles. The erudite Palatine Princess Elizabeth, eldest daughter of the "winter-king," the learned and artistic Anna Maria Schuerman, Constantijn Huygens, and the prince's councillor De Wilhem, both very potent at court, numbers of scholarly men at the universities of the Netherlands, theologians, physicians, mathematicians, naturalists, were subject to the powerful influence of the famous works which he wrote here, the most notable being the *Discours de la méthode*. He wandered from Amsterdam to Utrecht, from Franeker to Leyden, from Deventer to the little Egmont, diffusing his ideas. Here also he had to wage a sharp war on the orthodox who feared his philosophical propositions, his doctrines concerning the relation between soul and body, concerning God and the world, and who contended against him as a Romanist Vorstius or Arminius, his ideas in their eyes being pernicious to religious life. Voetius and Schoockius were vehement opponents of Descartes, of the *mendax Gallus*, whose studies in mathematics and natural history meanwhile

beginning of a flourishing :
people of the United Nether:
mining the fate of the world :
and social conditions. The
1640 were not only admire
become in many ways a mo:
other place," writes Descartes
his letters to Balzac, "could
where all the comforts of life :
desired may be so easily fou
country where one may enjoy
one may sleep with less un
always armies commissioned ex
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Besides the prosperity it wa
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CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE

THE prince's campaign along the Meuse was intimately connected with the movement among the nobility in the southern provinces and indicated the importance of a closer alliance with France. If France could be persuaded to join in vigorous action, Spanish authority in the southern provinces would be seriously menaced. If these provinces themselves actively coöperated, independence might be given them. In the contrary case a joint conquest and proportional division would be considered. Richelieu, embarrassed by his difficulties with the seditious French nobles and the party of the queen-mother now in Brussels, continued secret relations with some of the southern leaders, even aided them privately with money, and had his ambassador at The Hague, de Beaugy, attentively watch the doings of the States in the matter. But he was not yet ready to gather in "the harvest which was offered in Flanders" and endeavoured to gain time in order to strike his blow under more favourable circumstances. He was unwilling to leave to the Dutch their opportunity of acquiring all the spoils expected. His plans were assisted by the fear of the Belgian clergy for the Catholic religion in case of union with or dependence upon the northern States. The position of the southern malcontents was weakened by the slight eagerness manifested in the north for strong action in the southern provinces. People were afraid of

¹ Waddington, i., pp. 161, 171.

energy, money, troops, or resources, and surrounded by traitors, with the attitude of France and the government ventured to arrest the governor of Bouchain who fled to France. Warfusée was captured and his property was declared forfeit on account of his guilty participation in the treason of the English. Acquainted as he was with the Brussels government was therefore, in 1633, consulted with that view its attention chiefly to the west, he was commissioned to go to Spain by the Brussels government. He was in Brussels in April, 1634. His confession remained outside of the affair, and he was under sharp supervision in Madrid and

The death of Archduchess Isabella Clara Eugenia in 1633, delivered the compromised Brussels government prevent a revolt. The count van den Bergh was condemned in default to Mechlin; the prince of Barlout was condemned in Antwerp; Epinoy and Bournonville were condemned to the same fate by a hasty decision.

order not to bring discredit to the recently restored Spanish sovereignty by too great severity.

Meanwhile the negotiations¹ concerning peace between the States-General of the south and those of the north resulted in nothing. Aytona and his faithful helper, Roose, the president of the privy council, tried to thwart the "in all times and for all monarchies pernicious" States-General and wanted no peace concluded by them. But the Brussels States laboured under illusions for a long time. From the end of September, 1632, their deputies negotiated in the camp before Maestricht with the prince of Orange for a new Truce with an alliance of the two Netherlands, an arrangement not advantageous to Spain's interests and made more unacceptable when the north proudly appointed The Hague for the scene of further deliberations. The negotiations at The Hague from early December seemed in good faith, and the powers interested were officially informed of them. The Dutch were represented by sixteen delegates, prominent among them being Adriaan Pauw and Johan de Knuyt with some influential members of the States-General; from the other side came Jacob Boonen, archbishop of Mechlin, seven others, and Aerschot.

It had cost much trouble to overcome the opposition to negotiating of Zealand prospering by privateering, and of Friesland and Groningen jealous of Holland and suspicious of Spain. But there was a strong peace party in Holland, led by the council pensionary Pauw himself, aiming at the renewal of the Truce and following the policy of Oldenbarnevelt. This party pushed matters energetically and was helped by the land provinces in fear of the enemy's invasions and by the peaceful disposition of the

¹ See Gachard, *Actes des États Généraux de 1632, passim*; De Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden*; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, la France & les Pays-Bas espagnols*. i., p. 180.

ing not from the Spanish
States-General of all the provi
of Ghent. It soon appeared
had really no authority to nego
States-General or of Spain, bu
the name of their provincial E
continuing on the basis discus
binding themselves to mainta
sovereign. This attitude nearl
prince managed to calm the per
demands of the north incorpo
Five of the deputies, including
took these articles to Brussels.
General of Brussels declared the
sions, the infanta's Spanish advi
and the new instructions of the
sequently gave slight hope of
negotiations, while the plan o
former secret emissary, as a
deputies was not pleasing to A
Direct authority from the king
The Hague on the return of th
1633, unless that of 1629 given
transferred to the deputies migh
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four to three the States-General of The Hague determined early in March not to end the parleying, and this result was due to the prince's intervention. Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen formed the minority. Zealand was especially vehement, and Friesland and Groningen presented a strong remonstrance against all negotiation with these "masked Spaniards," as they called the States of the south.

The continuation of the negotiations began to make Richelieu uneasy about the result. Peace or truce in the Netherlands would not at all suit his policy. In February, 1633, therefore, he sent to the aid of the old and not very vigorous Beaugy at The Hague the able Hercule de Charnacé, who was to offer the prince larger subsidies, even a corps of auxiliary troops under a French marshal, or, provided the war was actively prosecuted, a treaty of cooperation for the conquest of the south, thus preventing any peace unless France were included in it. This attitude of France and similar pressure from Sweden naturally influenced the war party and the prince. Charnacé held back his offers cleverly as long as possible in order not unnecessarily to bind France. So the States at The Hague early in April offered an ultimatum of eighteen articles somewhat milder than the preceding. One addition was that the war in the East and West Indies should be continued unless Spain granted free trade in its colonies to the Dutch. It was not to be expected that Spain would consent to this. Furthermore, the States demanded a reply within fourteen days, impossible to obtain on account of the distance from Spain, which of course had to be consulted. To avoid a prolongation of the negotiations the States declared their purpose to open a campaign towards the end of the month.

The southern delegates again asked for instructions in Brussels, but the deliberations there lasted so long that the prince took the field before they returned from the

... ..
mated that France would |
joint war against Spain,
immediately ended. The
incorporated in the draft of
of the southern provinces
demanded for its share L
Artois, Namur, Hainaut,
surrounding territory, while
be allowed in the other pro
the north—a proposal that
representatives of the Stat
5th consequently adhered t
tion of the war outside of E
to conclude peace in Euro
closing of the Scheldt, cessi
one other city.

This ultimatum was not
zealous partisans of peace c
and Charnacé did not regard
troops as necessary in order
ing off of negotiations, altho
of those favouring a truce an
war party by giving lavish
Knuyt and others. Thus l
Hague than to beat about

Aytona, who had assembled a considerable army, prevented his further advance, and the attitude of the southern nobility, already betrayed by Gerbier, roused the infanta's suspicion. The disposition of the people also in the south was untrustworthy, to judge from the deep impression made by the pamphlet of Puteanus, the Louvain professor, *Statera Belli ac Pacis*, the *Scales of War and Peace*, favouring peace and the States. The *Anti-Puteanus* of Barlaeus, on the contrary, did not meet the popular taste.

The southern deputies still remained at The Hague, but negotiations were at a stand for want of the necessary powers from Spain. Meanwhile the uneasiness was increasing in the south, though the prince of Orange's campaign ended in a retreat to the Meuse. The admonitions and promises of the adroit Charnacé now secured their immediate purpose. The prince himself, Charnacé constantly offering him French aid, saw the uselessness of further negotiation, while the king's authority was waited for, and Aerschot, going to Spain for it, did not set out until the middle of November. A fortnight later the conspiracy in the south was completely discovered and the infanta died, the authorisation of 1629 thus lapsing. Although the peace-loving provinces of Holland and Overijssel were unwilling to stop negotiations at once, the States-General, at the instance of Charnacé, resolved, by a majority of the five other provinces to these two, upon the dismissal of the representatives of the south. On December 16th this resolution was made known to them, and they received permission to remain ten days longer to put their affairs in order. Before the end of the year they had left the territory of the United Netherlands and all negotiations ceased.

The States-General of Brussels now lost their importance. They continued in session for a time after the infanta's death, still hoping for the king's warrant and

Aytona was now alone at the
provinces, awaiting the new
blood royal, the cardinal
the king's brother, who was
southern Germany. From
a government in Brussels
continue the traditions of
with Roose's help all remedies
of the apparent independence
possessed in Isabella's last
negotiations at The Hague.
nobility rendered the Spaniards
ever, and "reliable" Spaniards
saw themselves intrusted.
The provinces under Spanish
to the sceptre, from which they
hoped to withdraw. The south
further, and the unhappy country
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A closer alliance between
Netherlands was now at hand.
shrank as the chance of peace
French party, still existing in
ing strength from the ambiguity
opposed a new treaty with
favours to the

prince and of the war party, they led in April to a treaty of ~~subsidy notwithstanding the antagonism of Amsterdam.~~ By it the States promised not to negotiate during eight months for peace or truce and not to conclude it within a year, while France in this time was not to make any agreement with Spain. France, unless it began a war itself with Spain, was to give, besides the customary subsidy of a million, another million and 300,000 livres for a regiment of French troops in the service of the States. Both parties were satisfied with this result. France was assured of the continuation of the war in the Netherlands without directly taking part in it, and the States secured considerable money. Most pleased was the war party in the United Provinces, which had vanquished Amsterdam's opposition. Highly honoured by the States and by his own government, Charnacé returned to France, not without making liberal presents to his friends in the administration of the States, especially to Musch and De Knuyt.

The war meanwhile brought slight advantage in this year. Aytona laid siege to Maestricht, the prince to Breda, but neither gained possession of the beleaguered fortress, and when Aytona came to the relief of Breda, Frederick Henry drew back to the Meuse country and from there went into winter quarters. After his victory over the Swedes at Nördlingen the new governor proceeded along the Rhine to the Netherlands and made his entrance into Brussels early in November. Don Ferdinand was an intelligent nobleman of twenty-five years, energetic, valiant, remotely resembling Archduke Albert, but more of a fighter, one of the best of the Hapsburg princes. His aim was not a truce or peace, but vigorous war. Richelieu also had become convinced that war was for France the only means of settling Netherlandish affairs. He believed that a division, between France and the States, of the country to be conquered could not be

France—the envoy Langer
ratification of the treaty a
proposed by Charnacé.
Heemstede, as he was called
Knuyt, representatives of the
an ordinary instruction a se
consultation with the prin
chamber” of His Excellency
the States-General. They
XIII., if possible, to engage
and to propose an eventual d
ing to the linguistic frontie
obtain the regions where F
remainder would go to the
“neighbour and firm bulwar
prince had the entire conduct
his own hands and deliberate
members of the States-Genera
power in these days.

At the end of June the an
and began immediately negoti
later to the draft of a treaty
with 8000 men to conquer
afterwards with the prince Br
help drive out the Spaniards.

pression produced by the battle of Nördlingen. De Knuyt returned to Paris in September, but in November he had to go home again for new instructions on the subject of the Catholic religion in the provinces to be conquered, which was disputed over for a long time until the States yielded. To the vexation of Richelieu and Pauw the offensive and defensive alliance was not actually concluded before February 8, 1635. Each party furnishing 30,000 men, a joint war was to be waged for the liberation of the southern provinces, if they manifested a willingness to cooperate within three months, otherwise they were to be divided up following a line from Blankenberghe between Damme and Bruges along the southern border of Brabant and Limburg. The Catholic religion was to be maintained as it existed in the territory to be divided, and negotiations with Spain were to be only "conjointly and with common consent."

It was a question whether this alliance might be called an advantage to the United Netherlands. The danger of having France for a neighbour was great, but the Dutch rightly thought that it had not yet gone so far. It was evident that a reasonable peace could not be secured. What could then be more desirable than France's powerful help against Spain, which had been urged ever since the days of Prince William? The treaty embodying Richelieu's idea of forming a Catholic state in the south—the old plan of Jeannin and Oldenbarnevelt—was to a certain extent a victory for the policy of the States, since France was drawn into the war. Even Holland had to give way to this argument. Much seamanship was still necessary to bring the Calvinistic statesmen to an approval of the provision, abominable in their eyes and contrary to the "old maxims," concerning the maintenance of the Romish faith in conquered districts. In May, France formally

the diplomatist-general, aided by Richelieu's trustee by Charnacé succeeding d'Estrades and other French and was characterised by fri and courtesies, in which th had no small share.' The p interests more in his camp t ambassador in Paris, Wille wijk, who merely performed The united power was gre a French army of 20,000 me to join the prince's equally able and energetic defende Aytona, while the French g and energetic. The allies troops at Maestricht and m expected uprising of the sout and plundering, the combin neighbourhood of Brussels at Don Ferdinand adopted Al battle, provided the cities w thus obliged the hostile army, of Louvain, to fall back in

Disease and famine ravaged the French-Dutch army which in July lay at Roermond. At the end of the month a Spanish force surprised Schenkenschans on the Rhine, so that the Betuwe was endangered, all the more so when Don Ferdinand occupied Goch, Cleves, and Gennep. The governor returned gloriously to Brussels in the fall; the most serious harm he had suffered was the loss of Aytona, who had died of fever.

The recapture of Schenkenschans now became the chief purpose, and it was only accomplished after incredible exertion in April, 1636. Great was the disappointment over this first campaign. The French complained bitterly of the neglect and misery that brought a pestilence upon them. It raged also in the Dutch cities, while the French troops, badly organised, commanded, paid, and provisioned, died by hundreds in the Veluwe and the garrisons. Each tried to throw the blame on the other, but even French writers admit the bad condition of the French army in those days before Turenne and Condé, not to be compared with the Dutch army under Frederick Henry, whose talent shone less in the open field than in war on fortifications.

The following year was no more profitable for the allies. A Spanish army invaded Picardy, frightening Paris itself, and was repulsed with difficulty. An attempt of the prince to take Breda failed owing to the approach of the Spaniards under Feria. In Holland people complained of financial distress, demanded a reduction of the troops to 22,000 men, and were inclined to participate in the negotiations preparing at Cologne for a general European peace. When France noticed this and Spain's desire to negotiate separately with the United Netherlands, Richelieu warned Charnacé to be on his guard, and the latter protested vigorously. The war, however, went on. For 1637 a joint attack on Dunkirk was planned, but storm and contrary winds

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of 1642 on the lower Rhine,
de Guébriant, could accomp
the imperial troops at Kem
ment of France --

hesitate to undertake such great enterprises as the French demanded with Gallic vehemence. Only Gennep, a "villainous hole" in the Cleves territory, was taken in 1641 by the prince's army. The slender results of the much desired alliance awakened vexation in the United Netherlands also and strengthened the peace party. Frederick Henry's continued sufferings from the gout made him likewise less eager for war. The French conquests in Artois and on the borders of Hainaut and Cambrai were mostly lost, and the condition of affairs was not changed by the death, in 1641, of the young Don Ferdinand, who was succeeded by the equally energetic Francisco de Melo as governor and captain-general of the Netherlands.

Better fortune attended operations on the sea in 1639. Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, the worthy successor of Piet Heyn, was now in command of the Dutch fleet. Under his direction great reforms were effected in naval affairs, and the victory won by him before Dunkirk in February, 1639, with a squadron of eleven vessels over the enemy's fleet of twenty ships promised much for the future. Some alarm was felt concerning this future, because there had been talk for years of an armada fitting out in Spanish and Portuguese harbours and destined to bring a considerable army to the Netherlands. Dunkirk ships had already departed for Spain to accompany the armada through the English Channel. Tromp received orders to cruise with thirteen vessels in the Channel and watch for the enemy, while Banckerts with twelve others was to blockade Dunkirk and Witte de With with five ships remained not far away. In the middle of September this divided force was surprised by the approach of a great fleet from Corunna under the Spanish admiral d'Oquendo who had no less than 67 heavy galleons with 1700 cannons and 24,000 sailors and soldiers. D'Oquendo's fleet had commands to avoid an engagement and,

landish harbours.

On receipt of definite intelligence the prince had set the admiral to collect as many ships as he could of Tromp, who was to unite at sea. Work in the yard proceeded especially when news came from Downs. The West India Company the owners of privateers and their vessels, which were sent to sea. Meanwhile Tromp had on the 15th with his own ships and the attack of the enormous Spanish d'Oquendo to seek refuge on the night of the 16th to the 17th the unequal conflict and Charles Banckerts joined him, and ammunition at Calais, took it whither d'Oquendo had steered immediately sent his report for reinforcements, especially directions how he was to act. The States-General resolved on this to order him, while awaiting the Spaniards busy, or, in case of

himself with arms against such nations as should seek to prevent his taking advantage of the enemy.

The attitude of the English was really suspicious. Admiral Pennington with some thirty vessels lay between the two fleets and warned Tromp earnestly of the consequences of an attack upon the enemy guarded by English cannon. Tromp's council of war hesitated to move, although about thirteen Dunkirk ships had already escaped, and numbers of Spanish soldiers were going over to Flanders secretly from other points of the English coast. But the States-General adhered to their resolution, notwithstanding the English, desirous of obtaining from Spain a large sum for their protection, threatened vengeance for any violation of their law. There was a moment of halting at The Hague, because the prince, who was just then negotiating about the English marriage of his son, wished not to offend the English court, and began to be "scrupulous." Tromp, however, failed by chance to receive ambiguous orders sent him, and the English nation now expressed its favour for the Dutch side, so that the arming of the English fleet had to be suspended. In the middle of October it was definitely decided to persist in the "vigorous" resolution, considering the state of opinion in England and on the fleet before the Downs, which had gradually been increased to over sixty vessels and eleven fire ships, manned by sailors attracted by Tromp's name as a guarantee of victory. The Dutch admiral endeavoured to get the enemy out of the Downs. He let one of his own ships bring spars and masts from Dover for d'Oquendo, and offered a quantity of powder to the Spanish admiral, who courteously declined the offer and refused to leave the Downs. Then Tromp determined to attack as soon as the wind veered to the west. This occurred on October 21st, when he ranged in order of battle his fleet now grown to ninety-five vessels and eleven fire ships, announced his plan to the English

rog d'Orquendo escaped to ships; forty of his vessels were carried off in triumph, and prisoners formed the loss of the Dutch lost but one ship and "Triton's chariot of victory" to The Hague, greeted by the country, which in a day of profound feeling of thankfulness inspired that had broken Spain's power. meanwhile was reinforced by the English coast, later by the force—the chief purpose of the French were made to feel this through the vigorous invasion Picardy. They had more reason visit of the queen-mother Marie unexpectedly travelled from Netherlands and was honoured pleased Richelieu and the king, erick Henry was moved to send to Paris to attempt a reconciliation firmly declined. There was so little was accomplished on lasting years by the great general Moreover the

~~Spain sought to use this feeling among the Dutch by offering anew to negotiate. Incessantly Spanish and imperial agents bestirred themselves to induce the United Netherlands to discuss a truce or peace and thus to separate the two allies or rouse mutual distrust between them. In the autumn of 1635 the States negotiated through their recorder Musch with the Spaniards first at Arnhem, afterwards at Cranenburg. Not a year passed but Spain made some effort to bring the United Netherlands to a separate negotiation or to show the prince the advantages to be derived from it for him and his house. Now a Brabant pastor, then a monk, or a French noble opposed to Richelieu, or the Danish ambassador was employed as intermediary. In 1641 an imperial ambassador, Count Auersperg, accompanied by the Spanish agent Friquet, appeared at The Hague, causing the French government annoyance. But Spain cherished too many illusions of the conditions it could secure in case of peace or truce, and of the power of its money and promises over the Dutch leaders. Negotiations between Spain and the United Netherlands were not yet serious, but France understood that it must keep an eye upon the sail, the more so because deliberations at Hamburg concerning a general European peace resulted, towards the end of 1641, in preliminaries fixing the terms on which representatives were to be sent by the different governments to a peace congress at Münster and Osnabrück. Much was still to be done before this congress could meet, but its foundations were laid.~~

~~The aged Richelieu died in December, 1642, and, although his follower Mazarin was immediately intrusted by Louis XIII. with the conduct of affairs, the States felt uneasy about the course of events in France, especially when in the following May the king himself passed away, and his widow took the government into her hands for her young son. Thus began again in France a period~~

one of them.





CHAPTER VI

LAST YEARS OF THE WAR. PEACE OF MÜNSTER

THE United Netherlands had now become a state which could not possibly submit again to the sceptre of Spain's king. Laying down the law in northern Europe, showing their preponderance in the neighbouring, small, German states, mediating in England driven through dissensions between king and Parliament into civil war, and ruling the seas, they stood the strongest power of Europe with France and against Spain, honoured or feared by those who needed their help or dreaded their enmity. And the arch-enemy saw its world-embracing empire fall. Portugal became free; Catalonia threatened revolt; Italy was in a ferment; the Philippines alone remained Spanish in the East Indies; all Spain's possessions in the West Indies were harassed by Dutch fleets; commerce was destroyed, industry was broken up, bankruptcy of the state was at the door. Then came May 19, 1643, the great defeat of Rocroy, when the young duke of Enghien commanding a French army annihilated the old Spanish regiments. Spain's ruin seemed near at hand.

But Philip IV. did not lose heart. His minister Olivarez was forced to resign, and De Melo in the Netherlands was dragged down in his fall. In the summer of 1644 De Melo was replaced by the excellent diplomatist, Manuel de Moura-Cortereal, marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, with whom the veteran imperial general Ottavio Piccolomini was to restore the lustre of the Spanish arms.

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rumoured zeal of the Beguines, sisters in secular garb exhorting Catholics to take part in their religious solemnities, noteworthy conversions like that of Vondel excited great indignation. Calvinistic synods and church councils made many a complaint of "popish insolences" and "Romish exorbitancies," and soon there was a temporary strictness in enforcing the placards against the "Romish superstitions." Although the avarice of officials, whose hands were stopped by bribery, and the moderation of many magistrates, who were supported by the prince, worked in favour of the Catholics, the Protestants could not be expected to remain content with visitations of houses and condemnations to fines, by which means the government wished to hold the Catholic population within the bounds of a narrow personal liberty of conscience. A general prohibition of the Catholic faith was urged. In this respect also agreement between the two allies left much to be desired.

The alliance continued. Five years more—Mazarin's *felix quinquennium*—the joint war lasted, year by year carefully planned by d'Estrades and the prince of Orange. But the Dutch army accomplished little. In 1643 Holland secured a reduction of the army of the States to 46,000 men by a considerable limitation of the number of men in the companies. An attack on Flanders was executed with slight energy by the apathetic prince, and the army returned early to winter quarters, satisfied with having made possible Enghien's victories in Luxemburg and Hainaut. The fleet, too, had little success on the Flemish coast. The results of next year's campaign were better. Sas van Gent, the key of the Scheldt country, fell into the prince's hands after a brilliant siege. To the vexation of the French no use was made of this conquest to cut off supplies from Flanders, Brabant, and Hainaut. Still more resplendent was the campaign of 1645 in Flanders. On the French side with the help of

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5th).

Once more the great general Antwerp in 1646 despatched of apoplexy. But he was an arduous undertaking to Hague in a pitiable condition. French got possession of C finished the campaign brilliantly Dunkirk with the aid of this nest of robbers caused Netherlands, but in recent years arisen with the French government of the Dutch merchants with the consequence of French privateering. Dunkirk in French hands made a dangerous commercial rivalry Flanders now lay at the feet of who was absolute master of Hainaut, Namur, and Luxembourg, and the northern section partly subject to the States or The Spanish troops were stationed at Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, defend the chief cities as long as of

withstanding all this, the population remained faithful to its old sovereign and would not hear of rebellion, so the discontented party of the nobility did not venture to move. The States of the southern provinces showed themselves ready for more sacrifices and new taxes. The appointment of Archduke Leopold William of Austria to the governorship of the Netherlands, the emperor's brother, an able general, a good administrator, and a devout Catholic, raised the hope of the unfortunate country, where he appeared in April, 1647. But it was then almost peace, as the prince had declared to the gentlemen greeting him at The Hague in the autumn of 1646.

Richelieu was still alive when the French government finally consented with its allies, the States-General and Sweden, to open negotiations for peace at Münster and Osnabrück with Spain, the emperor, and the Catholic German princes. The papal nuncio Chigi and the Venetian ambassador Contarini were to act as mediators. The imperial envoys arrived at the appointed place in July, 1643, and the others slowly appeared. Not until November did Mazarin send two French ambassadors, Claude de Mesmes, count d' Avaux, and Abel Servien, count de la Roche, to Münster by way of the republic, where they were received by the States-General.¹

The result of this French embassy was entirely satisfactory to Mazarin. Two treaties were concluded in The Hague at the end of February. One related to the next campaign. The other, a guarantee treaty, concerned the Münster negotiations and stipulated that there should be a joint negotiation with Spain, that all conquests must be retained, and that no treaty of peace could be made otherwise than *conjointement et d'un commun consentement*. Thus the States bound themselves anew to

¹ Aitzema, *Verhael van de Nederlandsche Vreedehandeling*, i., p. 457; Waddington, ii., p. 46.

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was particularly savage in its accusations. The uneasiness was calmed by the effective action of the States-General, whose president refused d' Avaux's request, secured at once the adoption of a "vigorous" anti-Catholic resolution, and referred sharply to the impropriety of this "ticklish" proceeding, but distrust continued and hurt the cause of France here more than anything else. A severe placard against the "papists" and stricter supervision of their religious worship were the immediate consequences. The desire of coöperating with France either in war or in negotiations for peace was not increased.

Negotiations at Münster progressed very slowly. The States-General refused to send representatives there, unless they were addressed as "Excellency" and treated with the same courtesies as the envoys of Venice received. These questions of etiquette are more than a mere form in diplomacy. This form was to show the Netherlands to diplomatic Europe as completely independent even of France and "sovereign." Monarchical France, still more or less in the habit of regarding itself as the guardian or saviour of the young state from Spanish tyranny, hesitated long but finally yielded to this demand "in order to take from our enemies the hope of dividing us, on which they are incessantly working." Affairs were far from being advanced enough for the ambassadors of the States to enjoy these ceremonies. During the whole of 1644 the provinces deliberated upon the embassy of the States-General to Münster and upon the instructions to be drawn up. This slowness angered the French allies who were afraid of Spanish intrigues and gold. In the matter of the instructions the first question was whether a truce or a definitive peace should be proposed. The following year was also spent in interminable discussions, and still the Dutch envoys did not appear at Münster to work in concert with those of France as had been agreed. Spain, long anxious to per-

... it was speedily evident to anybody in the country wished to see an end to Orange, on the contrary, hostilities in conjunction with the more actively active Spain and intrigues to estrange the and then to induce the States peace. Spain thought it a reason, where civil dissension breaking out during the middle States appeared for the time dreaded, and it was hoped in the opinion of their independence territory.

Until the middle of 1645 the Spaniards thus neglected Münster. In July appeared the count de Peñaranda, out of a stamp, cold and haughty, a diplomatist. With him were the shrewd ecclesiastic, and the man skilled with pen and speech in pamphlets, and a born diplomat were made with the help of Count win over Frederick II.

succeeded, for the prince declared that "he would never separate from France." Spanish intrigues had more success with peace-loving Holland. The accomplishment of Holland's plans for armed intervention in the war between Sweden and Denmark against the prince's judgment; Holland's refusal to do anything for Charles I. of England; the impossibility in conquered Hulst of carrying out the agreement concerning freedom for the Catholics, which impossibility, the prince saw, would render more difficult the winning of the south—all these facts show that the prince could not manage the Estates as he pleased. Spain took advantage of these differences. While the two French envoys in Münster, so much at variance that the duke de Longueville had to be sent as a third person to keep order, were dancing the "ballet of peace," Spain started in the winter of 1645-1646 an intrigue which extorted admiration from Mazarin, an expert in such matters.

Dutch negotiations at Münster advanced a great step. Eight representatives of the States-General, two from Holland and one from each of the six other provinces, arrived in Münster on January 11, 1646. A stately commission they formed, consisting of: Barthold van Gent, lord of Meinerswijk, representing Gelderland and acting as chairman; Johan, lord of Mathenesse, and Adriaan Pauw, lord of Heemstede, for Holland; Johan de Knuyt, the prince's adviser, for Zealand; Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst, for Utrecht; Frans van Donia for Friesland; Willem van Ripperda, lord of Hengeloo, for Overijssel; Adriaan Clant of Stedum for Groningen. The ablest and most influential members were undoubtedly Pauw and De Knuyt. The delegation was bound by oath to ample instructions, no less than 116 articles in length, the substance being that a truce of at least twelve years must be sought with full recognition of independence, and that the agreement of 1644 for joint action with France

might then obtain Antwerp either for the prince or for himself. D'Estrades was cautiously to bring up the subject of the marriage, but only with a view to the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, while Spain and France were to declare the northern provinces free.

Castel-Rodrigo sent from Brussels to the prince a report¹ of the pretended French offer to Spain concerning a mediation by the queen-regent of France. The prince grew suspicious and received d'Estrades coolly at first. The affair was just the reverse, and this time Spain had first spoken of the marriage. D'Estrades communicated Mazarin's plan to Frederick Henry who seemed finally not unwilling to consent to it. On February 28th the prince, appearing personally in the Estates of Holland and the States-General, made known what d' Estrades had told him and urged that the project should be approved, but that more should be asked from France, the division of the Spanish Netherlands in accordance with the 1635 treaty of partition. While the matter stood thus, a cleverly constructed pamphlet in French appeared from the Spanish side,² entitled *The discovery of the depths of Spain concealed under this proposition of giving the infanta of Spain in marriage to the king of France with the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands as a dowry*, in which, under the guise of a violent attack upon Spain, France was much compromised as desiring sovereignty over the States. There arose great indignation³ in the Dutch provinces under the influence of the rumours, coming from all sides and diligently spread by Spain, about the real plans of France. The prince himself, on account of his attitude towards d'Estrades, fell temporarily into suspicion with the States

¹ Chéruel, *Minorité*, ii., p. 276.

² *Négociations*, iii., p. 131, where Mazarin says this in a letter to his plenipotentiaries at Münster.

³ Van der Capellen, ii., p. 142.

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from the French side. France, it asserts, is beginning with its connections to surround us on all sides and to predominate over all Europe. To the same category belongs the pamphlet *St. Anne's dream*, in which a woman enlightens her husband on the danger of having France for a neighbour; the *French gossip* remarks on the matrimonial plans; the *Sibyl of Holland* makes a fierce assault upon *Ryckstadt* (Richelieu) and *Zamarin*; the *Copy of a letter sent to The Hague* in French describes, as perilous to the state, the ambition of the prince of Orange "who has no other design than to raise his fortune upon our ruins."

Pamphlets in favour of France flowed out slowly against this broad stream of libels. Mazarin invited his ambassadors at Münster to answer *Le caquet françois*, and in April, 1646, appeared for this purpose the *Letter of a Venetian gentleman to his friend in Turin*¹ with a Dutch translation. This letter referred to the Spanish intrigues of the spring and to the Spanish desire for "universal monarchy," which must have made Spain, the "sick man" of those days, smile sadly at the contrast between its former pretensions and present weakness. Of the same kind are the *Earnest and faithful discourse* and the *Holland gossip*. One pamphlet supports the interests of the fatherland against opponents of all sorts. It is the remarkable little book, *The unfeigned Netherland patriot*, repeatedly printed and afterwards continued, in which the much reviled Musch is pilloried and both Spaniards and Frenchmen are made out all that is bad, with the result that nothing more than truces ought to be concluded. It shows that Dutch neutrality must be maintained between the great powers and may pass for the first rough sketch of the later policy of the States toward Europe.

Amid all the talk raised by more than twenty-five

¹ *Négociations*, lll., 410.

best friends of France scattered among the people, opinion, regarding the Spaniards now changed completely by numerous anti-French peace expressed in them. unable to keep his old native land and had turned his friends, especially when Spain satisfied his wishes. He was again and between the severals inclined to cooperate with Louis XIV had disappeared. This was an envoy at The Hague from the friends and from the influence of the princess, whose sympathies were strong in spite of all its present and money. But France's principal regents of Holland, from all their acts, and they concluded a truce or peace with

From 1646 Mazarin could not convince the prince and his friends among the States, who inclined more and more to the party of peace. De K

French the subject of their deliberations. There were murmurs of the bribery of Pauw and De Knuyt, even of the princess, by Spanish gold. Both those gentlemen dined and wined at Münster with the Spaniards and were extremely intimate with them. From intercepted correspondence of Peñaranda the French ambassadors saw plainly what was doing. Spain conceded everything to the States, and in May agreement had been reached on many articles of a proposed treaty for a truce. In the summer the Dutch envoys went home in turn, apparently to seek an approval of their actions from the provincial Estates. The French protested to their Dutch colleagues at Münster and to the States-General and the province of Holland at The Hague. The States answered satisfactorily, but their army, taking the field late in the summer, lay still, and everything indicated the expectation of a suspension of hostilities preliminary to a treaty. The Hollanders at Münster tried with little success to mediate also between Spain and France. In November, 1646, however, the preliminary treaty between Spain and the republic, seventy articles long, was ready. It was no truce but a treaty of peace.

In the autumn Holland had urged upon the other provinces to negotiate not for a truce but for a definitive peace, to which Spain seemed well disposed. This proposal prevailed at length, although the ever bellicose Zealand long opposed it. The word truce was replaced by peace in the provisions already agreed upon. After much wrangling, negotiations were so far advanced at Münster in January, 1647, that seven of the eight Dutch envoys resolved to sign the terms made with Spain on condition that this signature should only be valid when a treaty between France and Spain became possible. This stipulation was dangerous to the work of peace, as France positively refused to give back its conquests in Italy, and Spain would not consent to the interference

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mote an exchange of the ratifications. Seldom does one encounter such a positive proof as can be given of the bribery attempted by Servien in the spring of 1647. It is his accounting for the 30,000 livres.¹ After reading this document one ceases to wonder that the accusation of bribery was so often heard in those days. Repeatedly Nederhorst charged his opponents Pauw and De Knuyt with it and they him. Servien managed matters very cleverly. During half a year he worked assiduously to break up the newly concluded peace. Vehement harangues to the States-General, letters no less sharp, special missives to the provinces outside of Holland, pamphlets against peace, conversations with the leading statesmen, visits to the chief cities—he spared nothing to attain his end.

The death of the prince in March, 1647, made little change in the situation. The health of the long suffering Orange prince had rapidly deteriorated in the last year. His legs were swollen, his hands stiffened, his throat and lungs gave out, his mind now and then entirely failed him; a sort of childishness began to appear, which unfitted him for the serious consideration of affairs and made him wish more for peace and rest. He was now ruled completely by his vigorous wife, while his son, afraid of the father's jealousy, kept in the background and dared only act in secret with d' Estrades and Mazarin. The son, who longed eagerly to distinguish himself in war, was a decided adherent of the French policy of coöperation, and influenced by Mazarin and his agents he privately opposed the party of peace.² The Spanish intrigues did not miss their aim in these circumstances, although the old prince would not allow himself to be led into compromising engagements with Spain.

¹ See Blok's essay: *De Nederlandsche vlugschrijven over de vredesonderhandelingen te Munster*, in *Vers. en Med. Kon. Akad.*, iv., 1, p. 321.

² Waddington, ii., p. 133.

first more inclined to enjoy his friends at court, in the theatre and on the race-hold of affairs. He let t without manifesting symment, but, under his mot himself sharply as to the d help could be expected fro also no opposition, provid of Orange were not neglect

The advocates of peace Almost simultaneously with of the Spanish government finance at Brussels, provide half guilders, to work for pe of the marquis de Castel-Roc vince the States-General of t conclude peace upon any t them the means of overco power. To the vexation o ted to the States-General ar long document, the *True* negotiations, which was pri and propositions and distri phlet. Thus was published

"many beautiful discourses and tracts" with the party of peace.¹

Some of these writings proceeded from Antoine Brun, the well-informed diplomatist, who crossed the frontiers on pretext of a journey to Brussels and wished to visit The Hague. The French ambassador moved heaven and earth to prevent this, so that the Estates of Holland from fear of public opinion begged Brun to give up his purpose. The negotiator returned by way of Leyden, Amsterdam, and Deventer, not without conferring with various persons, distributing money, and praising the peaceful disposition of Spain in a *Representation* dated from Deventer, which was supported by some *Observations* attributed to Adriaan Pauw. By the latter was a collection of pieces relating to the negotiations and personally assailing Servien. The most noteworthy work of this time is Brun's *Touchstone of the true interests of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and of the intentions of the two crowns concerning the treaties of peace*. In this Servien's productions were contested point by point in excellent French, among others the sharp *Letter written from The Hague by a French gentleman to a friend in Paris*, and the advantages of peace were contrasted with the evils of war. The violent tone of Servien's speeches, calling out violent replies, tended with these pamphlets to stir up the minds of men. Servien openly accused Pauw and De Knuyt of "impostures which they have forged in concert with the ministers of Spain"² and demanded the punishment of these faithless ambassadors.

The other Dutch plenipotentiaries now left Münster³ for The Hague, as for lack of integrity they were also attacked,

¹ *Vredeh.*, ii., p. 249; Van der Capellen, ii., p. 176.

² Aitzema, *Vredehand.*, ii., p. 336 *et seq.*

³ *Négociations*, iv., p. 119; *Doc. inéd.*, T. 83, p. 226. Pauw remained there the last—until April—but he was finally left completely alone by the French ambassadors.

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... vened in order not to raise the States too ... Pauw and his friends restrained themselves, ... was ready at Münster by November. ... De Knuyt with Mathenesse, indisputably the ... of personages, left for The Hague on October ... 1647, and endeavoured to carry the affair through. ... discussions took place in the States-General, but ... it was finally agreed that for the sake of the existing ... treaties one more attempt should be made to bring ... about peace between France and Spain.¹

Thus began again the mediation of the States at Münster, but at the same time the treaty of peace with Spain was brought into shape. The mediation between France and Spain seemed at first to have some success, but the agreement between the latter and the States was already so far advanced that Spain urged peace upon the republic, threatening to break off everything. The signature of the treaty was alone lacking, and Nederhorst's opposition gave the French hope that the affair would not be settled, especially when De Knuyt, veering with every wind and apparently influenced by the warlike young prince, exhausted himself in assertions of his willingness, with Zealand and the house of Orange, to help France to a satisfactory peace.

The French soon had no more illusions. At The Hague the French ambassador La Thuillerie still protested, and by Nederhorst's advice France endeavoured to secure postponement so far as possible. But nothing availed. De Knuyt became more intractable every day, and Nederhorst observed that he would eventually have to give way to the general wish. He declined to participate on January 30, 1648, when the others after some hesitation signed under pressure from Spain, which declared it would consent to no further delay. The French government continued to protest at The Hague,

¹ Van der Capellen, ii., p. 204.

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war between Nederhorst and Pauw, who had become fierce personal enemies at Münster. Nederhorst's friendliness towards France at Münster roused the ire of Holland's representatives as much as their supposed Spanish leanings did his. The numerous visits made openly and secretly by the French upon their Dutch ally, the interviews in his house and theirs, were excused by the conscientious Nederhorst on the ground of the original instructions given the envoys of the States, commanding them to act in close harmony with the French. On the same ground he reproached his adversaries for their intimate relations with the Spanish plenipotentiaries, who treated Pauw and De Knuyt especially with extreme civility and would have nothing to do with Nederhorst after his refusal to sign the first draught of peace of December, 1646. Matters were no better between Nederhorst and the others in the course of 1647. Mutual accusations of bribery occur in the pamphlets of the spring. The *Deductions* presented to the States-General by both parties in January, 1647, had not bettered the situation. There was serious talk in the Estates of Holland and even in the States-General of dismissing Nederhorst, but the support given by the Estates of Utrecht to their representative prevented this. His refusal to sign the definitive treaty of peace of January 30, 1648, caused renewed exasperation. He was sickly and often did not attend the meetings of his colleagues. Although he signed later, his repeated absences prevented action for the time. The *Reasons* for his new refusal he presented to the States-General on February 3, 1648. They were immediately answered in a vehement *Contrary advice and refutation* by Mathenesse and Pauw, to which Nederhorst replied in an equally violent *Representation*. These writings were widely read in the spring of 1648.

A sequel to this contest of pens was that waged in the

explains clearly once again the alliance with France in opposition to the "adherents" and "Pauw and his coadjutors" and his eagerness for the profitable alliance are scourged. The ambition of "those great personages who have imitated Herod and Pilate," is ridiculed. The generally recognised leader of the "French" party, *Answer to the printer's confession* (1701), is less violent against the "French traitor" than the "little devil" from Utrecht. *Confession*, with its coarseness directed against "scoundrels," Bicker and Pauw, and the "rogue," surpasses all in vulgarity long *Penitence* and the worthier *Nettel* attributed to Pauw himself, finish the confession series. Soon afterwards Ned

The tone of the writings last mentioned is full of vailing bitterness and how weak the means were to descend to such means in the face of coming defeat. The *Dialogue between Nedderick*, written between April 17th and 18th, 1701, on the dissensions between Holland and Zeeland, a province threatened with the support of France to continue the war and

regent say: "rather French than Hollandish." This discord was indeed a great peril. But the views of Holland triumphed likewise over the not very serious opposition of William II. coming up at the eleventh hour. The popular rejoicing at the peace in Holland and elsewhere was manifest in the performances given in June in honour of the peace with words by such men as Samuel Coster, Gerard Brandt, Jan Vos, with verses by Vondel and others addressed to Andries Bicker and his colleagues. Vondel's *Leeuwendalers* immortalised this feeling in the charming idyll of Hageroos and Adelaert, "united by unfeigned love," and sung the song of peace.

Joy was not everywhere. The war party smarted under its defeat and abstained from festivities. The representatives of France, Sweden, Portugal, and Hesse declined to burn before their dwellings the tar-barrels offered them. The prince did not yet openly venture to show displeasure, but to his friends he expressed his indignation at the intrigues of the peace party. Zealand and Leyden had no celebration, and in many a city and village the preachers inveighed from the pulpit against the promoters of peace. People remembered on June 5th, the day of the proclamation of peace, that just eighty years earlier Egmont and Hoorn had been beheaded, and the festivities seemed somewhat forced, "like a marriage that takes place without the consent of friends," as Aitzema jestingly remarks.

In truth a dark shadow upon the treaty was this lack of the "consent of friends," particularly of that of France, with which country a close alliance had so recently been made. The excuse often heard for this breaking of faith with France, that this kingdom only feigned a wish to conclude peace and never really desired it, rests on an unjust conception of the facts.¹ It is not to be denied that the United Netherlands for their own advantage left

¹ Compare Chéruel, *Minorité*, ii., p. 475.

conduct of the States towards France the very dubious morality embodied that treaties are only valid so long as the temporary interest of the powers that has countless times been put in p

The peace of Münster was brilliant. The United Netherlands might well be pr gave them among the powers of Europe. The treaty, ' seventy-nine articles in length, 1 "the States-General of the United N respective provinces of the same wi districts, towns, and appertaining lan sovereign States," on which the king of claim now, nor ever hereafter shall cl himself, his successors, and descendants he concludes "an eternal peace." W empire there was to be a continuation (2) friendship, the king coöperating until th the emperor and empire should be obt (3) tory was indicated by the possessions t all the conquests of Maurice and Freder kept, unless they had been recapture court, consisting of an equal number of side, was to settle the minor difference (4) tiers and rights. The *status quo* was East and West.

footing of friendship, with prohibition of higher taxes than their own subjects paid, retention of the former exemptions from toll, and abolition of the king's rights to tolls on the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt within the borders of the United Provinces. The Scheldt and its canals were kept closed by the States; the vessels and goods coming in and out of the Flemish ports were to pay duties equal to what was imposed on those entering and leaving the Scheldt, so that the dreaded competition of Antwerp and Flanders would be finally suppressed. In the matter of religion everything likely to cause scandal was to be avoided in public exercises both in the Netherlands and in the dominions of the king, and ecclesiastical property in the United Netherlands was restored or paid for. Restitution was to be made of the property of the house of Orange, even in Burgundy, with exceptions previously agreed upon. The members of the house of Nassau were not to be prosecuted for the debts of the late Prince William I. of Orange. Prisoners on both sides were to be released without ransom and with complete amnesty for all political offences. All records and documents relating to places ceded, also those concerning litigation, etc., were to be mutually delivered. The allies of both sides, who within three months after the ratification should wish to accede, were to be allowed to participate in the peace, especially Hesse, East Friesland, Emden, and the Hanse towns. Both sides promised to protect the seas and rivers as much as possible from piracy.

Such was the treaty alike honourable and advantageous to the United Netherlands. It put an end to the war, which had been waged during eighty years with varying success, which under the able guidance of the three princes of Orange and of the States of Holland, Zealand, and the other provinces had called into being the strong and independent state now making its appearance among

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the powers of Europe. That state was destined for at least a hundred years to hold an important place in the history of the world—the glory of its citizens and their descendants, an object of admiration to contemporaries and later generations.



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CHAPTER VII

FIRST YEARS OF PEACE

THE young republic of the United Netherlands after the peace of Münster appeared resplendent amid Europe's states. Her territory, inconsiderable compared with that of the great powers of the time, would scarcely have given her a claim to a modest place in the council chamber of Europe, but the glorious history of her origin, the energy of her relatively large population, and the development of her strength often allowed her a deciding voice. She owed this not merely to herself, but also to the political circumstances which for the moment prevented other, greater, and more populous states from exerting their full force.

France, after the battle of Rocroy, that lowered Spain's military renown, coming up more and more as the first power in Europe, beheld itself weakened in the midst of an arduous foreign war by internal commotions, by the contest of the Fronde against the omnipotent Mazarin and the court of the reigning queen-mother. The brilliant Paris of Henry IV. and Richelieu was the scene of civil war and a strife of barricades, and the restlessness prevailing there and in the provinces acted unfavourably upon the influence of France abroad. Unhappy is the country where the king is a child, even though this child is named Louis XIV. The old enemy, Spain, lay exhausted and now sought more in diplomacy than in war the means of preserving some of its importance in Europe. England, since Elizabeth with greater mari-

time pretensions than its actual sea-power, and now, in Cromwell's days, disposing of a disciplined army under one of the greatest generals it has ever known, was paralysed by the civil war which in 1649 brought King Charles I. to the scaffold. The German empire, enjoying long desired peace after a barbarous war of thirty years, had seen in this war the bonds uniting its states still further loosened: neither the emperor, constantly menaced by the Turks, nor Brandenburg, Cologne, Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, or any other German state could match the republic in power and prestige. The Baltic powers did not feel equal to her: Denmark sued for her favour to hold Sweden in check; Sweden, although proud of its victories on sea and land, hesitated to oppose the States, its old allies; Poland followed unwillingly the Danish example. Asiatic Muscovy respected the strong commercial state of the west more than any other in Europe. The Turks still considered the republic as their ally against Spain in the Mediterranean Sea. The piratical states of Africa's northern coast feared to exercise their calling too openly at the expense of the Dutch merchant ships, remembering the sharp lessons inflicted upon their corsairs by such commanders as Tromp, Evertsen, De Ruyter, and Van Galen. Italy's antiquated little states, mostly chained to Spain, were of slight consequence in Europe; Venice asked the support of the States in its hard fight against the Turks. Little Portugal alone ventured to thwart the republic. It was not really the republic but the West India Company, the commercial corporation, with which it contended for the mastery in Brazil, calculating that the States were enjoying the just concluded peace too much to engage again in war.

How proud the Dutch must have felt at the place in the world won by their country! We find the echo of this feeling in the contemporary prose and poetry. The

historian Wicquefort, commissioned by the Estates of Holland to write the history of the time, reminds his readers "that this history may be put upon a parallel with the finest histories of past ages,"¹ and says of the republic "that there is no power in Europe which has not sought her friendship and which has not found advantage in her alliance." In his *Song of Peace* Vondel sings to "hollow and hungry Europe":

"Netherland's peace doth now laws give
To all realms and princes around,
Light she sheds on healthful ground,
With torch and trump to make joy live."

And he compares his "Batavians" with the "State of the valiant Latins." The pamphlets of those days show the plain Dutch citizens expressing their opinions on the monarchs and countries of the world. Over the beer, in the boat, on the waggon, in the bookshop political events are discussed without fear and with a remarkable knowledge of affairs. Citizen and peasant judge and condemn Charles I. and Cromwell, Mazarin and the French nobles with equal freedom. The good people of Amsterdam seek the latest news from distant lands every morning and try to profit by it. "Thus the world all seems to be built about Amsterdam."

The "profit" of the merchant became more and more the principle guiding the policy of the States, especially of the Estates of Holland. And in Holland it was Amsterdam that gave the tone, as was shown by its pushing through the peace of Münster despite all opposition. The interest of commerce was to rule the politics of the republic so long as Amsterdam had its way, supported as it was by many regents in Holland, whose cities were dependent on Amsterdam or considered commerce as necessary to the existence of

¹ *Histoire des Provinces Unies*, i., p. 2.

their country. But on the other side stood a powerful party with quite other interests in domestic and foreign politics, the old Orange war party. It could still count upon the preachers, whose hatred against Spain and Rome was coupled with a strong aversion to commerce, which they abominated as incompatible with true religion. It found a vigorous leader in the young prince of Orange who did not conceal his dislike of "those rascals who have made peace," of whom he wished he could "break the neck," and who now rising from his life of "debauchery and pleasure" hoped for a resumption of the war. It was supported by the army and its officers, whose income fell off in time of peace, and by Zealand, which sadly needed its rich revenues from privateering during war. The opposition between the two parties speedily appeared in foreign affairs. Amsterdam and the prince soon antagonised one another secretly and openly in all things.

This was evident from the attitude of the republic towards Spain, the latter country being represented from June, 1649, by its ambassador, Antoine Brun.¹ More than anybody else on the Spanish side, Brun was convinced that peace with the republic had alone rescued the southern Netherlands, placed between two fires, for Spain from the danger of a partition between France and the States. So he came with the purpose of maintaining this peace as long as possible. In the beginning there were naturally many matters to cause friction, particularly with reference to disputed territory, to commercial interests, and to the possession of ecclesiastical property. But Brun settled everything quietly with the support of Archduke Leopold William, governor of the southern Netherlands. The able Spanish

¹Archives, iv., p. 314.

²P. L. Muller, *Spain and the parties in the Netherlands*, in *Nijhoff's Bijdr. N. R.* vii., p. 136; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies*, ii., p. 270.

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diplomatist kept on good terms with the princess-mother, Frederick Henry's influential widow, and with her friends. Through her and them he attempted to win the young prince, but he quickly observed that the prince, full of aversion to Spain, the arch-enemy of his house, was not to be persuaded by any large pensions or promises of future revenues. Brun's hope remained fixed upon Holland, and with its statesmen he coöperated to prevent the prince from throwing himself into war again in alliance with France. The courtesies he heaped on the States, the pompous phraseology in which he recognised their independence on every occasion, were intended to show Spain's good and loyal feeling towards such plans.

France, both Mazarin and his opponents of the Fronde, desired nothing more than this renewal of the war, and the prince himself was burning with impatience to resume the ancient strife of his fathers. Like his cousin William Frederick of Nassau and his confidant Cornelis van Aerssen, lord of Sommelsdijk, he believed in his heart that Spain in 1648 was only saved from ruin by the peace and must have given up the southern Netherlands, if the war had been continued. By a new alliance with France to retrieve the loss suffered, by a joint conquest of the southern Netherlands to prevent Spain from ever attacking the republic again at a more favourable opportunity, and thus to realise the brilliant plans of his father, the old vision of his grandfather who was so foully murdered by Spain's hireling—this was the prince's ideal. In August, 1649, we find him in secret relations with d' Estrades, who, under Frederick Henry, had repeatedly been the intermediary between the Oranges and the crown of France. Willem Boreel, arriving at Paris in 1650 as Dutch ambassador, remained outside of these affairs. The French ambassador at The Hague, Brasset, zealously aided in them, as did William Frederick and Sommelsdijk who maintained relations with

of the southern Netherland
Mazarinades in French and
Netherlands proves an excellent
affairs.

With regard also to the
prince and Holland were
abhorred the sentence of
victim, but the prince, with
now King Charles II., had
wished for nothing more than
in-law's death and help from
in-law. His dynastic interests
Cromwell and Parliament, at
war with Spain, a joint war
France, against revolutionary
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have been chiefly a naval power
its commerce and fishery. It
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placet Deo, translated in a pamphlet: "the justice of a war is always decided by the victory." The preservation of neutrality brought many difficulties. When in the autumn of 1648 two envoys of Parliament, Dr. Isaac Doreslaer, a Hollander by birth, and Walter Strickland, appeared at The Hague to announce an embassy from Parliament and to urge that the royal fleet should not be received in the harbours of the Meuse, where it had taken refuge from the Parliament's fleet, Holland recognised the justice of this claim, and the prince had to yield, though he continued to aid the royal family with advice and money. While Holland rendered all honour to the two envoys as ambassadors of a friendly power, it could not secure their reception as such by the States-General, the royal English resident Boswell continuing to be recognised. The horrible murder of Doreslaer on May 12th by Scottish partisans of Charles II. in The Hague remained unpunished, to the vexation of Parliament, under the pretext that the perpetrators could not be discovered among the many English refugees in the capital. The assassins fled to the southern Netherlands, and nothing was done but to protect Strickland, who tarried longer to keep an eye upon the intrigues of the royalists. But the States-General persistently declined to receive him, so that, bitterly complaining, he left The Hague in the summer of 1650. After this treatment of its envoys Parliament sent his passport unasked to the Dutch ambassador in London, the old Joachimi, but in order to please Holland assented to the dispatch of Gerard Schaepe of Amsterdam as commissioner or consul in charge of the interests of Dutch subjects and even honoured him like a real ambassador. Thus the republic and its new English sister were on a very delicate footing, and not much was needed to precipitate a conflict, especially as the royalists started from here all manner of plans, equipping ships and soldiers for Scotland, where Charles II.

circumstances.¹

Less sharp was the conflict between the Baltic states. Denmark proposed Sweden with the help of the inducement it offered for the reduction of the burdens of Frederick III., who had a Danish statesman, Corfitz Ulfeldt, at The Hague to propose to the States an alliance and a redemption of the provinces having no commerce with an alliance with Denmark for the Swedes, and the prince was so greatly interested that the treaty was carried through the "redemption" with the defensive alliance, but the treaty was really concluded by Holland, Friesland, and Gelderland. Denmark paid the States 1,000,000 guilders a year.²

Another commercial affair was the dispute between Portugal concerning Brazil. In the years in 1647, the West India Company stood at thirty per cent.,³ and the States obtained financial and material aid

ugal, continually victorious in Brazil. The Portuguese ambassador at The Hague, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, ought to prevent this help by clever diplomacy. In October, 1649, it was finally resolved to assist with a fleet the company, which had long ago lost Angola and Loando in Africa, and only retained possession of a few places in Brazil, but before action was taken, its condition became so bad that all help seemed superfluous. After Count John Maurice's departure Witte Corneliszoon de With appeared unable with his small force to sustain the rapidly declining Dutch authority in Brazil. He retired in 1648 to Recife and asked for reinforcement, but he was left to his fate and gave vent to his indignation in numerous letters, complaining of his pitiful want of provisions, etc., and declaring he would serve "rather the Turk than the company." At last his circumstances grew so desperate that in the spring of 1650 he returned, upon his own responsibility, with a few ships to the fatherland. He arrived in May, but, for leaving his post without orders, the prince, after consultation with the States-General, had him thrown into prison at The Hague, while his captains were imprisoned by the admiralty at Amsterdam. Holland was exasperated at this asserted violation of its sovereign rights by the prince, the States-General, and the admiralty. The captains were liberated from prison by violence. Without the consent of the provincial Estates the States-General had no jurisdiction in any of the provinces, and De With, as a subject of Holland, could only be tried before a judge of Holland. Fearing Holland would release the admiral also on its own authority, the prince allowed him to be conducted to his lodging. Meanwhile the Portuguese rule was restored in Brazil at the expense of the company, and war with Portugal did not break out. There was no desire to engage in a new war for a dying company, whose misfortune was chiefly due to poor

management and neglect, no matter how stockholders cried.

Relations were reasonably good with the sm on the eastern border, especially with the frien of Brandenburg, now related to the house c The States remained on amicable terms with t Elector," one of the "most considerable" princes of his day, who then resided at Cleves appointed as governor there John Maurice the although they kept possession of his fortresses E Gennep, Wesel, etc. They were friends also energetic landgravine of Hesse, who extended risons far over her frontiers to the Rhine and Friesland. The States held Emden and Le East Friesland as strategical points. East Fri well as Bremen and other Hanse towns, neede port of the States against Oldenburg, which h lished a toll upon the Weser, thereby getting in difficulties. But the States were unwilling t even with little O i

the political traditions of his family. Young and ardent in spirit, personally popular, surrounded by young officers, urged on by the family of his English wife, full of sympathy for France, and sharing its indignation at the peace of Münster, he would be a dangerous adversary for Holland's statesmen, if ever he could win as much influence as his father had enjoyed. The policy of the republic would then be ruled not by the commercial interests of Holland but by dynastic and political considerations of a general nature. Thus the republic's foreign affairs were closely connected with the influence of the prince,¹ and her internal condition must be of importance to the rest of Europe. And just in these years came a domestic crisis which was attentively watched from abroad.

Holland's endeavour was to prevent the prince from obtaining the great influence which his father had secured between 1630 and 1640. Naturally it aimed at a diminution of the prince's power by cutting down the army, the excellently organised instrument which his father and uncle had used to establish their authority. There was cause enough in the present state of peace to disband some of the troops become superfluous after the treaty with Spain. The financial burden, under which Holland had groaned for years with its debt of 120 millions of guilders, would be lessened by such a disbandment. This had been one of the chief reasons of Holland's eagerness for peace.² On the conclusion of peace the army consisted of about 60,000 men, cavalry and infantry, costing annually nearly ten millions. The prince, the council of state, and the Estates of Holland agreed that so many troops were no longer necessary,

¹ Mazarin refers to this at the end of 1649: *Archives*, iv., p. 326. Cf. Waddington, ii., p. 251.

² Wijnne, *De geschillen over de afdanking van't krijgsvolk* (*Werken Hist. Gen.*, No. 41), p. xiv. Cf. De Beaufort, *Geschiedk. Opstellen*, ii., p. 66.

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who would not hear to it, and who
state and Count William Frederic
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possible domestic disturbances, sufficient
kept to guard the frontiers and to guard
They thought that 30,000 men at least
during the Truce. Holland wished that
mustered out from each company, which
council considered too much. After
Estates of Holland resolved in October
of money to citizens for the lodgings
should cease and that the soldiers should
and provide their own lodgings; that the
should be changed into light arquebuser
eign troops paid by Holland and fifty
them in the whole army should be distributed
of the remaining cavalry. The prince's
tion too considerable, and when His
authority discharged the 600 men, that
and later the six other provinces in
declared this action unlawful, which
consideration acknowledged. The
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arquebusiers and agreed to subscribe to
of the 600 men, if this were accomplished.
General

panies of the excellent foreign troops. After remonstrances from Holland in the interest of its involved finances, the prince made some further concession, but Holland insisted upon the disbandment of fifty-five companies of infantry and nearly half of the cavalry, reducing the army to less than 25,000 men. During the autumn of 1649 the wrangling continued, while Holland justified to the other provinces its attitude by official letters and secretly, and the States-General sought to dissuade Holland from the threatened arbitrary disbandment.

Little progress was made in the spring of 1650. Holland asserted that it would have an annual deficit of one million guilders even with its proposed disbandment, and flatly declined to approve of the number of troops desired by the prince, appealing to its right to be taxed no more than it wished. It was no longer simply how many and what troops should be mustered out, the difference at last being only about a few hundreds, but it was chiefly the difficult constitutional question how far a province, as paymaster of the troops standing to its apportionment, had a right to consider itself invested with sovereign power over those troops,—whether the army of the republic was a whole or whether it consisted of seven separate armies. This was connected with the important question, how far the provincial sovereignty went as opposed to that of the States-General—the old apple of discord which had caused so much mischief in Oldenbarnevelt's time. The antagonism between what may be called the federal and the unionistic conceptions of the state of the United Netherlands appeared sharply, joined as in the days of the Truce with the not unjustified dread of too great power for the princes of Orange. Just as Maurice in 1618 championed the rights of the States-General against the Estates of Holland, William II. now defended the same rights. As Oldenbarnevelt then

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disputes. There were not wan
religion into the affair: preachers
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warned against the religious ideas
which seemed to them merely a
Arminian faction. This time the F
by the council pensionary, as the
now called. Jacob Cats had been
of Frederick Henry to oppose h
Pauw kept in the background. A
stood the burgomasters and ex-bu
dam, the most prominent being
Cats

A minority even in the Estates of Holland favoured a middle course or stood on the prince's side.

The prince was powerfully supported by his cousin, Count William Frederick, who was now playing the part of William Louis in 1618, urging his young relative to resistance and consulting with him on the measures to be adopted.¹ Also the prince was much under the influence of his confidant, Cornelis van Aerssen, lord of Sommelsdijk, a friend to France, the son of François, a colonel in the service of the States, a rich and influential man, who with less ability dreamed of acting the part of his father against the "Spanish-loving Arminians." Further the prince was influenced by the dangerous intriguer, Cornelis Musch, clerk of the States-General, and among the prince's advisers must be named his secretary, Hildersich. These four constantly appear in the pamphlets as the trusted counsellors of the prince, mention sometimes being made of Alexander van der Capellen, lord of Aartsbergen, and Johan van Rheede van Renswoude of Utrecht. There was a close connection between domestic and foreign politics in these dissensions. While no shadow of proof exists that the Holland party consulted Spain secretly, as the prince and his friends supposed, it is certain that the prince himself sought the advice of the French crown concerning his measures and that, for the contingency of civil war in the republic, he counted upon the support of France for the six provinces against Holland. France was to be promised that peace with Spain should be broken after the restoration of internal tranquillity. Though the French government actually bound itself to nothing, it evidently desired to see the prince victorious. But it was unwilling to compromise itself and waited for the turn domestic affairs would take. For the time being, the young and inexperienced prince seemed the weaker party as

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 320 *et seq.*, especially p. 336. Cf. Wijnne, p. lxxxv.


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resolved to send a "very notable deputation" to the cities of Holland, which deputation was to be appointed by the prince, while full authority was given him to take measures for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the Union.¹ This most important resolution invested the prince temporarily with dictatorial power and was hastily passed. But the difficulty was that the resolution was adopted only by a majority of votes and under protest from Holland, while Utrecht opposed but yielded later, and Gelderland objected to the "authorisation" of the prince. Considering further that the voters were not numerous, the whole assembly consisting at most of about thirty persons, the authority granted the prince assumes a doubtful character. The prince's presence during the discussion influenced the course of affairs, although he departed before the voting. On the following day the prince came again to the meeting and informed it that he would himself head the deputation, to which he had appointed four members of the States-General: Aartsbergen of Gelderland, Mauregnault of Zealand, Renswoude of Utrecht, Clant of Groningen; two members of the council of state, Asperen of Holland and Lucassen of Zealand, besides the treasurer-general Brasser. This communication was accepted as a notification, and the prince was asked to persuade the cities of Holland to yield "by all means of induction."

The deputation started out on the 8th of June, accompanied by a brilliant retinue of about 400 officers, designed to impress magistrates and population. Only one town, Medemblik, was not visited, but the prince appeared in all the other towns of Holland entitled to vote. The result, however, did not equal the expectations. Some cities showed themselves ready to consent to the prince's will. No less than nine refused more or less roundly to yield. Dordrecht set the example: its town-council,

¹Wicquefort, i., *Pilces justificatives*, No. xiv.




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the deputation, but the prince
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half, while officers mustered out were to obtain a pension, and those remaining in the service received the same pay or a little less. The commission from the Estates of Holland wished to discharge 1125 men and 116 cavalymen more, to abolish the allowance for lodgings, and to cut down the pay of the officers. From a "Conciliatory advice" soon presented to the Estates of Holland it appeared that they wanted to disband only 585 more men than the prince, so that, "the difference being of slight importance," no great trouble would have resulted, if much more had not already happened between the prince and Holland. It was determined on July 29th to make this advice into a resolution.

But Holland on the 27th had sent a letter to the six other provinces defending its "separate discontinuation of the payment of some militia," and the prince, angered by opposition, now decided to make use of the resolution of June 5th and to throw the sword into the scales. In concert with his advisers he concluded to arrest six members of the Estates of Holland, who, as he said later, had shown "insolent obstinacy," and with a reliable armed force to occupy Amsterdam or some other cities. The double plan was carefully arranged weeks beforehand and was now to be rapidly executed.

Early on the morning of Saturday the 30th, Jacob de Witt of Dordrecht, Jan de Wael, burgomaster, and Albert Ruyl, pensionary of Haarlem, Jan Duyst van Voorhout, burgomaster of Delft, Nanning Keyser, burgomaster of Hoorn, and Nicolaas Stellingwerff, pensionary of Medemblik, were summoned to the prince, but on their arrival the lieutenant-colonel of his guard, Van Meteren, arrested and locked them up each in a separate room of the prince's quarters. The persons named were chosen, not because they all had especially declared themselves against the prince's plans, but to punish the respective cities for their opposition. The prince, who



appointed for the return
Meanwhile an armed force
and the prince's guard
Hague. The president
General were summoned
what had occurred. The
were conveyed under military
commandant of Loeveste
first part of the plans was
satisfaction.

The operation against Amersfoort was successful. The management of the city itself wished to undertake at Count William Frederick's disposal forty-eight companies, numbers collected at Amersfoort, Uiterkerk, and later were joined under command of the count at Noordwijk and Sommelsdijck to surprise the city, and this was done by tillot, a Frenchman, who, in a boat with fifty picked officers, appeared upon a gate early in the morning with his troops. Thus it was executed without bloodshed, which the case. Gentillet

commander arrived in the night from The Hague at Abcoude, and Sommelsdijk and Dohna from Gelderland were also there in time, but the cavalry, ten companies from Arnhem and Nimwegen under Captain Mom, went astray in a storm near Hilversum on the heath and came much too late. At the appointed time there were only four companies of cavalry in Abcoude, with which it was not dared to begin operations from fear of armed resistance, so that Gentillot, tired of waiting, drew back upon the main force at Abcoude.

Meanwhile the wandering cavalry had been observed by the postal messenger from Hamburg to Amsterdam. He had been incautiously allowed to proceed to the city, and just after eight o'clock he informed the burgomaster, Cornelis Bicker, that he had seen unknown troops a few hours away. The report was soon confirmed by the governor of the castle of Muiden and by fleeing peasants. Bicker, who chanced to be the only burgomaster present, had the gates closed at once, raised the drawbridges, and assembled the town-council, believing some Swedish or Lorraine soldiers from Jülich or Brabant were approaching, and remembering recent rumours of hostile designs against the city. Later in the day vigorous measures of defence were taken: the council of war was summoned, the militia was called to arms, cannon were dragged to the walls, armed vessels were stationed in the Y and Amstel, and preparations for inundating the surrounding country were made. Count William Frederick, at last in possession of his whole force, moved from Abcoude close to the city, but he found it so ready for resistance that he did nothing but send in a letter from the prince, which was to have been delivered to the town-council after the surprise. The prince expressed a wish with the support of his troops to give his message to the council. Not until evening did two members of the council come in an armed boat to inform the count that



by water. Count William
posted his troops so as to
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Hague until after the mor
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and perceiving that the othe
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separate article, which the
escape, stipulated that the
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tions of the States-General
found the matter settled.]
following day and A

The prince had attained his object, although not quite in the anticipated way. The six arrested members remained a few weeks longer in confinement at Loevestein, but after consultation with their cities they were released one after the other in the latter part of August, the cities having to remove them from office. The "reasons and motives" for the imprisonment were delivered in a sealed packet by the prince to Holland and the States-General, and so this affair came also to an end.¹ The disbandment was taken up again in August, and the prince met the universal wish for economy by a sacrifice of the foreign troops so dear to him. This was agreed to by a unanimous vote of the States-General, while it was also established that no province could disband on its own authority, and differences must be settled by amicable agreement or by the stadtholders. Twenty French, thirty-two English, and three Scotch companies were designated for discharge besides twelve companies of cavalry; four companies of cavalry and 1000 men of the infantry continued in service six weeks longer, while an effort was made to decide about them. In response to the prince's communication the Estates of the six provinces thanked him for the trouble he had taken. At the end of August the prince went to Dieren to amuse himself, after his success, with hunting, and Cats says in rhyme:

"All that trouble great, 't was gone in a moment's flash
Like the thick clouds, which the heavens with wonder dash."

The result of the contest increased the prince's credit, although the opposing party, now again called the "Loevestein faction," was still dangerous because so numerously represented in the town-councils of Holland. The attitude towards France was modified in accordance with the known partiality of the now powerful Orange

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 398.

111 September matters
prince consulted with Bras
d' Estrades, who was then
how mediation could be be
States-General to send an u
archduke at Brussels, intim
his victorious troops penetr
should accept the mediatio
States determined simply to
parties, and this was chiefly
The French wanted the affair
ously, though it was evident
before Holland could be pers
October the draft was made,
treaty between France and
joint war against Spain in the
official mediation of the Stat
was not ripe for such far-reac
circumstances the prince w
approved of the draft. Yet h
Before the middle of October
to Dieren again, ostensibly for
over the Estates of Gelderlan
tiation concerning the sale

¹ Archives. iv. p. 100.

Brandenburg to Prince William seems to indicate other plans, connected perhaps with a ducal title in Gelderland—plans and prospects of much importance for the republic's internal condition.

While all this was in suspense, and nobody could tell the result, the news suddenly came that the prince had been taken sick at Dieren. Some days later the illness was pronounced a light case of small-pox. Although the treacherous nature of this malady was well known, the reports at first excited no alarm. The patient was brought to The Hague, and the disease was supposed to be taking its ordinary course, when it was announced that the prince had died late in the evening of the 6th of November. It was a terrible blow to the house of Orange and to the fatherland. Although the exasperation of the Holland party gave utterance to many a bitter word concerning the departed, although an unknown donor thus exulted in the contribution box of an Amsterdam church:

"The prince deceased,
My gift 's increased;
No news pleased more
In years four score,"

there was nobody untouched by this sudden death. Is it strange that murmurs of poisoning were heard and have continued even to our time? They arose from the apparent carelessness of the physicians in their early treatment of the case, and Spain's presumed interest in the prince's death strengthened the otherwise baseless suspicion.¹ Deep was the dismay of the people attached to Orange, and only the birth of a son, eight days later, afforded some consolation, or at least some hope for the future, which seemed at first dark for Orange as well as for the fatherland, that felt the absence of a prince of

¹ See De Beaufort, *Geschiedkundige Opstellen*, ii., p. 102.

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was accomplished not by the '
The moderate elements of the
the prince's sudden death, l
government of the States on
two parties the former, headed
the Amsterdam lords and Jacc
the more powerful; the other
lead of the rather unprincipled
very moderate Beverweert, an
Wolfert van Brederode insignifi
paralysed by dissensions, partic
between the princess dowager,
princess royal.

The jealousy between the am
the proud mother of the new-
Orange party greatly. While st
princess royal, who aspired to th
her son, quarrelled with Prince
the youth of the princess as
another guardian, having her ow
elector of Brandenburg. The
royal for her English family
eager to assist with the mon
arrogance of the English king
mother-in-law the former's i

and Brederode, the "born count of Holland," a scion of the race that asserted its descent from the ancient family of counts, all three having an eye upon the military posts of the dead prince, by the opposition to the elector as a foreigner, and by discord between him and the chief advisers of the princess royal, Beverweert and Johan van Kerchoven, lord of Heenvliet. Under these circumstances some universally hated Orangemen, like Johan de Knuyt in Zealand and Musch in Holland, became victims. De Knuyt was removed from his post of first nobleman, and the clerk escaped a similar fate and an investigation of his far from spotless life by a speedy death.

The question of the guardianship was referred by the Estates of Holland to the court of Holland, which pronounced for the mother as guardian with the addition of the elector. The grandmother and the elector appealed from this decision to the High Council, which declared all three guardians with the prince of Landsberg, a Palatinate relative of the Orange house. This met with the approval of none of the parties, and after much wrangling an agreement was reached in August, 1651, that the guardianship should be exercised by the princess royal as guardian, together with the princess dowager and the elector. The cradle of young William Henry of Orange was surrounded by quarrelling members of the family. Even over his name difficulties arose, the mother wishing to call him Charles after her brother, the English exile. But uncommon princely splendour was displayed at his christening as also at his father's funeral.

Naturally the Estates of Holland and of the other provinces encountered slight opposition in getting possession of the rights enjoyed by the princes of Orange. Immediately after the prince's death the States-General came together hastily, informed the different provinces of the event, and requested them to

deputations went to the prov
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called "Great Assembly" was
possible to Holland's liking. Th
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easily to be managed. The State
land proposed and summoned for t
the seven provinces to a "Great A
the Estates of Holland resolved
of the appointment of magistrates.
received from the Estates the priv
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"lieutenant" for the young prince
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in this opinion, as did also Utr
Overysse. A few days after the 1
gen had chosen Count William F
The Estates of Holland seized --

the rector of Leyden University, the granting of pardons; the prince's guard became the guard of the Estates; the keys of the gates were thenceforth to be kept by the magistrates of the town instead of by the military commander. Holland likewise entered into "private correspondence" with the other provinces, particularly with Zealand, in "preparatory conference"¹ over all sorts of affairs, which it desired to carry through the "Great Assembly" to be convened.

The Great Assembly did not meet in 1650 but was solemnly opened on the 18th of January, 1651, in the old knightly hall of the counts decorated with trophies of the Spanish war, with conquered flags and streamers.² The large hall offered by the Estates of Holland was provided with benches arranged around the sides in the manner of an amphitheatre. In the middle before the chimney there was a table for the officers and for the foreign ambassadors to be received. A considerable number of deputies from the seven provinces was present; especially from Holland and Friesland came many of the ablest magistrates, mostly members of the States-General; and this assembly might have passed for an extraordinary meeting of that body. After a short address by Pibo van Doma from Friesland, whose turn it was to preside over the States-General, Jacob Cats in the name of Holland made a long speech—"after his manner quite long and more polite than strong or touching" Wicquefort says of it. He affirmed that, nobody of the house of Orange now being capable of assuming the dignities of its fathers, circumstances made necessary deliberation upon the maintenance of the union of 1579. Three preliminary points had to be kept in view: the

¹ Joh. de Witt to Dordrecht, Jan. 7, 1651 (*Rijksarchief*). These and later notes from De Witt's correspondence are mostly taken from Fruin's full extracts.

² *Holl. Mercurius*, 1651, p. 60. Further, Wicquefort, ii., p. 3; Aitzema, iii., p. 496.

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no suitable stadtholder, with
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four partisans maintained in
appointing no stadtholder, whi
Groningen adhered to their vie
tration was so little decided."

thought of for the young prince, a contingency by no means impossible.

With regard to religion an agreement was soon beyond question upon the principles of Dort. They were to be maintained by each province in its territory "with the power of the land." But the five delegates from the provincial synods desired further vigorous action against "popish idolatry, superstition, and hierarchy," against the "innumerable Jesuits, priests, curates, and monks," who were overrunning the land "in thousands like locusts"; they asked also for enforcement of the placards against other sectaries, against the public worship of the Jews and the calumination of the reformed doctrine in books and other writings, finally for observance of Sunday and for measures against brothels, theatres, luxury, and such crying sins, in order to show that the authorities had not in vain received "the sword." The "politic" Estates of Holland were unwilling to go so far, although the more orthodox Zeeland urged that satisfaction should be given to the preachers. Friesland, Groningen, and Overijssel sided with Zeeland, but Gelderland and Utrecht hesitated. A proposal of Holland was, on January 27th, converted into a general resolution of the assembly. It declared that the Dort principles were to be conserved, that other sects should be kept "in all good order and quiet," that the placards against the Romanists should remain in force.

There was much more discussion concerning the army which had lately given rise to such dissension. Four things were prominent: the chief command, the transfer of garrisons, and the secret correspondence about military affairs within and without the country. The provinces were of most varying opinions, but Holland and Zeeland agreed in wishing to intrust the chief command to the council of state and not to the States-

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 506.

general with or without a
addressed vigorous repre
favour of the young prince
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The secret correspondence on
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pensions" was followed by a placard, which naturally did not remedy the evil. New instructions were drawn up for the council of state, the chamber of accounts, the boards of admiralty, the higher and lower officers of the general government. The foreign embassies remained subject to the States-General. The sittings and travelling expenses of the deputies of the States-General and the council of state were established.

Towards the end of the important meetings, to which it was sought to give a more solemn character by decreeing that the resolutions adopted should be considered "of the same power and vigour" as the union of Utrecht,¹ the council pensionary, Cats, in an evil hour raked up the troubles of 1650. He had repeatedly offered in the Estates of Holland to resign on account of his great age, but no action was taken so that in June, in order to bring out a decision, he simply laid upon the table important papers in his possession, among them being a written "Complaint" against Amsterdam and the carefully guarded "Reasons and motives" of Prince William "both with regard to the arrested gentlemen and to what is begun at, by, and about the city of Amsterdam." The reading of the latter violent document excited at once such indignation that special commissioners were authorised to investigate it further. They proposed to offer a written refutation of it to the Great Assembly, to request it to declare illegal the resolutions of June 5 and 6, 1650, which had led to one thing and another, and to withdraw the thanks previously offered to the prince. Holland examined the whole affair thoroughly and learned that Musch was the chief author of this document as well as of the complaint against Amsterdam. Musch was dead,

had reached the noblest parts of the state." Cf. Pamphlet Thys., No. 5900.

¹ The resolutions are sometimes comprehended under the name "Further union of The Hague of 1651" (Pamphlet Thys., No. 5879, 5880, *et seq.*).



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men exulted loudly: "now the Lion has again a clog upon his claw."¹

The work of the assembly was unquestionably important. By its resolutions, as well as by what it left undone, it fixed the government of the republic in the form resulting from the insurrection against Spain. Availing itself of the temporary eclipse of the sun of Orange, it organised the government of the States, with all its faults and without great changes, for the needs of the moment. The aristocracy of the regents, whose representative it might be considered, maintained through it, under the lead of Holland's statesmen, the principle of "aristocratic government" in opposition to the monarchical tendencies of recent times and to feeble democratic utterances here and there. The principle set up by Oldenbarnevelt and his partisans was most plainly subscribed to by the Great Assembly in all its acts. John de Witt thus formulates this principle in one of his letters: "these provinces are not together *una respublica*, but each province is separately a sovereign *respublica*, so that these United Provinces must be called not by the name of *respublica* (in the singular number) but by the name of *respublicæ federatæ* or *unitæ* (in the plural number)."² This principle may be regarded as of great importance for the future of the United Netherlands, although it was far from finding universal acceptance.

¹ Jer. de Decker.

² Dated May 10, 1652 (*Rijksarchief*).



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 called, but were of a more critical

Between the English and the D
 long existed a commercial jealousy
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 in the time of James and Charles I
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 internal troubles. Shortly after th
 that denial of English supremacy
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 to continue th

the complaint. Seeing that England could do little, the States paid no attention to the English pretensions. Meanwhile the English claims had excited a deeply rooted hostility to the English in a large portion of the population of the Netherlands. Many merchants, seamen, and fishermen showed aversion to everything that was English. There was further since the king's execution a universal detestation among the Dutch of the English regicides, who had laid hands upon their sovereign. The old complaints of English arrogance towards foreigners were repeatedly heard in the Netherlands and appeared in numerous pamphlets dealing with English affairs of the day. As England's power rose under Cromwell's energetic rule, these complaints did not become less, especially when English war ships about 1650 began annoying Dutch merchantmen with the search of their cargo and crew on the pretext of acting against the piracy of the French and of the English royalists in the Channel.

The feeling in England towards the Dutch was not kindly. A self-conceited contempt for the smaller nation and ridicule of its peculiarities, of its slowness, its intemperance, its distrust, its thirst for gain, the comparative roughness of its "mynheers," its exaggerated neatness, led to sharp criticism of the republic's inhabitants. English travels and pamphlets of the time are full of all this. The protection granted in the Netherlands to those now considered as England's enemies, the unpunished murder of Doreslaer, the preference shown to the king's ambassadors over those of Parliament, the memory of the unfortunate Ambon affair, commercial difficulties in India and elsewhere — all had occasioned much bad blood and increased in England the national enmity toward the Dutch. As long as the civil war continued, the attitude of the States with regard to the old pretensions was without danger, but conditions changed

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in the worst way. St. John proposed "a more strict and intimate alliance and union" for the promotion of "a more intrinsic and mutual interest of each in other," founded upon similarity of religion, government, and commercial interest. The idea encountered cool reserve upon the part of the Dutch. The majority of the population of the Netherlands, favouring the Orange family and the Stuarts, wanted no close connection. Not to displease the ambassadors, it was declared that "a treaty over common interests" would be concluded. But this was altogether too general for St. John. He desired a "clear and satisfactory answer" and formally offered a close, defensive alliance which was then discussed seriously in the provincial Estates.

While the affair was in suspense, news came that Tromp, sent out to curb the royalist privateers on the Scilly Islands, had occupied one of these islands. This act, viewed with suspicion in England, also the attitude of the populace and of the Bohemian royal family, Prince Edward being especially conspicuous, in The Hague towards the Englishmen of the embassy so angered Parliament that it summoned St. John home and only rescinded this resolution, when Holland promised to stop the insults and actually prosecuted Prince Edward. Negotiations were resumed, the English now considering chiefly the support given the Stuarts in the Netherlands, while the Dutch sought reciprocity of commercial advantages with restoration of the *Magnus Intercursus* of 1496. The English, showing little diplomatic talent, reverted often in vague terms to the plans of union, but the States, ever dreading public opinion, made answer more in general. The English demands concerning the royalists appeared on the contrary very definite. In certain cases they asked for the confiscation of the property of those daring to support the royalists, thus also of the princess of Orange, a request impossible to grant. Pro-



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¹ Gardiner, II., p. 82.



the father's imprisonment by command of the prince : have shocked the son who with Cornelius set about ring his release. The exclusion of the father from place in the government menaced their future also, and the prince's death suddenly improved their position. Jacob de Witt returned immediately to the government of Dordrecht, and John became pensionary of his native town on December 21, 1650. With a number of members of the government he then represented the States regularly in the Estates of Holland, soon also in the Great Assembly, where he exercised an important influence, especially in the treatment of the English proposals. Concerning them and domestic affairs we possess noteworthy information in his correspondence with his city.¹ In the autumn of 1651 he assisted Pauw in managing relations with England. He was a member of the committee appointed January 25, 1652, by the States of Holland to give advice on English affairs. As pensionary of the "first city" of Holland he could not take a place on that commission, but his ability drew attention to the young statesman who was soon greatly to influence the fate of his country.

After negotiations with St. John were broken off and the Englishmen had departed, the Great Assembly, at the motion of Holland, resolved to send an extraordinary embassy to England. The unexpected promulgation of the Navigation Act lessened the chances of its success, and some months elapsed before the embassy was sent. It consisted of Cats, the former commissioner of the West India Company, and the Zealander Van de Perre. These gentlemen landed at Gravesend on Christmas, receiving all the honours of honour, though hooted at by the people of London, where caricatures and pamphlets appeared against them. The embassy was to negotiate not only the *Magnus Intercursus*, but also for the repeal of

¹ The letters are in the Royal Archives.



Witt especially, dreaded this as a great misfortune for both nations. First of all the increase of the navy was an urgent necessity.

Economy had been introduced in the navy after the peace of Münster. Some ships of war were sold openly or secretly, also to England, or dismantled; many seamen were discharged; and good captains went into the merchant marine. In February the States-General resolved to fit out fifty, later one hundred more vessels, for the protection of commerce¹ which could not be well enough guarded by the fleet of nearly seventy-five ships then in existence. The resolution to enlarge the navy was brought to the notice of the various powers, including England. It was regarded by the English government as a threat and occasioned a considerable increase of the navy on that side also, so that it soon numbered far over one hundred sails. The English vessels were larger and better manned than the Dutch, even than Tromp's flagship, the *Brederode*. While both sides prepared, the Dutch ambassadors continued to negotiate, but the long list of grievances with the indemnity desired, which the English government in March laid before them, was not promising. A month later that government requested before further negotiation "settlement of the demands, which are a matter of right and justice and touch our honour." Negotiations went on until the end of May, when an unexpected event precipitated the crisis.

The question of the right to search the cargo of neutrals and to confiscate the enemy's goods in neutral vessels gave rise to it. During the prevailing tension between France and England the English admiralty desired their cruisers to exercise this right without restriction. On the other hand, the States-General in

¹ Gardiner, *Letters and papers relating to the first Dutch war*, i., p. 85; Wicquefort, ii., p. 122.



Tromp was unwilling to strike, began hostilities and fired repeatedly upon the Dutch admiral's ship, first with warning shots across the bow, then straight at the ship. After some hesitation Tromp answered with a shot which was followed by Blake's full broadside and by a regular fight between the two fleets. Twelve English vessels hastened from the Downs, and the battle soon became general until darkness separated the combatants. Tromp had lost two ships and withdrew to the French coast, confining himself, as he afterwards declared, to defensive tactics.¹

There was great indignation in London at Tromp's attitude. A commission of inquiry, of which Cromwell was a member, pronounced him guilty. Opinion differed in the Netherlands, where many disapproved of Tromp's action and attributed it to his Orange partisanship, it being well known that the Orange party desired war in the interest of the Stuarts and of the young prince, who might then be made captain-general. John de Witt and others hoped for peace. They believed peace to be more to the Dutch interest than war. The English would have the "golden mountain" of the rich Netherlands to attack, while the Dutch would have to assail the "iron mountain" of England impoverished by civil war. If the Dutch were victorious, what advantage would result to them? And what might they not lose? New instructions commanded Tromp to act only on the defensive and to strike the flag "according to ancient custom." It was immediately resolved to send Pauw himself to England in order, with the help of the Hollander Willem Nieuwpoort already there, to convince Parliament of the peaceful disposition of the States and to cause the battle of Dover to be forgotten, as the consequence of a misunderstanding. At the same time the fitting out of

¹Gardiner, ii., p. 119; Geddes, p. 209; Gardiner, *Letters*, i., p. 170 *et seq.*



...e also that had been feared soon came to pass. The great
und...ension of Dutch commerce promised England an
c...antage with its situation in the path of almost all the
...Dutch merchantmen. Vice Admiral Ayscue, summoned
from the West Indies, succeeded in destroying a fleet of
Dutch merchantmen near Calais, while Blake himself fell
upon the fishing fleet off the Orkneys and captured the
Dutch war ships protecting it. Tromp first blockaded
Ayscue in the Downs, but did not fight him on account
of the efficient defence of the coast. He then followed
Blake northwards and found him late in July, but was
prevented from attacking him by a violent storm and
returned home with scarcely half of his storm-ravaged
fleet. Ayscue sailing out again was repulsed near
Plymouth by the Zealand commander, De Ruyter,
who was convoying a merchant fleet through the
Channel.¹ The disappointment over Tromp's expedition,
the distrust of his loyalty to the existing government,
the heavy loss sustained in the fishing fleet, caused his
suspension immediately after his return. There was talk
of bringing him to trial. Vice Admiral Witte de With
was given chief command in his place to the great vexa-
tion of the disorderly crews of the fleet, who would not
allow the strict captain upon Tromp's ship. With
difficulty he succeeded in joining De Ruyter menaced in
the Channel by the English superiority, and united they
encountered Blake in the Downs October 8th after a
severe storm. De With contended valiantly, but with-
out much discretion, against Blake's larger force. The
cowardice of a score of his captains, who took to flight
during the battle, so reduced his strength that after a
sharp engagement he ordered a retreat on the following
day.²

The injury suffered and the stoppage of commerce and

¹ Geddes, p. 227; De Jonge, i., p. 422; Gardiner, *Letters*, ii., p. 1 et seq.

² Geddes, p. 254; Gardiner, *Letters*, ii., p. 217.



land, though not without bitter complaint of the lack of confidence shown him. In November the hero sailed into the North Sea with a fleet of almost one hundred ships escorting nearly five hundred merchantmen. Storm and fog compelled him to bring back the latter, but with some sixty ships he put to sea again early in December and on the 10th met Blake off Dungeness. The English fleet was now somewhat less in number, though its vessels, as usual in this war, were larger and better manned. This time many English captains left their admiral in the lurch, and Blake suffered a severe defeat, making Tromp for a time master of the sea, so that he threatened a landing upon the English coast and caused people to fear an attack on the Thames, where many war and merchant ships were as good as unprotected.

The reorganisation of the English fleet was effected under Blake himself and the two able generals of the army, Monk and Deane, who were placed on the fleet. By the middle of February it was again ready to put to sea. It found Tromp in the Channel on his voyage back to the fatherland with a convoy of 150 merchantmen. Off Portland the fleets met February 28, 1653. A fierce fight ensued during two days with the English vanguard—the English had adopted the Dutch custom of a division into squadrons,—but Tromp, who had already been at sea nearly three months, perceived speedily that his powder would soon run short, and the merchantmen impeded his operations. On the third day only thirty of his ships appeared able to offer resistance, bravely led by himself and by his subordinates, Johan Evertsen, Pieter Floriszoon, and De Ruyter, who had also covered themselves with glory in the first and second days. With unsurpassed seamanship Tromp fought through the enemy's strong force, losing but a few of his vessels, and in the evening of the third day, almost without powder,



with an offer to open negotiations. Pauw made some difficulty about signing this letter, although he was authorised by the Holland committee for English affairs, so the matter was brought "under oath of secrecy" before the Estates of Holland, the letter was then signed by Pauw and handed to Stone, who immediately departed with it for England.¹

The sending of this letter in the name of the leading Dutch statesmen was a dangerous sign of exhaustion. There was no mistake about it. Fishery and commerce were at a stand, bringing thousands to beggary; the harbours were crowded with vessels; the lack of grain was seriously felt; and money was no longer to be found in the public treasuries. All sorts of means were thought of to provide money for pressing needs, but it quickly appeared that the only satisfactory way was—peace. This feeling was welcome to the Dutch statesmen who had tried to prevent war and were now waiting for a chance to restore peace. The most influential of them was the young man who had become the right hand of the enfeebled council pensionary and might already be considered as his presumptive successor: John de Witt. He was unwilling to let the opportunity pass, and urged the other members of the committee on English affairs to work for peace. It was chiefly due to him that the secret letter was sent off. This had scarcely taken place, when Pauw died (February 21st), and De Witt, who had repeatedly shown uncommon capacity and energy in filling his place temporarily, was a few days later again invested temporarily with the important office by an almost unanimous vote, a proof of great confidence in the young statesman, who might be regarded as Pauw's pupil. The secret letter carried to London by Stone made its way, but the war party in England, considering

¹Concerning this, see the very important letter of De Witt to Van Beuningen dated February 13, 1653 (Royal Archives).



established another government with himself as actual dictator, until England should give itself a more monarchical form of government, either by his restoring the Stuarts, as the royalists hoped without good reason, or by his assuming the royal title himself or some other corresponding to it. The last occurred, and on December 16th "His Highness Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the Republic of England" took the oath as such amid the acclamations of his soldiers and partisans, while the English people quietly looked on, weary of change and longing for a strong government. A peaceful attitude was to be expected from one who had disapproved of the war, but little sign of this appeared at first. The English council of state, sufficiently informed of the enemy's desperate condition, rejected De Witt's proposition and insisted simply upon taking up the interrupted negotiation over the English demands. Meanwhile the war was to be prosecuted vigorously.

The States resolved to venture the utmost to rescue the rich fleet expected from France, before it should fall into the hands of the English in the Channel. Hope for the new year of war was inspired by the good news still coming from the Mediterranean, where Van Galen on March 13th destroyed, at the cost of his own life, Appleton's British squadron off Leghorn, the second under Badiley immediately returning to England. Success was most desirable, for should the "French fleet" be captured, innumerable people would be ruined, and still worse would become the sad condition of Amsterdam, where grass was growing in the once crowded streets and 3000 houses stood vacant, where many wharves, shops, and warehouses were closed and the want of work hurt all classes. Not alone Amsterdam, but also "the whole country was quite full of beggars."¹

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 420.



For these circumstances resolved England. The men chosen Beverningh of Gouda, Nieuw-
 te friends of De Witt,
 ngestal from Fries-
 lid not receive
 Cromwell put
 owed him
 close alliance
 mption of St.
 conviction that God
 states for the glorifica-
 the liberation of the world
 ke of the Romish dominion.¹
 establishment of good friendship
 the interest of both; together they
 whole world's market, impose their will
 and regulate all commerce. Thus spoke
 erful leader of England's destiny, mingling
 al and religious, commercial and moral principles,
 was his custom. While influential, he was then in
 fact only a member of the council of state, which per-
 sisted in the old demands for reparation on account of
 previous injuries to the English, although that council
 also wished *una gens, una respublica*, an idea that went
 farther than the close alliance between two states pro-
 posed by Cromwell—one state under one common
 Government, with the same laws, possessions, and
 interests.² These demands were unacceptable to the
 States. They desired no such close union, and two of
 the envoys went home for instructions, while Beverningh

¹ Especially important for this negotiation are De Witt's letters to Beverningh (Royal Archives), which Wicquefort, ii., p. 239, may also have drawn upon, and the Thurloe Papers on the English side. Thurloe was then English secretary of state.

² Geddes, p. 336.

³ Gardiner, ii., p. 345; De Jonge, i., p. 511.



ing of the princess for her royal brother in exile the germ of a new and relentless war with the English republic, of the destruction of freedom and the whole commonwealth. His own safety was in peril, but he did not hesitate to accept the doubly dangerous post of council pensionary, the "vexatious office," the "gilded slavery" now permanently offered him. His ambition and his responsibility towards the fatherland, whose prosperity he always identified with his party's victory, impelled him not to refuse the office. The young man took the oath on July 30, 1653. Like his predecessor and in view of Oldenbarnevelt's fate, he asked as a servant of the Estates of Holland a "strong act of indemnity for his assurance and security." At once he opposed energetically Zeeland's proposition to the States-General (July 28th), backed by Friesland and Groningen, to make the prince captain-general and admiral, and his Frisian cousin his lieutenant during his minority. Holland had him draw up a sharp "deduction" against the plan. Zeeland's scheme was frustrated for the time.

The report of the two envoys returning from England was considered in the usual slow fashion, and De Witt sought to gain even more time, like a fisherman watching attentively for the right instant to attain his object.¹ He managed to prevent the recall of the two envoys left behind, while Beverningh and his colleague in London kept Cromwell and the council of state busy, sometimes negotiating with both, sometimes secretly with the former only, about the grand but fantastic plans going through the English statesman's mind, and based upon a great Protestant commercial alliance with a close league of England and the Netherlands. Cromwell sent a formal proposition to the two gentlemen.² He offered an offensive and defensive alliance between the two

¹ Geddes, p. 357.

² Gardiner, ii., p. 349.



adherent of the States party, but quite unexperienced in naval matters. He received only a provisional appointment; De Ruyter and Pieter Floriszoon were raised to the rank of vice admiral, Cornelis Tromp and two others to that of rear admiral. An expedition under Witte de With in September and October succeeded in protecting the East Indiamen and escorting home the fleet returning from India, which had sailed around Ireland to Bergen in Norway, but his fleet as well as Monk's was later dispersed by storm.

Meanwhile there was a "restless, factious, and grievous time" in the Netherlands, as Aitzema says, while anger against England, the cause of all the trouble, took deep root among the whole people. The heavy taxes awakened universal dissatisfaction. More and more it became evident that the country needed peace. Cromwell was made Protector in December, 1653; this gave almost unbounded power to the man in England, who had always desired peace, and circumstances there appeared more favourable, although the most violent Independents wanted to carry through the war. With tears in his eyes the new ruler declared that nothing had so grieved him as this war.¹ Now he hoped to realise his cherished plan for an alliance and urged it strenuously, deeming other disputed points of minor importance. The envoys were careful not to offend him by a refusal, showed a willingness to consider, and finally got from Cromwell the draft of twenty-seven articles. Some of them were very aggravating, stipulating that the prince or any of his family should never hold the offices of his forefathers, not even the command of a fortress or a ship, that all attempts to elevate him should be suppressed by force and, if necessary, with English help, that an annual sum should be paid for the fishery on the English coast, that only a limited number

¹ Geddes, p. 365; Gardiner, ii., p. 353.



having been in secret correspondence with the two Holland envoys, particularly with Van Beverningh. He, too, saw the impossibility of the acceptance of such a secret article in the treaty of peace with England. Such a treaty would be approved neither by the States-General nor by a single one of the provinces, he wrote to Van Beverningh.¹ Cromwell appears privately to have given the latter to understand that, if necessary, he might be satisfied with a declaration that the province of Holland would adhere to the resolutions previously taken concerning the stadtholdership and the captain-generalship, and that any captain-general to be appointed should be obliged to swear to the treaty with England. It is not quite certain whether this expedient was suggested by Holland's envoys and De Witt.² The other stipulations of the peace occasioned no serious objection, but the formal exclusion of the prince was not to be thought of, not even in Holland alone. De Witt's cleverness surmounted all difficulties in a way that proved his extraordinary diplomatic talents. Van Beverningh after a week returned suddenly alone to London. Urged by De Witt, the States-General sanctioned his mission, which was to keep an eye upon the sail in London besides secretly to appease Cromwell with regard to the exclusion. Then the council pensionary induced the States-General to resolve not to send the treaty about to be concluded with Cromwell to the provinces for advice but to ratify it immediately after its reception. The other two envoys, Van de Perre having died, now went back also, being called with Van Beverningh "extraordinary ambassadors to the Lord Protector," by which the new state of affairs in England was recognised. A new

¹ Geddes, p. 387 *et seq.* The account by Geddes drawn from the best authorities is very full upon this entire matter, and has here been followed in its main points.

² Geddes and Gardiner believe the idea proceeded from Cromwell.



declared that he would only ratify the treaty with this "temperament" concerning the prince, deviating from his original demands, in case the ambassadors assured him that within two or three months he should receive the desired formal Act of Exclusion of the prince given by the Estates of Holland for that province. This was announced by the two ambassadors of Holland in a special letter to the Estates, not then in session, together with an account of their promise to Cromwell to recommend the Act. A private letter to De Witt, however, informed him that there was still hope of persuading the Protector to renounce this. The council pensionary acted as if he had not received his letter, pushed the treaty of peace through the States-General, as related above, and then summoned the Estates of Holland for the 28th of April. At the beginning of the meeting all the members were sworn to secrecy, and the official letter of the ambassadors relating to Cromwell's wish was then read to the Estates. The reading excited indignation at their conduct, and although Dordrecht and Amsterdam wanted to pass the Act, the deputies of nine towns refused to take this important step without first consulting their constituents; the nobility appeared divided. Now the matter had to go to the towns, which might have made an end to secrecy, but De Witt arranged that only the ruling burgomasters, again under oath of secrecy, should read the ambassadors' letter. If they did not consent to assume the responsibility, the town councils in their turn were to be put under an oath of secrecy before they might read the letter. Everything must be done as quickly as possible, and on May 1st the Estates met again. At the morning session voting began, and a majority was obtained for the Act, when there came a package from Van Beverningh for De Witt and a letter for the Estates from the ambassadors in London. The letter asserted apparently that Crom-



secret was already betrayed. A bribed clerk of De Witt had given information to Count William Frederick, and like wildfire the report spread of a separate negotiation and secret agreement between Cromwell and Holland. In the States-General De Witt was asked for information, but he answered generally that Holland had done nothing illegal. People began to suspect something, and a storm arose. Friesland violently assailed Holland; the princesses wrote passionate letters to the States-General; there was popular agitation in several provinces. De Witt stood firm as usual, but even Dordrecht commenced to waver to his vexation. The deputies of this town absented themselves from the meeting of the Holland Estates which, themselves fearful of the consequences, thanked their ambassadors in London for not yet delivering the Act. Enlightenment was more loudly demanded in the States-General, first from Holland which evaded the question, then from the ambassadors in London, who were ordered on June 5th to send over to the States-General all secret instructions received from the Estates of Holland. De Witt succeeded in getting this order postponed until the following day, but at once he informed the two Hollanders in London of what was to be expected, intimating to them that it was now time to act, *i. e.*, to hand over the Act, provided it were done immediately.

There was again a vehement discussion on the 6th of June in the States-General, but the resolution of the 5th was definitively passed, and De Witt was obliged to acquiesce in having the Estates of Holland allow the two Holland ambassadors to send over a copy of the Act to The Hague. But in the evening of this day he persuaded the States-General at the eleventh hour to transmit their order to send over the instructions and not yet to deliver the Act, on account of the importance of the matter, in cipher instead of in the ordinary form—

willing to do anything possible to obtain this peace and, now it was secured, not again to endanger it. Whether Cromwell first desired the Act, or De Witt originally wanted it, which is less probable on account of his knowledge of domestic politics and his cautiousness, the course of events showed that it would profit neither of them. More than anything else it served to embitter the people against De Witt and his party. It helped undermine the government of the States and finally strengthened the prince's party, which could have been neither Cromwell's nor De Witt's purpose. Its demand was an act of bad statesmanship.





repute as a mathematician was established by his invention of the chain shot and his writings on curves,¹ highly esteemed by such mathematicians as Christiaan Huyghens and Van Schooten, and treating of the intricate problems of hyperbolas, parabolas, ellipses, conic sections, and the determination of place in plane and space. His calculations of the chances of life and their connection with life and redeemable annuities laid the scientific foundation for the modern theories of life insurance. His share in De la Court's noted work on the political and economic condition of Holland about 1660 proves his capacity as an economist, and his extensive correspondence shows his clear insight into many things. His name has rightly been given to a period of Dutch history, because he was at once a representative and leader of his people.

One of the most important events of De Witt's private life was his marriage (February, 1655) to Wendela Bicker, the daughter of a deceased burgomaster of Amsterdam, and related to a number of the first families of magistrates.² The family connections of De Witt were thus largely extended, a great advantage in Holland governed by comparatively few families of municipal magistrates, and De Witt did not scorn this advantage. Even the appearance of bribery was always avoided by De Witt, but he used all means to secure offices for able members of his family. The appointment of his brother as governor of Putten (March, 1654), of his father as a member of the chamber of accounts (1657), of his relative Van Slingelandt, later of Vivien as pensionary of Dordrecht in his own place, of numerous cousins to all sorts of municipal and provincial posts, showed that he was often successful in widening the circle of his family in the government of Holland. His letters on these unedifying affairs afford a certain enjoyment by reason of

¹ *Elementa curvarum linearum* (Lugd. Bat. et Amst., 1659).

² Lefèvre-Pontalis, i., p. 119.




Was no harmony in the guidance of this party. De Witt **s**uccessfully replied to his opponents in the States-**G**eneral. A letter from Cromwell to Zeeland exhorting **i**t for the sake of religion not to endanger the treaty **m**issed its aim and occasioned more bitterness. Some **d**isturbance in North Holland was brought about by a **j**ourney of Count, soon Prince, William Frederick, the **e**mperor in 1654 raising his entire house to the rank of **i**mperial princes. Amsterdam and other cities took **m**eaures to guard against a possible assault. The **g**arrison of The Hague was strengthened ostensibly **a**gainst the disorderly troops returning from Brazil.

Commissioned by the Estates of Holland De Witt **w**ith the aid of Van Beverningh drew up a "Deduction" **i**n defence of Holland's and his own conduct, the **m**anifesto of the existing government. This Deduction **c**omprised an argument for the necessity of Holland's **a**ction in the interest of peace, which otherwise would **n**ot have been obtained; then a demonstration of the **l**egality of the Act; afterwards a proof of the propriety **o**f Holland's action towards the other provinces, the **f**oreign powers, and the house of Orange. It went into **a** calculation of the thanks given to the Orange family **i**n money and offices since the insurrection against **S**pain, on the other side alluding to the gratitude which **t**he other provinces owed to Holland for the Spanish as **w**ell as the English war. The reading of the document **l**asted for hours, first in the Estates of Holland, then in **t**he States-General (August 5th), but naturally it did not **c**onvince the opposing party. Gradually, however, **m**inds subsided into calmness, because people began to **u**nderstand that peace would be imperilled, if Holland **w**ere forced to revoke the Act and Cromwell were thus **d**efied.

The commotion assumed critical aspects in some prov-
inces, particularly in Overijssel and City and Land.

the general government. Something had to be done by the States-General in September, 1655, to send a deputation to the province, but Holland now considered the affair as "domestic" and refused the deputation. Other political difficulties meanwhile brought De Witt and Prince William Frederick into closer relations. Their agreement was broken by the discovery of the treachery of the clerk, Johan van Messen, who had committed most secret papers to the prince's agent, Huyven. An important result of the meeting between De Witt and the prince was a missive from the High Mightinesses to Overijssel, dated January 10, 1656, requesting both parties to send delegates to The Hague for the purpose of settling their differences with the help of William Frederick. This was done, and De Witt and William Frederick undertook mediation. The draft of an agreement abrogated the resolutions of the Overijssel Estates taken in the affair after April 8, 1654, a general amnesty was proclaimed, Prince William Frederick laid down his lieutenancy and Haersolte his office of bailiff. The matter remained under consideration in the province during the whole year, while Prince William Frederick and De Witt worked less heartily together. Hasselt had long been at variance with Zwolle, and early in June, 1657, the troops of Zwolle bombarded Hasselt, cities and country in the province preparing for civil war. Fortunately Hasselt gave up its pretensions after a few shots from the Zwolle batteries and made a treaty with the majority. The minority turned for justice to its powerful protectors, Holland and Amsterdam, but De Witt presented a new agreement which was accepted. Cornelis de Graeff and John de Witt were appointed mediators to settle everything amicably in conjunction with commissioners from both parties. On August 20th all was finished, and in the



teen securing all the important offices. The action of the lords led to fighting in the assembly, where weapons were finally prohibited and a guard was placed. The election of officers in February, 1657, was attended with such confusion that the deputies of the city called for the intervention of the States-General. Against the plans of the city government Rengers and Lutzborg stirred up the guilds, and they opposed the desired deputation by bribing Johan Schulenborgh, delegate from the city to the States-General. A popular rising at Groningen was led by Warendorp, and the plundering of houses and assaults upon magistrates compelled the city government to accede to the demands of the league of the Ommelands. The States-General sent no deputation, the league triumphed, Rengers and Lutzborg succeeded one another in the highest offices. After a few years the city government and its friends among the nobles felt strong enough to attack again Rengers and Lutzborg. But they resisted and remained supreme until the end of 1658, while the stadtholder looked on helplessly and De Witt from The Hague continued to support his friends in the province. A new deputation from the States-General in the spring of 1659, invited by the party of Rengers, favoured the league's opponents and a better enforcement of justice, against which Rengers and his friends had often sinned.

Dissensions in the other provinces were less important, but testified also to the necessity of a stronger central government.¹ Everywhere in the republic differences prevailed, in which Holland secretly or openly sustained the anti-stadtholder party and the council pensionary made his influence felt. He succeeded usually in restoring order without removing the root of the evil, a policy of dexterity which would lead not to thorough improvement but in difficult circumstances to great confusion

¹ Wagenaar, xii., p. 397.



aval : his return from England. The Orange adherents
utter ~~ould~~ not accept Van Beverningh, just as Holland
of ~~opposed~~ the appointment of a field marshal, and a com-
F ~~promise~~ for both parties to agree to both candidates was
not carried through. At the end of 1656 De Witt
succeeded in obtaining the appointment of his trusted
colleague as treasurer by a majority in the States-
General, but when the other party wanted to decide
about the field marshal by a majority vote, Holland
objected and appealed to the complete authority of the
provincial Estates in military matters as one of the
essential parts of freedom. De Witt was moved by fear
of too great a military power in one hand. The Orange
party was far from being equal to him and his able
friends. The disputes between the two princesses of
Orange, the jealousy between the two princes of Nassau,
the incapacity of the party leaders, gave De Witt the
finest chances to thwart their plans again and again.

De Witt kept a watchful eye upon everything, upon
the attitude towards the church, upon the finances in his
province. Danger threatened in ecclesiastical affairs,
because De Witt knew the influential preachers must be
respected, and the government of the States, mindful of
what had occurred in the time of the Truce, feared
nothing so much as their displeasure. One of the council
pensionary's first letters aimed to remove the suspicion,
which had arisen against him as a Cartesian, of laxness
towards "the papal superstition and other errors." The
apostolic vicar of the diocese of Utrecht, Jacobus de la
Torre, could testify in his *Relatio seu descriptio status
religionis catholicae in Hollandia* (1656) to the flourishing
condition of his church in these parts in spite of all the
placards and resolutions and of the strife between his
secular and regular clergy, the Jesuits troubling him in
their struggle for greater influence. Here and there
persecutions might take place, but there was generally a



nts, were managed or rather left unmolested. a zealot occasionally insisted upon the deposition of Remonstrant magistrates, they were constantly being introduced into the government, even at Amsterdam, and were not troubled, if they did not make themselves or their opinions too prominent. The Collegiants, resembling in many respects the Remonstrants and Mennonites, remained at first more in the shade, being naturally quiet country people. Their chief seat, Rijnsburg, where the Van der Kodde family had placed itself about 1620 at their head, became the centre of a remarkable religious movement which, besides liberty of worship, accepted the principle of liberty of speaking or "prophesying" for every member of the community, and thus opposed the ordained clergy and considered their existence contrary to ancient Christianity.¹ The lack of Remonstrant preachers after 1619 under the pressure of persecution helped this free preaching very much. Later pious Remonstrants joined the Collegiants and extolled their principles as recalling those of the first Protestants in the country. Laymen also championed zealously their doctrines, as the former Rotterdam baker Frans Oudaen, head of the Rijnsburg society about 1660. Eminent men, Van Beuningen, Adriaan Paets and Johan Hartigveldt of Rotterdam, came into close touch with the community. Thus attention was drawn to them more and more, and their following was extended about the middle of the century.² At Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Leyden, Haarlem, in some villages of North Holland, similar "colleges" arose, striving for a regeneration of the Christian church without a binding confession of faith, without minister or prescribed church rites except baptism by immersion and the communion, without wishing to be called church communities, in perfect freedom resting

¹ Van Slee, *De Rijnsburger Collegianten*, p. 58.

² Hijlkema, *Reformateurs*, p. 10.



not escape the vigilance of consistories and preachers, but no kind of pressure could bring any strong action against them. The governing party adhered to its tolerant principles, in part because its members often felt attracted to the new dogmas, in part from a longing for rest and peace.

De Witt's activity in financial affairs was important. The heavy debt, under which Holland groaned in consequence of the Spanish war, burdened its budget in 1650 with seven million guilders of interest upon a sum of over 150 millions, and the English war considerably increased this sum. During and immediately after the war De Witt set to work to lighten the burden by a reduction of the interest. Such reductions of interest were not uncommon. In 1640 Holland had lowered the interest on its debt from 6½ to 5 per cent., and the States-General had followed that example in 1649. Now De Witt sought to reduce Holland's interest from 5 to 4 per cent. and encountered violent opposition. But, supported by Van Beuningen and others, he succeeded in convincing the Estates of the desirability of the matter, especially when he joined the reduction with a plan of redemption, by which Holland's entire debt would be paid off in forty-one years, and the States-General also reduced their interest from 5 to 4 per cent., so that Holland's securities yielded no less than those of the Generality. The credit of Holland was thus placed on a solid basis, and De Witt might well glory in "the great work, upon which I have for some time past exerted all my strength," by which his province profited annually to the amount of 1,400,000 guilders, representing a capital of twenty-eight millions.

If De Witt could have had his way, the maintenance of peace would have been the chief aim of the Dutch policy in Europe, because he believed in his soul that for a country living by commerce and navigation nothing



marriage of the young and ambitious Louis XIV. to the oldest daughter of Philip IV. brought new perils, although the infanta solemnly renounced for herself and her descendants all claims to the Spanish crown and its possessions, while the lands and cities now obtained put France in a position to resume the subjugation of the Netherlands at any time with a good prospect of success. Spain saw the consequences of this condition and understood that its interest was to retain the friendship of the republic as much as possible.

Relations with England left at first little to be wished. The Dutch ambassador Nieuwpoort was very friendly with Cromwell and his able secretary of state Thurloe,¹ and no reason for discontent was given by allowing the Stuarts in the Netherlands. But there was no diminution of the commercial rivalry: the Navigation Act raised up English commerce and augmented the mutual jealousy. During the English-Spanish war difficulties again arose through the search of ships for contraband. England also protected Portugal, between which and the Netherlands the long threatening war broke out in November, 1657. This war was limited mainly to a naval demonstration under Obdam on the Portuguese coast and to captures of Portuguese merchantmen by De Ruyter. Cromwell's death in 1658 prevented any strong action of England against the Netherlands, as the weak government of his son, Protector Richard, was not equal to a vigorous guidance of England's policy. The arrival at The Hague of the energetic George Downing, as English ambassador, who wished to see the commerce of England upheld with strength and ability, gave occasion for all sorts of troubles, by which the old grievances were raked up again, the good understanding

¹ His papers, the *Thurloe Papers* (London, 1742), are together with the ordinary *State Papers* an excellent authority for the history of these days.



the protector of the political equilibrium hereabouts since the events of 1644 and 1645, particularly when Dantzic, the centre of the corn trade, was blockaded by the Swedish fleet and threatened by Swedish troops. The States had already tried to enter into closer relations with Brandenburg and had gathered troops on the East Prussian frontier to watch the Swedes ruling over the neighbouring Bremen territory. It was resolved to send a deputation to Sweden and another to Denmark to preserve peace in the Baltic. In December, 1655, Charles Gustavus got possession of Elbing, and Brandenburg went over to the Swedish side in the hope of throwing Poland's sovereignty over Prussia. Despite Swedish protests, De Ruyter's squadron in the spring of 1656 sailed for the Baltic and then a fleet under Obdam, who was soon in command of forty-two ships. In July he appeared before Dantzic, raised the blockade of the city after uniting with a Danish squadron, remained there till October, and then returned home, leaving in the city a Dutch garrison of 1500 men. The deputation to Sweden under De Witt's cousin and successor as pensionary of Dordrecht, Govert van Slingelandt, and that to Denmark under the experienced Van Beuningen were likewise successful. Sweden in September renewed Elbing the old treaties of friendship with a declaration of the neutrality of Dantzic, and Denmark was brought to a defensive league, evidently designed to oppose Sweden and in case of necessity to restore peace by force of arms. The treaties with Sweden and Denmark plainly did not agree with one another. De Witt had at first taken up the Dutch policy in the north with great caution, believing with Amsterdam in the importance of peace. The good understanding between him and Van Beuningen, who was known to him from the pensionary days in Dordrecht, who had resided at the Swedish court as "extraordinary deputy" during



were driven from Bremen, lost most of Schonen, in the early spring of 1658 also Funen and the small islands, and soon saw the Swedish king attack Zealand and menace Copenhagen, quickly led to the peace of Roeskilde, by which Denmark became almost wholly dependent upon Sweden. The struggle of opinions in the republic was just decided in favour of Van Beuningen, when the unexpected news of this peace came to take away the basis of his policy. Van Beuningen did not give up, but urged Denmark to disregard the treaty of peace, promising the support of the States. Charles Gustavus of Sweden, observing this, suddenly assailed his enemy anew in August and laid siege to Copenhagen by land and sea, closing up the Sound with his fleet and by the conquered forts of Elsinore and Kronenborg. This energetic attitude of Sweden made Van Beuningen win his cause. The Swedish power must now be curbed, and De Witt offered no further objection to helping poor Denmark. Early in October Obdam was sent to the Sound with thirty-five ships and 4000 troops under Colonel Püchler to relieve Copenhagen and to "ruin" the Swedish fleet, so that no dangerous naval power could arise in the Baltic. On the 8th of November Obdam met the somewhat larger Swedish fleet under Wrangel in the Sound and actually destroyed a large part of it after a bloody battle, in which the valiant Dutch vice admirals, Witte De With and Pieter Floriszoon, lost their lives, while Obdam himself with his ship only escaped disaster through the efficient support of Aart van Nes and some other captains.¹ The small remnant of the Swedish fleet retreated to the forts, and Copenhagen's siege was raised. The Dutch ships did not return home after this success but remained in the Sound on account partly of the appearance there of an English fleet, whose intentions were mistrusted.

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 558 *et seq.*



regions under the mediation of the States, which brought about peace at Oliva May 3d between Sweden and Poland and on June 3d peace at Copenhagen between Sweden and Denmark. De Witt might well be content with the result, for success had at last come to his plans for the mediation of the States between the belligerents. He had raised higher than ever the consideration shown the Dutch in the Baltic without disturbing the general peace of Europe and in conjunction with the two great powers, whose enmity he most feared, whose friendship he deemed most desirable for the Netherlands.

A time of peace seemed to have dawned upon Europe. The peace of the Pyrenees, followed by that in the Baltic, had cleared away the greatest difficulties. The war with Portugal still remained, but the draft of a treaty drawn up in the Estates of Holland was soon made, notwithstanding the opposition of Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Groningen, the basis of a negotiation with Portugal at The Hague, where in the name of that kingdom the able Count de Miranda appeared. It was speedily evident that Brazil would have to be given up by the West India Company, but Zealand and Gelderland, both interested in the company, refused their coöperation, and the vote of City and Land could only be obtained; because its representative, Schulenborgh, was apparently bribed by Portugal and approved of the treaty against the wish of his province. The treaty with Portugal was signed (August 6, 1661) under the vehement protest of Zealand and Gelderland, which asserted, not without reason, that to conclude a treaty of peace by a majority of votes was contrary to Article 9 of the Union of Utrecht. But Holland carried first the peace through and after more negotiation (at the end of 1662) the ratification. The long delay was owing to the desire of the East India Company in the



1660 the recognised leader of the republic, the statesman who, by his comprehensive knowledge of political conditions, by his rare capacity for work, and his endless resourcefulness, really merited universal confidence. Though the genius of the great advocate might be lacking in him, John de Witt was never at a loss for expedients which could rescue the republic from its temporary dangers, and he steered the ship of state with a steady hand upon the surging waves of European politics. His diplomatic activity shows us the cautious leader, the calm calculator, the acute judge of men, and his domestic policy also makes us admire him. He was not a man who excited enthusiasm, who in burning zeal conducted his party to victory along the royal road of open strife; he is the quiet thinker, who seeks to convince by plain argument, who yields where the opposition appears too great, and is moderate in triumph, the object more of rational than of passionate admiration—the best type of the Holland regent of those days, simple and worthy, incorruptible and steadfast, cool of head and heart, vigorously doing his duty to the end, *sævis tranquillus in undis* as few of the Dutch statesmen before and after him.





Hague and in his castle at Breda, William III. of Orange grew up, with a clear mind and promising talents, but delicate in health and needing the cares that surrounded his youthful existence. We have a description of his appearance at this time: "very handsome, with a long but well-formed face, a gentle eye, an aquiline nose, and an alert mind, he speaks well and boldly."¹

The regents now ruling powerful Holland knew well that they could not always prevent his rise, and although theoretically they might regard him as merely an eminent personage, as perhaps the most eminent subject of their commonwealth, although they hoped by adroit measures to hinder the union in his hands of all the dignities of his forefathers, yet it could not escape them also that the people considered his elevation to those dignities as a matter of course. For the time being, however, the government of the patriciate, of the municipal aristocracy, seemed to be supreme in Holland at least, and the government in the other provinces was more and more modelled after it.

Holland attracted the most attention in the republic. Only rarely were the steps of the foreign traveller directed towards the other provinces, usually towards the neighbouring Zealand which showed so much resemblance to Holland and was so closely attached to that province. Only rarely did he penetrate to Utrecht and Gelderland, and then he confined himself to the chief places of those provinces; the north, even important Friesland, was but little visited; the regions of the south, the conquered territories, the generality lands, remained quite unknown to the foreigner. And the writers of the fatherland paid but slight attention to most of the "seven provinces"; they, too, limited themselves in their accounts principally to Holland and its cities; even the smallest of these cities found their admiring historians, while the larger places

¹ *Voyages de Mons. de Monconys*, ii., p. 127.



shady trees, with its stately palaces and bustling crowd, one travelled to Leyden, learned and industrious, but unhealthy and repeatedly ravaged by pestilence, with its umbrageous Rapenburg, through a glorious country rich in trees and meadows, which found its match in the lovely downs above Haarlem, in the prosperous region between Hoorn and Enkhuizen, but was only excelled by the beautiful banks of the Vecht with their superb lanes and villas, then already sung by the poets as the ideal of nature and rustic life, being continued in the much lauded fields between Utrecht and Amersfoort, *le plus beau chemin du monde* at this time. What a difference from the heaths of Gelderland and Overijssel, from the bad roads in Brabant, which could not be passed over even in the middle of summer without plunging the waggon up to its axletrees in the water! Astonishment was excited by the active traffic in Holland, where regular boats on the canals, famed for their clear water and environed by trees, united the cities in addition to the waggon service as of old; only some parts of Zealand and Friesland and the immediate vicinity of the city of Groningen could equal it.

These three provinces were the ones which might to some extent be compared with Holland in their abundance of meadows, drainage, diking, and laying out of canals. Zealand, however, had already seen its best days, and was beginning to suffer from the difficult communication between the scattered islands and from the continued emigration of the population to the more promising Holland; the improvement of the fens and the consequent building of canals in Groningen, though undertaken partly with capital from Holland, increased at this time, under the lead of such energetic personages as Adriaan Wildervanck, the prosperity of the province in a great measure; the construction of dikes on the islands of Zealand brought great profit to many people in Hol-



than 2000 students. Haarlem, since 1667 connected with Leyden by a canal, was the seat of the beer and linen industry. Little and quiet Deift was a prosperous town of brewers and men living upon their income. Ancient Dordrecht was the centre of the brisk commerce on the rivers, particularly in French and Rhenish wines. Rotterdam through its English commerce had already come up as one of the greatest cities of the land. Pleasant and healthful Gouda, almost entirely spared by the pestilence in this century so often appearing in the Dutch cities, was amid a watery region a country town frequented by men of leisure and abounding in pipe factories. There were further some thirty smaller and in part walled towns and four hundred villages, many of which would have been called cities in other countries. And all this was in a territory scarcely sixty miles in circumference, whose population may be estimated at not much less than one million, half of the whole population of the republic.¹

This population, by its constant meeting with other nations over the entire world, by the settlement of many foreigners in its midst, by the influence of French civilisation upon the upper circles, was already on the road to lose some of its peculiarities, at least so far as the dwellers in the cities were concerned, but it still preserved singularities enough to fascinate the foreign traveller. Its healthy mind, its vigorous energy, its constancy, its inexhaustible patience, its steady perseverance, its ardour and power in work, its care for the poor and unfortunate, its moderation in eating generally, the respectability of its magistrates, its simplicity of dress,

¹ *Het Interest van Holland* reckons the population at nearly 2½ millions, but with a conjecture which the author himself calls "rough and uncertain," while the calculation of the poll-tax in 1622 makes out a population of over 600,000, which is assuredly too small for this time (see *Interest van Holland*, p. 18 *et seq.*).



men, excessive luxury, prevalence of gambling, universality of the duel for insignificant reasons, all proceed from the development of the court life at The Hague in Frederick Henry's later days and in the time of William II., when a crowd of young noblemen from France particularly, attracted by the military renown of the Oranges and by the brilliancy of the stadtholder's court, settled in The Hague and introduced the refined but corrupt French habits to the aristocratic society there, which regarded Paris as the university of civilised life.¹ And though sometimes the traces of a like spirit may be elsewhere perceived, generally they are derived from that source, and facts show them to be exceptions. Memoirs like those of Constantijn Huygens, the son, those of the lively Madame de Zoutelande, of the wearisome rhymester Coenraet Droste, such correspondence as that of Christiaan Huygens, present to us the existence of this time at The Hague in all its colours, but on the other hand stands the evidence concerning the life and domesticity of old Holland, as it was still to be seen among the great majority of the population, in the journals of Doubleth, the letters of John de Witt, the biographies of the great Dutch naval heroes, literary personages, and statesmen, in Cats's pictures of family life, in the dramas and farces of the time, in the travels and observations of foreigners.²

When Temple, the English ambassador, who spent two years here, speaks of the simplicity of the first seaman and the first statesman of the period, when he testifies to the plain life of both—De Ruyter not being distinguished outwardly from an ordinary sea captain or merchant, De Witt simply dressed, living like a common citizen, followed upon the street by a single servant, the

¹ *Voyage de deux jeunes hollandais à Paris*, ed. Faugère, 2. éd., p. 5.

² See in general: Schotel, *Het oud-hollandsch huisgezin der zeventiende eeuw* (Haarlem, 1868).




positions and complete their education by a journey to France and England or to Italy. The class of the nobility is hardly elevated in consideration above that of the magistrates. In Holland it is small in number, partly in consequence of the long Spanish war which extinguished many families. Only a few noble families remain there, which proudly hold themselves aloof from the families of the magistrates, even from those which by purchase have come into possession of noble estates and titles. The nobles imitate principally the French nobility, just as the officers and the wealthy merchants' sons do, and like them they would gladly shine in a stadtholder's court.

Such was the society of Holland. That of the other provinces showed about the same type: somewhat rougher, somewhat more uncivilised in outward appearance as well as in inward characteristics, somewhat less spoiled also by the less turbulent life and the less luxury. The numerous nobility of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overysse asserted itself vigorously in those three provinces like the influential nobility of Friesland and Groningen, less polished than that of the eastern provinces owing to the greater remoteness of the northern provinces, from which its members only went to Holland to sit temporarily in high government boards and were then wont to adopt the customs of Holland.

The foreigner saw all this with interest, but Temple says at the end of his observations on the people of Holland that a man would choose rather to travel than to live in this country, where the earth is better than the air, profit is more in request than honour, where there is more sense than wit, more good nature than good humour, more wealth than pleasure, where a man finds more things to observe than to desire, and more persons to esteem than to love.

One of the most striking peculiarities of the Hollander,



the master of the house or from his satisfied or severe, full or sombre state of mind at the time of the building. With the increase of wealth and of the number of independent gentlemen the former penthouses on the first story necessary for business disappeared, and there were more windows; the simplicity of the decoration of gable and cornice, of inner chamber and rear of house, was less striking, while the yard from a bleaching-ground became more and more of a garden, adorned with flowers and shrubs, with statues and parterres, with fountains and hedges cut in figures, again after the French style, with white sand and gravel artfully arranged in the form of mosaics. Formerly these gardens were more frequently found outside the walls of the town in the vicinity, with a summer-house for the centre and stiff beds of flowers and vegetables. These outside gardens continued in use for nearly two centuries longer, together with the gardens near the houses they were, for the tulipomania of about 1636, richly provided with all sorts of flowering and bulbous plants. The common citizen also diversified his bleaching ground with a little flower garden, preferably by the side of the canal where he dwelt. Within and without great care was taken to secure neatness and cleanliness. Fresh paint, beautifully scoured copper or painted iron knockers and knobs on the door delighted the eye. Stoop and gable, passages and rooms were regularly, even daily, scrubbed and washed, Temple ascribing this to the desirability of avoiding the effects of the extreme moisture of the air and giving the same reason for the striving after cleanliness and neatness in the house, evidenced by the constant cleaning and polishing of furniture and metal-work, the favourite occupation of the Dutch wives and daughters who could hardly be imagined without duster or washing brushes.

This cleanliness, however, extended less to the body



With plain citizens these rooms had mats on the floor, in wealthier homes they were provided with inlaid floors or with rich tapestries on floors and walls. Finely sculptured cabinets and chests, curiosities from east and west, Frisian clocks, elegantly carved chairs and tables, artistically stained window-panes with armorial bearings or figures from biblical or profane antiquity, exquisite glass and mirrors, costly porcelain and stone jars attracted attention here. But the mistress of the house was reluctant to let the careless stranger enter. Only after removing his boots or shoes was he admitted to those sanctuaries, however desirous the owner might be to have her treasures admired. In the sleeping-room carved bedsteads with heavy curtains of green damask, fine serge, or cloth were only seen in the houses of aristocratic and very wealthy people. The ordinary citizen, even though quite rich, slept in the ancestral bed built into the more or less sculptured wall, up to which one had to climb with a ladder or a stool. In all houses there were beds of down and an abundance of clean linen which comforted the foreigner as he thought of those dark "sleeping closets," carefully hidden from sight during the day by painted or carved doors. Smooth English mats on the floor augmented here the impression of neatness. Huge chests for linen with fine copper or iron trimmings, well-stocked wardrobes and cabinets furnished the sleeping apartments. The kitchen with its shining vessels, its beautifully washed tiled floor and tiled or plastered walls, its caned chairs, its full "treasury" or cupboard for dishes and plates, its amply provided tin closet where the daily tinware found a place if not received in the tin closet of the front room, its well-kept hearth or fire-pot, testified to the love of neatness, which was regarded as a cardinal virtue in the servants no less than in the mistress of the house.


Thus the worthy Hollander lived in his home, to



stances. Butter and cheese at the same time was a superfluity. The peasant drank buttermilk; sweet milk was for the inhabitant of the city and was peddled early in the morning through "Holland rich in cream and milk," as "fine, pure morning's milk." Of the midday meal eaten at twelve o'clock the principal dish was soup with peas and beans as the chief ingredients or cabbage and bacon, and meat was comparatively little employed, mostly in hotchpot. The upper classes made more of a ceremony and in "dainty abundance" prepared the midday meal after the French style, having usually fish for the second course, salad for the third, and tarts and fruits of all kinds. Beer was commonly drunk at meals by the citizen; the higher classes added to the heavier sorts of beer a rich choice of French and Rhenish wines. Brandy was usual even among well-to-do people only at feasts and sociable gatherings. Gin did not make its fatal appearance until later in the train of the potato, which was little known as a food here at this time, although Raleigh as early as 1584 had brought it from Virginia to England and it had appeared some years afterwards in the Leyden botanical garden. Forks were in fashion only among the upper classes; the citizen, even though well off, ate with his fingers. Supper was eaten towards bedtime; it consisted mostly of bread and butter again; among the more wealthy people it was enlarged into a new repast. About ten o'clock the old-fashioned citizen then went to bed, it being the hour also for closing gates and taverns. Few people remained up longer, and many retired earlier.¹

In general the life of the Hollander in the middle of the seventeenth century manifests a tendency to greater luxury, even to extravagance, which gave rise to a rivalry in fine carriages, costly apparel, furniture, jewelry, and

¹ See Kalf in the work: *Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*, section "Domestic and social life," p. 7 *et seq.*



and prose writers like Huygens and Heemskerk describe the exaggerated elegance of the feminine costume—"more flag than covering"—in inimitable style, sometimes lashing the foolish extravagance with cutting ridicule, sometimes unfolding with ironical admiration the mysteries of the refined art of the toilet.

The costume of the men was much less extravagant, although the French fashion began to make itself felt here, too, more and more among the wealthy class. The round felt hat with broad flexible brim of old times was giving way to the small Swedish head-covering with narrow brim, to the Polish cap, to hats of round or pointed crowns with modish ribbons, plumes, and tufts of feathers, such as only fops had worn at first. The short-clipped natural hair of Maurice's time was becoming old-fashioned in comparison with the long and curly locks of the younger men unfeelingly adopting the fashion of big wigs. The sober mantle of black cloth over the modest black doublet, adorned only among the rich with gold or silver buttons, became gradually brighter and finer in stuff and colour and was soon replaced by the fashionable silken mantle, while the doublet now slashed and trimmed with gold lace was of costly velvet, silk, and satin, and the stiff linen Spanish collars and sleeves since the time of Frederick Henry made way for all sorts of French lace-work, the rings and bracelets compressing hands and fingers giving evidence also of refined luxury. The breeches, decked with ribbons and bows, slashed and pulled up in the French manner, vexed old-fashioned people who in the "laced flapping tattered smallclothes" of the younger men saw incorporated the frivolity and wickedness of their century and shunned the dangerous appearance of effeminacy and immorality presented by the borrowing of fashions for men from the dress of women and the reverse. The gilded swords of state, the cosmetics and patches used also by the dandies, the red




guilders might be considered as the smallest fortune of a rich man.

People began, however, as elsewhere to comprehend the harm of this growing extravagance, and not only writers and ministers opposed it, but the municipal governments commenced thinking again of renewing the old statutes against excessive luxury at weddings and feasts, in dress and costly things, and even set about making new regulations. Repeated reference to this occurs in the pamphlets, and the luxury of some is contrasted with the dearness of bread and the indigence of others. Measures are demanded for preventing the gnawing poverty that threatens the needy, when the necessities of life grow dearer. In the trying time of the English war poverty rose to a critical height among the working class. And after that came in 1655 the evil of the pestilence to scourge the country. Over 13,000 people died then in Leyden, about one-fourth of the population, and nearly 18,000 next year at Amsterdam. The large disbursements of the almonries, amounting in 1660 at Amsterdam for the Reformed alone to 238,000 guilders, exclusive of the distribution to the indoor poor which sometimes ran up to 600,000 guilders, indicate the great number of the poor, as do the countless exhortations to charity and the establishment of poorhouses and work-houses that were no sooner erected than filled.¹ Foreigners note, however, that poverty in the Netherlands was relatively not so prominent as in other countries.

The general prosperity depended mainly upon the commerce which is depicted for us in a vivid but certainly not impartial manner by the already mentioned *Interest van Holland*, written by the Leyden manufacturer Pieter de la Court and carefully revised, improved, and aug-


¹ De Bosch Kemper, *De armoede in ons vaderland*, p. 97.



ceased, the state of war in north and south was ended, the Dutch ships of war were often making the Moorish corsairs on Africa's northern coast feel the power of the States, and were upholding the honour of their flag on the seas of the world.¹ English rivalry began to come up seriously in consequence of the Navigation Act, which continued in full force under Charles II. also to the disappointment of the Dutch merchants, but for the time being Dutch commerce was a match for that rivalry. It was even more so for the French, Danish, Swedish, and German competition, which could not be so well measured against it chiefly for want of the capital so abundant here and so easily obtainable. The principal aim of Dutch policy must be the preservation of the "blessed" state of peace according to De la Court and to De Witt himself, and the "interest of Holland" seemed to profit by everything working in that direction. The rise of a stadtholder's power, therefore, had to be opposed in every way, because experience in the past had taught that another political tendency was to be expected from it, which would not be determined by commercial interests but by general politics and even by dynastic motives, inspiring naturally slight sympathy in the merchant, whenever he saw in them no advantage to himself. De la Court's book, which exhibited this tendency most plainly, excited as much satisfaction and agreement in the ruling party as indignation and protest in their Orange opponents, as appears from the violent pamphlets published for and against it in these years. The author's

Bz. in the *Gids* of 1853; Van Rees, *Verhandeling over de politieke gronden en maximen*; Veegens, in *Historische Studiën*, ii., p. 30; Fruin, in the *Gids*, 1865, ii., p. 459.

¹ Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Vereinigten Niederlande*, p. 14, shows an increase of commerce from 1660 after a temporary depression, evidently the result of war. •



beloved monopoly, would not hear to greater freedom for private commerce, while by the small salaries of its officials it gave occasion for secret trading and dishonest practices of all kinds.

Van der Lijn and his successor Carel Reinierszoon, under whom the rule of governor and councils was again regulated and fixed after the old style, supported by justice and police under their management and connected with the exclusive maintenance of the Reformed religion, were not the men by vigorous action to lead the company into new ways or even to bring it to a more flourishing condition along the old ways. They obeyed the orders of the seventeen, kept up the monopoly, and manifested towards the native princes at the request of their masters "a benevolent, modest, humble, and friendly attitude," towards the English and other rivals a cautious reserve in order to afford no opportunity for grievances. Peace seemed the best means for the promotion of commerce. So far as possible the seventeen desired to avoid the costly wars of Van Diemen's time. They wished thenceforth exclusively to see efforts made for an increase of the dividends, not for an increase of power and territory. The days of Coen and Van Diemen were gone forever. It was forgotten that in these regions commerce and a display of force irrevocably went together.

The appearance of Johan Maetsuycker, as the successor of Reinierszoon who died in 1653, able as he was, did not open a new epoch. A clever diplomatist and a careful magistrate, quite after the heart of his "principals" in the fatherland, more than a brilliant warrior and an organiser as Coen and Van Diemen were, he upheld the company's authority during twenty-five years upon the whole with great success. With the help of the talented Rijklof van Goens, governor of Ceylon for a long time, he drove the Portuguese from their last footholds upon that island and the shores of Hither India; only Goa and



which stopped all commerce temporarily.¹ We know that these large dividends cannot be considered a criterion for the flourishing condition of the company, as they did not always proceed from actual earnings, but could often be paid only from money collected. It was precisely these dividends, however, that brought the profits most in evidence, and therefore De la Court could say for this time that the company notably increased the prosperity of the country, although these profits were not based upon the company's real progress. Outside of the circle of the company's high officials and its highest directors the actual condition of the great commercial corporation was as good as unknown. The mysterious bookkeeping of the company and the confusion pervading it made it extremely difficult for any but the initiated to see that neither the large dividends nor the resulting high prices of the shares of the company were infallible proofs of its prosperity. But aside from the large dividends it was the considerable clandestine profits, enjoyed by officials in India and the fatherland, by the managers even of the company's business, that contributed to the growth of wealth in the fatherland, a fact which redounded as little to the credit of those officials and managers as did to Holland's forefathers the often wild speculation in the company's shares on the Amsterdam Bourse, bringing naturally great gains to some but quite as great losses to others.

Very important for the company was the establishment of a small colony of Netherlanders at the Cape of Good Hope, where, under the lead of the energetic ship's doctor, Jan van Riebeeck, who governed there during ten years, a fort was built and land was distributed to the company's officers. A beginning of colonisation was thus made for the benefit of the East Indiamen sailing to and from the Indies, the Cape from this time becoming for

¹ Klerk de Reus, *Uebersicht*, Beil. vi.



difficulty it dragged out its existence, while its shares, continually falling, began to approach the zero point, most of its possessions, neglected and impoverished itself, led a miserable life. The greatest gains in its territories were obtained by private merchants, partly through the secret evasion by the company's poorly paid officials of what still remained of its monopoly. The slave trade furnished rich revenues to some houses, notably to the firm of Coymans in Amsterdam, and anger was frequently displayed when people ventured to discuss openly "unchristian" but profitable commerce.¹

The only of its colonies formed an exception to the favourable rule, New Netherland governed since 1647 by Peter Stuyvesant. Under his vigorous and intelligent, though oftentimes arbitrary, rule an end was made to the wars incessantly waged with the Indians under his predecessors, Van Twiller and Kieft. Security in the territory occupied and the generally friendly relations with the neighbouring English colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia made the population of the colony slowly increase, so that by 1660 it had risen to about 10,000 souls, chiefly settled upon Manhattan Island along the banks of the Hudson. The capital—it had been prophetically named New Amsterdam—then contained 1600 inhabitants. Great dissatisfaction, however, prevailed in the colony with Stuyvesant's arbitrary administration and with the almost complete absence of the influence of the people upon it. Moreover, the East India Company gave itself little concern about the extended possession, except so far as this procured the gains by the revenue from the trade in beaver skins. A great danger for New Netherland lay in the fact that the English government had never recognised officially the legality of the settlement and from 1606 had

¹ See pamphlet Thys. 7374, entitled: *Tsamenspraeck tusschen een nederlandsch ende brabantisch koopman.*



obtained in this country, by the obligation for the fishermen to bring the whales caught and the oil and whalebone into Dutch ports and to sell them there, by the strong guard given the whalers by the war ships of the States. Coupled with this industry there was a small trade with the Eskimos of Greenland's coasts and Davis Strait in wood, copper kettles, axes, knives, and trinkets.¹ "Commissioners of the Greenland fishery," composed of the principal shipowners, had the supervision of these interests.

The branches of industry connected with navigation and the fishery, not only shipbuilding on the Zaan but also the manufacture of nets, ropes, sails, anchors, and cables, flourished naturally as much as did navigation and fishery themselves. Industry in general seems in these years to have given slight grounds for complaint, although De la Court earnestly urged a reduction of the oppressive imposts and abolition of the restrictions that held almost every branch of industry in chains. The halls and guilds in his native city and elsewhere, keeping the woollen and cloth manufacture under the guardianship of the municipal government, appeared to him in conflict with the principles of freedom, from which he expected the richest fruits for commerce as well as for industry. He believed not unjustly that without great harm an attack could never be made upon liberty of worship, which had promoted the commerce and industry of the country in great measure by attracting hither so many manufacturers and merchants expelled from other lands.

These free economic principles were far from being applied to industry. It still remained locked in the fetters of the guilds of the Middle Ages. The immense importation of raw materials from all countries of the

¹See Zorgdrager, *Groenlandsche Walvischvangst*; Luzac, *Holland's Rijkdom*, ii., p. 277.



Not published until our day and in many ways the basis of the later written *Interest van Holland*.

The Leyden author so well informed on economic matters, who is considered one of the most remarkable economists of the seventeenth century, was not so observant of the religious phenomena about him, to which he gave attention only so far as they might serve to explain the economic principles championed by him.

He would have been the last to deny that religion played a great part in his time. With his liberal conception of religion, which brought him into the odor of atheism, he knew very well that the inhabitants of his city and country were in general little helped by that liberality. He refers repeatedly to the self-interest that ought to prevent the ruling Reformed party from using their power to suppress people of other opinions, who even in Holland were in the majority by far. Not half the population of that province is of the Reformed faith, he says of his days; in particular most of the "old inhabitants," peasants, monied men, and nobles are still Catholics, many indeed Protestants but Mennonites or Rijnsburgers. In Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel Catholicism was unquestionably far in the majority, although some districts, as the Veluwe since John of Nassau, counted many of the Reformed religion. The number was very small in the three northern provinces and Zeeland, as appears from De la Torre's report of 1656.¹ The Catholics above the Meuse at this time may be estimated at about half a million.

The freedom of worship in this country astonished all foreigners extremely on comparing it with conditions elsewhere, but no less astonishing was the large number of Protestant sects resulting therefrom. Most attention was attracted by the numerous Mennonites among the

¹ Reprinted in the *Archief van het aartsbisdom Utrecht*, x., p. 95; xi., pp. 57, 374.



but he does not say too much, theoretically at least, when he affirms that as elsewhere every man could eat, lodge, and market where he chose, here every man could pray with whom he pleased without any notice being taken of it. He had seemingly heard little of the great conflict that shortly before his arrival in the republic had shaken the entire Reformed Church to its foundations, the fierce dispute between Cocceians and Voetians, which might have caused a revival of the old discord of Arminians and Gomarists.

After a quarrel over the Sabbath agitating men's minds during years, a new important difference came up about 1660 between the theologians of Leyden and Utrecht, that concerning the forgiveness of sin and the doctrine of grace, in which Voetius himself strongly opposed the "Leyden heretic," being soon helped by Maresius of Groningen, who forgot his former disputes with Voetius to join him in combating Coccejus and his friends, whose doctrine resembled the Arminian conception of predestination. Coccejus's moderate opinion found support in the government hostile to theological faction and composed to a large extent of elements half or wholly Arminian. On the other hand, the Voetians depended upon the partisans of Orange, in old times the protectors of the stricter orthodox tendency. Political and ecclesiastical dissensions thus threatened to bring the republic into trouble again, and in particular the strife over the "public prayer" gave occasion to violent commotion in church and state, when the Estates of Holland (1662) took up anew the subject of naming the prince of Orange in public and church prayers and formulated a prayer making no mention of the house of Orange. But resolutions and the clever avoidance of dangerous points of dispute succeeded still in conjuring the peril of a renewal of former factions, although the internal contentions in the church could not be ended.



explained, they must be given what they want, because only in that way are they attracted. Fortunately the men in power thought otherwise. Strongly under the influence of the Cartesian ideas penetrating more and more among the developed class, they had more than formerly an eye and ear for the progress of natural science.

The universities, Leyden first of all, which early in the century were especially noted for the flourishing state of the classical and theological studies, had not lost their renown, although the number of students no longer assumed such proportions as had been the case about 1640. This was a result both of the restoration of peace in Germany and of the disappearance of the matchless philological geniuses, who constituted Leyden's glory in the first half of the century, possibly also of the extensive exploitation of the foreign students mentioned by some authorities and of a certain love of ease that had arisen with the university's success.¹

Coccejus still lived at Leyden, the acute and compassionate author of the *Summa doctrinæ de fœdere et testamento Dei*. In Utrecht Voetius still swayed his heavy sceptre with unabated adherence to the principles of Dort. The vehement Maresius of Groningen continued to stand in the breach, since 1641 as the successor of Gomarus on the watch for all heretical doctrines, whether Arminianism or Cartesianism or whatever else must be to the strictly orthodox mind from the devil. They upheld the fame of dogmatic studies in the Netherlands, against which the philosophy of the Cartesians, proclaimed by Regius and Franciscus Burman at Utrecht, by Heydanus and his protégé Arnold Geulinx at Leyden, managed to defend itself successfully, being sure of the support of the friendly, ruling party in the States and in spite of the mild prohibition of 1656 that

¹ Wittewaall, *Proeve van De la Court's Welvaren van Leiden*, p. 148.



them all like a giant, the victorious refuter of the theory of the quadrature of the circle, the successful solver of the most difficult problems in numbers, the founder of the calculation of chance, the inimitable, clear thinker, who in mathematics put "the firmness of the rhetorical connection and the plainness of the demonstration" far above the results, the discoverer of the law of the conservation of the *vis viva* of motion and of the conservation of motion of the centre of gravity, of the pendulum's laws of motion, of Saturn's ring and moon, the inventor of pendulum clockwork, of the gunpowder machine, precursor of the gas machine and consequently of the steam engine, the talented expounder of the phenomena of light, of gravitation, of magnetism, the greatest mathematician, physicist, mechanician of his time, "the new Archimedes."¹ In the spring of 1666 he settled in Paris and helped establish there the *Académie des Sciences*, of which he was one of the first and foremost members. In his fatherland he found but few among the many dilettanti to understand and appreciate his work, so he left it in order from a more central place to let the light of his genius shine over the world, surrounded by men with whom he had been for years in close scientific relation, until the strict Catholicism prevailing at the court of Louis XIV. made life there difficult for him also, the liberal thinker, and drove him back to the fatherland.

The Netherlands swarmed² with men who, under the influence of Cartesian ideas, devoted themselves to the natural sciences, mostly estimable dilettanti like old Constantijn Huygens himself, who in his letters and posthumous writings displays a remarkable insight into scientific problems and had long kept up a correspond-


¹ See on him in general: Bosscha, *Christiaan Huygens* (Haarlem, 1895).

² See Sorbière's account of his travels through Holland in 1660 (*Bijdr. en Meded. Hist. Gen.*, xxii., p. 57).



buy old books and to sell new ones; its book auctions obtained great renown like those of Frankfort formerly. The peace of Münster, the waning splendour of philological studies at Leyden, above all the decreasing number of foreign students there injured this flourishing trade, but the Elzeviers succeeded in maintaining their old fame. Leyden and Amsterdam were long known over the whole world as the foremost seats of printing, where under the protection of Dutch liberty many works were printed and published that were elsewhere prohibited by the arbitrary decision of governments or the influence of the clergy. With Paris they possessed the largest share in the book business of those days.

If the republic might be called the promised land of inventors, dilettanti, publishers, booklovers, no less was it the land of painters and engravers. The aristocrat and the common man, the dweller in cities and the peasant, were accustomed to decorate their houses with art works of more or less importance. A portion of capital was invested in paintings, and they formed a considerable item of inventories and inheritances. There was almost no board of government or guild which did not own several portraits of its members past or present, in full consciousness of their dignity seated in their meeting room amid the emblems of their business or office. There was no officer of militia but he wanted to be immortalised upon canvas. Every family of consequence had its portrait gallery. At every fair of any note pictures and prints by well-known masters were offered for sale. Every notable event in the life of the family or in the state was commemorated by a painting, a print, or a medal. Every city of any extent could show its art amateurs and collectors of paintings. From no period of Dutch history are so many masters of art to be named, have so many art works of importance come down to us as from these days, when an abundance of money





Leyden Dou had excellent pupils and imitators of his fine style of painting in Frans van Mieris, Gabriel Metsu, Godfried Schalcken, Quiringh Brekelenkam. The "candlelights," the cabinet genre pictures, and the interiors of the Leyden school belong to the most attractive specimens of painting of this period. Jacob van Ruysdael excelled his uncle and teacher Salomon in the reproduction of the poetry of the water and the dunes in the vicinity of Haarlem and is esteemed the first landscape artist of the century, the best expert in the beautiful atmospheric and light effects of Holland. The reveller Jan Steen, Van Goyen's son-in-law, passing his life in poverty and miserable circumstances, created at Haarlem and Leyden those humouristic pictures of tavern and kirmess jollity, of household disorder and delights which made his name proverbial. The sons of Frans Hals and his able pupils Jan Miense Molenaer and Philip Wouwerman, the latter himself the founder of a numerous school of landscape painters and world-famous for his handsome horses, recalled the great portrait painter of Haarlem. Gerard Ter Borch of Overijssel established his great name as a portrait and genre painter. Johannes Lingelbach happily imitated Wouwerman, Claes Berchem more Van Goyen; Ostade had excellent pupils in Dusart and Brakenburg. Meindert Hobbema, little known in his time, is now celebrated as the equal of Ruysdael. Aert van der Neer, as little considered in his days as Hobbema was, is now highly praised for his exquisite moonlights and night conflagrations. The court and fashionable painter Gerard van Honthorst, whose portraits have survived in large numbers and testify to his fertile but too industrious talent; the Delft painter of churches, Gerard Houckgeest; the many-sided Karel du Jardin—they all can only be named here. Ludolf Backhuysen of Emden and especially Willem van de Velde the younger immortalised the great sea fights of the English wars and



time to set the fashion. The many architectural works necessary in extending and beautifying the cities: gates, public buildings, houses of private individuals in old and new quarters of the towns, an increasing number of the last excelling in architectural style and adornment, gave the city architects as well as the carpenters working for their own account an opportunity to display their taste and talent. The Hollander's love for his dwelling, the desire to let some of the prevailing prosperity appear on the outside, the fashion of renovating the gables brought into existence those numerous more or less beautiful gables of the seventeenth century, whose abundance helps to form the peculiar type of the Dutch cities. Artists like Salomon de Bray of Haarlem, painter, draughtsman, architect, author, all at once, could at this time give expression to the inspiration of their genius to their hearts' content. The genuine Dutch Renaissance style still flourishing about 1640 is, however, more and more lost in the tendency to the classical style followed after the example of France. The old peaked gable is given up for the horizontal cornice; instead of the sharp gable running up to a point comes the heavy monumental horizontal line; luxurious decoration with pilasters and leafy ornament, with baskets of fruit on the cornice, with wreaths and garlands upon the gable above and near the windows, takes the place of the former charming simplicity and prepares for the reign of the rococo which is soon to dawn.

If we thus see traces of an approaching decline in some arts notwithstanding their brilliancy, this is very distinctly perceptible in literature. The somewhat rugged national strength, that spoke from Roemer Visscher, Bredero, and the young Vondel, that animated Huygens and Cats to their best works, has ceased to inspire the literature of this time. Vondel, Huygens, and Cats still live — the last died in 1660, the other two



the French pattern would drive out both the classicism of Vondel and Hooft and the romanticism of Vos. With the foundation of the society *Nil volentibus arduum* at Amsterdam in 1669 under the management of Dr. Lodewijk Meijer began a new period of Dutch literature, that of a formal art bound down to fixed rules and models, soon overpowering all true art wherever it appeared, as did the rhetoricians of the sixteenth century. In the department of prose the affected style of Hooft's *Historien* had a great influence on the historical writings of Brandt and others. The grave stiffness of the ordinary written language was little adapted to lead to a rapid development, the less so because men soon imitated the French novel of those days and deviated further from the free forms, of which Marnix had given the example in his *Byencorf* and which are only to be found again in some well-written pamphlets of the seventeenth century. In those pamphlets, whose language has hitherto attracted too little attention from Dutch philologists, are often found the best productions of the easy prose of those days, much more natural than the prolix language of the learned men, than the complimentary forms of the epistolary style of the cultivated classes larded with French words and turns of expression, than the more or less conventional tone of the popular books of the time. There is to be heard the proud Dutch burgher of the most flourishing period in his real shape, coarse and rough sometimes but round and open, proud of his freedom, jealous of his rights.

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


Brandenburg, counted for little. The emperor, assailed by the Turks, was obliged to turn all his attention to that side. The mighty States-General believed they could without danger neglect the claims of Münster, Cologne, and Neuburg.

Feeling with regard to France and England could not be so secure. The way the young Louis XIV. took full possession of the royal power after Mazarin's death, his marriage to the oldest daughter of the king of Spain, who was nearing the grave, and whose only son was a weak child, warned such a statesman as De Witt of what was to be expected from Henry IV.'s grandson, the heir of the French pretensions to the southern Netherlands. To obtain these provinces would have satisfied one of the great monarch's dearest wishes. Like many of his predecessors and successors he regarded the possession of the Walloon portion at least of the Netherlands as indispensable to the safety of his own northern frontiers. Louis's attempts to make himself master of the principality of Orange could not be disagreeable to the party now ruling in the republic. The occupation of the city and castle by French troops in March, 1660, with the secret and well-paid coöperation of the governor Dohna, was viewed by the States with apparent indifference.

The ambassadors sent to France under the lead of Van Beuningen to prepare a close alliance between England, France, and the republic soon saw that this was impossible but that a separate alliance with France might be obtained. After Mazarin's death an offensive and defensive league with France was concluded April 27, 1662, for twenty-five years with promise of a mutual guarantee of treaties made, of possessions and rights in Europe, with reciprocal commercial advantages, and with limitation of the number of troops each should furnish for the other's aid to 12,000 men on the French side and 6000 men on the Dutch side. The replacement







such plan for robbing his father-in-law and brother-in-law during their life and declared he would not settle the affair until their death.

D'Estrades in these discussions incautiously mentioned the law of succession or devolution, of which the French government had already secretly determined to avail itself, if it should seem necessary to prove the queen's rights to the southern Netherlands. The so-called devolution law, in the provinces of Brabant, Mechlin, and Namur a fundamental principle of the law of inheritance, decreed that only children of the first marriage had a right to the father's estate with complete exclusion of the children by the second marriage. Louis XIV. believed he might appeal to this law on behalf of his wife, who was the daughter of Philip IV.'s first marriage, even against the young successor to the Spanish throne, who was the offspring of his father's second marriage. It remained to be seen whether this law of private inheritance in some provinces was applicable also to the succession of the sovereign of all the provinces. The rights of the queen, based upon the non-payment of the dowry and upon the law of devolution, were now named, and De Witt and Spain might consider themselves warned. De Witt denied very strongly the validity of the devolution law, although he did not cease to negotiate over the partial annexation. If France were ever to obtain the southern Netherlands, it must owe them not merely to its own rights but to an agreement with the States.

Thus "the great affair" remained on the tapis, and De Witt did his best to convince the States of the necessity of an early agreement with France. But the French government, resting its claims to the entire inheritance of the Spanish king on the non-payment of the dowry and the devolution law unreservedly brought forward, was no longer inclined to enter into such an agreement as might conflict with these asserted rights. "His Majesty's real








republic. Neither Beverweert's pliability, nor Van Hoorn's knowledge of commerce, nor De Witt's incomparable art of discovering expedients could remove the serious difficulties in the way of an alliance. The old differences were constantly coming up again: the English *Dominium Maris* with regard to fishery and commerce, England's unwillingness to recognise the principle of the "free sea," troubles in the Indies, the relations between the English and Dutch companies, commercial grievances in Africa and America had to be considered at length. After Charles II.'s marriage to the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, the strained attitude of the republic towards Portugal became of consequence. And soon the difficulties were to be increased by the appointment of Downing, the champion of Cromwell's commercial policy so hostile to the republic, as mediator for Portuguese affairs at The Hague (June, 1661). The faithless, brutal, avaricious diplomatist, who cleared his way with the new ruler just in time, was little suited to prepare for friendly relations, although on his arrival he poured out over the States such fine words as "particular confidence," "very singular affection," "very hearty thanks," "very good and clear understanding," and "interest of religion and neighbourhood." His presence impeded negotiations with Portugal, as he sought to promote English commerce at the expense of Dutch interests and exercised pressure upon Portugal, so that all De Witt's talent was necessary to conclude the Portuguese affair in a manner not too injurious for the States.

During the negotiations with England the question of the prince of Orange soon came into the foreground. Adroit management of the Orange party might have accomplished much for the prince. But this was still lacking, and dissension between the two princesses prevented use of the favourable circumstances. The Act of Exclusion was of course repealed immediately, and in



him live at The Hague "in the house and under the eyes" of the States and to appoint one of their partisans as his tutor in place of his bastard uncle, Zuylesteyn. Thus William II.'s son was to be brought up in the ideas of the States. The princess offered objections. The matter remained undecided, when the sudden death of the princess in England from the smallpox changed the whole state of the question in January, 1661. In accordance with her desire Charles II. took her place as guardian, and the spring of 1661 saw a drawing together of the three authorised guardians, who desired a change in the commission and its enlargement with Orange members under the supervision of Princess Amalia. At the same time a new movement for the designation began in the republic. The States showed unwillingness to take any further trouble about the prince and revoked the resolutions concerning his education. Zuylesteyn and the preacher, Trigland, continued to have charge of the education, and the youthful object of all these intrigues pursued his studies quietly in the shadow of academic learning at Leyden.

English efforts to secure the prince's designation in one way or another persisted. Even the support of France and Brandenburg was sought for them, but the former saw more advantage in an alliance with the party now ruling, and the latter was too desirous of the friendship of the States to help. The relations between Charles II. and Princess Amalia grew more strained, and the princess soon showed herself as ready as her daughter-in-law had previously been to agree with Holland regarding the treatment of the young prince. In March, 1663, she requested Holland again to undertake her grandson's education, and Charles II. joined in this request, being prepared then to retire from the guardianship. But Holland refused once more. The dissensions between the guardians made it plain to the leading statesmen that




ments, for the Royal Company of Adventurers, of which the king's brother, the duke of York, was the head. Holmes's rough way of accomplishing his task did not improve the feeling. A long list of English claims was offered the Dutch ambassadors in London, calling for an indemnity of eight million guilders from Netherlanders, especially from the East and West India Companies. The States did their best to keep the peace thus menaced. They even allowed the capture of three regicides of Cromwell's time, who had taken refuge in Holland, an act of weakness shocking Dutch ideas of liberty and feeding popular discontent with De Witt. In September, 1662, the treaty of friendship was signed, and the ambassadors and Downing returned to their respective countries. Questions regarding the seizure of vessels, etc., were to be submitted to a court of arbitration, but there was no commercial advantage for Netherlanders in England and no final settlement of the old points of dispute now raked up again.

This conclusion of the long negotiations was critical, because it had appeared that a strong party in England, including the duke of York, the heir to the throne, desired nothing more ardently than a new war with the republic in order permanently to cripple its commerce and sea power. The peace party, led by the duke's father-in-law, Lord Clarendon, still had the upper hand, but Clarendon's powerful influence was decreasing, particularly after the sale of Dunkirk to France, like the loss of Calais felt as a blow by the English people. New complaints and difficulties soon arose when Downing, who secretly belonged to the war party and considered the condition of the republic as extremely favourable for a war with England, had returned to The Hague (September, 1663). Differences about old privateering affairs, about the violation of English commercial regulations, about the lack of promptness in striking the flag,



account of commerce, internal disturbances, and the heavy burden of debt were afraid of a war and would consent to anything to avoid it. This opinion was not entirely unfounded, but there were bounds to the patience of the States, and England was fast approaching those bounds. This appeared from the resolution of the States-General in the spring of 1664 to keep De Ruyter at home instead of sending him to the Mediterranean to combat privateering, a resolution that was not carried out owing to more favourable news from England. De Witt hoped to remove the differences and considered with Downing a speedy investigation of England's pretensions. Reports of English preparations continued, and in May, 1664, the Dutch at last resolved to fit out thirty ships, ostensibly against the Spanish pirates, and to make ready for a large loan. Rumours of war were rife; uneasiness in commercial circles was shown by fluctuations in the shares of the East India Company, and they fell from 500 to 440 per cent. Some of the English claims were found to have not the slightest foundation, others were to be satisfied as quickly as possible. Van Gogh, a weak and inefficient man, was appointed ambassador to London. The equipment of the fleet went on in order to be prepared for any emergency. Intelligence came that England was enlisting sailors, building ships, and displaying great activity, so that it was feared she would assail the unsuspecting merchantmen returning from India without first declaring war.

Then arrived indisputable proof that Holmes in February had attacked the possessions of the West India Company on the coast of Guinea and had taken the island of Goree and some ships. It appeared that the Royal African Company was busily engaged in executing its plans in Africa with the support of its numerous stockholders among the royal family and the high aristocracy, who hoped to improve the company's bad



attitude of England the Dutch set about making their fleet ready. They still hoped for peace, however. Perhaps it might be secured by the intervention of France. But Louis XIV. showed slight inclination to intervene, because his own plans could never suffer in a war between the two maritime powers. Despite the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, he sought to remain neutral in order to take advantage of any opportunity that might be offered in the southern Netherlands.

De Ruyter succeeded without much difficulty in reconquering the West India Company's African possessions. The English government replied to the first reports of this success by laying an embargo upon all vessels, especially the Dutch ones, in English ports in order to provide sailors for its fleet. Downing began now to ask indemnification for England's expenses in making preparations. The attitude of France caused Charles II. some uneasiness, until he was certain that this country would not go to war with England for the sake of the republic. English war ships commenced to bring in Dutch merchantmen. The States on their side now seized English vessels in Dutch ports, though but few of them remained after a warning from Downing. The Dutch fleet, being dismantled for the winter, could not capture English merchantmen. The war party in England was unquestionably supreme, and Parliament readily granted all the money asked, even to the unprecedented sum of two and one-half million pounds. The London Exchange exulted, the people railed at the Dutch, Parliament was praised for its "brave vote" against the "insulting and injurious neighbours" who committed the crime of surpassing England's commerce.

A slight chance for peace lay in England's hesitation on account of the attitude of France. Memorials by Downing and deductions by the States, designed to prove their authors in the right, were addressed to foreign



favour of this pretension, and in the following year the States recognised the count of Limburg-Styrum as the owner of the lordship. Bishop Christopher Bernard von Galen vigorously urged the claims of Münster, but neither his representations, nor the support of France and the emperor could move the States to accede to his demands, so that he was greatly angered. There were the old difficulties between the bishop and his capital. The attitude of the States in 1658 had saved the city from complete domination by its lord, but von Galen did not give up, so that Münster repeatedly asked a garrison from the States, as Emden was protected in that way against its count. Friesland and the eastern provinces sometimes took much trouble to comply with the city's wishes, but Holland feared complications with the empire and let the favourable moment pass for raising on this side a strong bulwark, though earnestly importuned by the resident Aitzema, who was intrusted with the care of the city's interests. The States confined themselves to a weak mediation, and the respectable delegation sent to Münster in the summer of 1660 to effect an agreement met with little success. Before the sending of the deputies the bishop with an army of 14,000 men had laid siege to the city, and he encompassed it more closely and prevented all attempts at relief, so that in despair of help from the States it finally surrendered in March, 1661, vexed at their unwillingness. The half-hearted action of the States also excited the ire of the bishop, and he was ready to cool it at the first opportunity. Further dissensions with the States arose concerning the transportation of letters between Amsterdam and Hamburg, which took place partly across the bishop's territory and was there dependent upon the privilege of the count of Thurn and Taxis for the general imperial postal service dating from Maximilian's time. Another serious matter was that of the debt due, on account of an inheritance, from the



who expired in 1665 and left a son under age. It was no wonder that the bishop watched anxiously the course of the complications with England, and that the latter was disposed to take advantage of his feelings. He hoped furthermore for help from Brandenburg, Cologne, and Neuburg, which all had grievances against the States. France, however, served the republic by restraining these princes and by influencing von Galen to leave the States in peace. The bishop saw in the English war just beginning a fine opportunity to attain his purpose, sent representatives to London, and concluded on June 13, 1665, with England a secret treaty, by which he was to receive until August 500,000 rix-dollars and later 50,000 rix-dollars a month in return for the promise to attack the Netherlands from the side of the land with 10,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry.

In all these doings the warlike bishop was inspired by an exile from Groningen, Johan Schulenborgh. During the peace negotiations with Portugal his conduct as deputy to the States-General had been as equivocal as formerly in the disturbances at Groningen. As president of that body he had approved the treaty of peace, at De Witt's instigation and being bribed, as was asserted, by Portuguese gold, to the great exasperation of his province. He was removed from all his political offices and condemned to refund 4000 guilders on account of frauds imputed to him but not fully proved. The energetic Schulenborgh endeavoured in conjunction with Rengers to regain his influence by means of the guilds of the city of Groningen, with whose leaders, the architects Warendorp and Van Emmen, the advocate Harkens, and the alderman of the tailors, a certain Udinck, he had been connected in previous commotions. A movement of the guilds at Groningen resulted from his secret intrigues in the summer of 1662. The municipal government saw itself compelled to abolish some unpopular taxes and to




CHAPTER XII

SECOND ENGLISH WAR

THE two maritime powers had prepared themselves as well as possible for the impending conflict. The English navy, much neglected immediately after Cromwell's death, was notably improved after the Restoration. Under direction of the king's brother, the duke of York, lord high-admiral of the fleet, great reforms were introduced, and the intelligent administration of such men as Samuel Pepys had a good influence. There was still, however, a lack of money and consequently of all sorts of things. Workmen in the yards and sailors had to complain of poor payment, materials and provisions alike left much to be desired, serious injury resulted from the custom of having the posts of naval officers filled by wholly inexperienced persons or by army officers. At the outbreak of war England had a navy of about 160 ships with 5000 guns and more than 25,000 men under such commanders as Monk, Prince Rupert, Montague, Ayscue, Lawson, and Penn, who were a match for the Dutch admirals.¹

In the Netherlands, since the imperfection of the fleet had so plainly appeared in the first English war, work had been zealously pushed in augmenting the number of the regular naval ships so as no longer to be dependent upon armed merchant vessels or upon the aid of private

¹ Tanner, *The administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the Revolution* (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1897, p. 17). See De Jonge, i., p. 616 *et seq.*



ing the possibility of sailing out. Great expectations were entertained of this "armada," the most considerable that had ever left Dutch harbours, under command of such men as the lieutenant admirals, Jan Evertsen, Kortenaer, and Stellingwerff. The caution of the chief commander in remaining upon the coast on account of contrary winds excited vexation. Urgent letters from De Witt, who thought of going with the fleet as deputy, and a sharp order from the States constrained him to seek the British coast in order to risk a battle. The English fleet, sailing out again, met the Dutch at the mouth of the Thames. After a few days of drifting Wassenaer, though missing the advantage of the wind, resolved to attack. Off Lowestoft a bloody battle was fought on the 13th of June. This engagement resulted very unfavourably for the Dutch, owing to the bad coöperation of the seven squadrons forming their fleet, to the mutual jealousy of the subordinate commanders and the lack of confidence in their chief, so that each of the captains fought on his own account. In the beginning Kortenaer was killed, and several captains, in contrast to the great bravery of others, manifested slight eagerness for the fray. The English finally broke through the Dutch order of battle, and the confusion now became terrible. The ships of York and Wassenaer engaged one another; York was wounded and his vessel was almost boarded, when suddenly Wassenaer's riddled ship was blown up. This event settled the issue of the combat, and many vessels now took to flight, following the example of Kortenaer's cowardly pilot who sailed away with the admiral's flag at the mast. Some captains still held out, but at last all gave way, being pursued by the English who captured several ships and destroyed others. Stellingwerff and the vice admiral Schram also lost their lives. Jan Evertsen, succeeding to the command, attempted with Tromp and others to restore order, but he too had to give up, and



ing the objections of the most experienced mariners, De Witt succeeded in getting the fleet from Texel to sea through an outlet regarded as impracticable, which has since, as John de Witt's Channel, conserved the memory of his energy. The fleet, again over 100 vessels strong with 20,000 men, sailed out on August 14th to look for the enemy, "in a splendid condition and full of courage." The council pensionary himself was on board to share its perils or glory.

The enemy had attempted in the harbour of Bergen to capture the returning fleet, which had sailed around Scotland to that place, but was repulsed with the help of the Danish forts. His main force still lay off the Dutch coast, but De Ruyter, escorting the returning fleet, did not encounter the English, and a severe storm destroyed several ships and injured the others so that they had to seek port. A second storm at the end of September inflicted further damage. De Witt with De Ruyter, however, managed to repair the fleet every time, and early in October they again sailed out to search for the enemy on the English coast off Yarmouth and the mouth of the Thames. But the enemy remained inside, and new autumnal storms and sickness compelled De Ruyter in the first days of November to return without having accomplished his purpose.¹ The council pensionary now resumed his post which had been occupied during a few months by his cousin Vivien.


The first year of the war on the sea had thus brought nothing but misfortune and disappointment. The war waged on land at the same time with Münster had also not been fortunate. Army and fortifications had been terribly neglected. Since the death of Prince William II. the once excellent Dutch army had become more and more disorganised. No field marshal was appointed after

¹ Most important letters concerning the doings of the fleet are to be found in De Witt's correspondence from the fleet itself (Royal Archives).

von Waldeck at the disposition of the republic. Waldeck was an experienced general and had refused the command of Münster's troops. France promised to do its best to prevent the war and succeeded in breaking the dreaded coöperation of the princes on the lower Rhine, so that Münster finally stood alone.¹ War with Münster was plainly inevitable, and late in July Prince Maurice was appointed chief commander with the Rhinegrave von Solms and the Scotchman Kirkpatrick as generals and with eight deputies of the States, including Cornelius de Witt, "to assist with word and deed." After an unsuccessful treacherous attack upon Arnhem and Doesburg the bishop sent to the States-General at the end of September a declaration of war, while he moved towards the Dutch frontiers with his army under command of the count of Hesse-Homburg. Prince Maurice complaining of the small army left him after garrisoning thirty forts, the States took 9000 new troops into service besides 6000 militia for the frontier fortresses. At the end of the year the army had increased from 20,000 to 70,000 men, and the expenditures upon it amounted to over five and one-half million guilders.


But this was all in preparation when the bishop began his attack. The forts of Twente and a large part of the Achterhoek were occupied by him in September; Salland and Twente purchased a safeguard from him; the Dutch army on the Yssel was not strong enough to drive him away, but prevented his crossing the river. In October the enemy forced his way from Staphorst and Rouveen into Drenthe and farther into the Oldambt, where he plundered and burned and was with difficulty kept by Prince Maurice from attacking Groningen. Fortunately French help now appeared, 6000 troops under General Pradel, governor of Bapaume, sent in accordance with

¹ See Der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster, 1650-1666*, p. 277 et seq.




the emperor's ambassador to The Hague, Friquet, who promoted a good understanding between the States and the princes of the empire, and the French diplomatist Colbert-Croissy, who acted equivocally. These negotiations led to peace on April 18th, by which both parties were to evacuate the territory occupied, and Münster gave up its claims to Borculoo and promised not to increase its army over 3000 men. This result was more favourable to the republic than could have been expected. A last attempt of the English diplomatist Temple to induce von Galen to continue the war failed. An eye had to be kept upon the sail in this quarter for fear of another attack. The bishop had made peace, because he was about to be assailed from all sides, and it was hard for him to swallow his defeat, while the course of the war had shown that the army and fortifications of the States were insufficient of themselves to oppose him, whenever he should again venture upon war.

The death of Philip IV. of Spain in September, 1665, brought new dangers into European politics, because his son, young Charles II., declared by will his sole heir, was so weak that he could not be expected to live long, and then the same will indicated as successor not the French queen, on account of the stipulations of the peace of the Pyrenees, but Philip's second daughter, the empress, and, in her default, the emperor and his children. It was no secret that Louis XIV. did not intend to accept this settlement and reckoned upon the aid of the States. Early in 1666 he declared war on England to satisfy the States, which had long been urging France's engagements by virtue of the treaty concluded. A joint naval expedition was planned with the coöperation of a French squadron under the admiral of France, the duke of Beaufort. The French squadron was not assembled until late in the spring and then made little haste to unite with the Dutch fleet. This latter was



the fleet sailed out, divided into three squadrons and each of these again into three sections: De Ruyter with Van Nes in the front, Evertsen and De Vries in the middle, Tromp and Meppel in the rear. Off North Foreland on the 11th of June the English fleet under Monk was encountered, also divided into three squadrons but, by reason of the detachment of twenty vessels under Prince Rupert to hold de Beaufort in check, considerably weaker than the Dutch, though provided with heavier ships.

Then began the fierce four days' naval battle, the most murderous of all time. On the very first day there was a bloody fight between the English and the Flemish coast, with great bravery and great losses on both sides. On the second day De Ruyter broke through the hostile line and destroyed several of the enemy's ships, so that Monk at last had only twenty-eight vessels. In a masterly manner he conducted the retreat to the British coast, during which Ayscue, the vice admiral in command of his second squadron, fell with his ship into Tromp's hands. Prince Rupert's return from the Channel reënförmed Monk again to about sixty ships, and once more he was able, close by the English coast, to attack the Dutch fleet reduced to about the same strength. This time also the British gave way, but on the fourth day they renewed the savage combat with even greater violence than before, so that the sea looked red with blood and the clouds of smoke from burning vessels obscured the light of day. The Dutch force was in peril for a brief space, but at the decisive moment De Ruyter hoisted the blood-red flag in sign of a general attack, broke the British line in different places, and was soon chasing the enemy's fleet in a wild flight. The entire English fleet would have been annihilated, if a dense fog had not stopped the pursuit. Thus ended this battle in a complete victory, and the Dutch fleet decked with flags



out of the service, bewailing the injustice done him and with his Orange friends considering means for overthrowing the existing government and elevating the prince. X

This time the victory of the English was not for a moment in doubt. They ruled the sea and even threatened its inlets. The rear admiral Holmes pushed, on August 19th, within the Vlie to destroy merchantmen lying there, and burned the two convoy ships destined to protect them and more than 140 of the mercantile vessels. A landing on Terschelling next day was a complete success, and a large part of the island was pillaged and laid waste. The destruction of some English merchantmen on the Elbe at Hamburg afforded but slight consolation. Early in September the Dutch fleet, eighty ships of war strong, again put to sea under command of De Ruyter and with Cornelius de Witt as deputy. The British were met in the Channel off Boulogne, but they avoided battle to the disappointment of De Witt. Sickness on the fleet and the indisposition of the commander, burning tow from a match having flown into his throat, decided the States to recall the fleet.

The terrible fire of London, which made a deep impression in England like the plague prevailing there, seemed to the States to give a fitting opportunity to prove that the republic was not thoroughly beaten. As De Ruyter's illness prevented his commanding the fleet, John de Witt in the absence of his faithful friend was designated to lead it with the support of the lieutenant admiral Van Nes. So the council pensionary went with the fleet to the English coast again. Some ridiculed the gowned admiral, but De Witt, hoping this time to unite with the French under de Beaufort, boldly entered the Channel and offered battle to the enemy early in October. Neither a battle, nor a junction with de Beaufort followed; storms and sickness forced the fleet to return, and only a few ships remained at sea to protect com-




favouring him, Van der Graaf, excused himself from further participation in the case on account of remarks made concerning his incautious visit to the prisoner. The court was repeatedly urged to hasten matters by the States in De Witt's absence,¹ on October 4th by a deputation in which Vivien, pensionary of Dordrecht and De Witt's cousin, made a vehement speech. Acquittal was constantly advocated by the Orange party. After long delay and pressure also from the French ambassador the court pronounced sentence of death with confiscation of property by five to three votes, a severe punishment but one that cannot be called unmerited or unjust. In default Kievit had the same sentence and Van der Horst that of banishment. On October 11th the imprudent cavalry captain was executed amid the general compassion of the people who soon began to regard him as an innocent victim of his devotion to Orange—an unjust opinion which was fostered by the Orange party and which later greatly injured De Witt and his friends.

In the autumn of 1666 the States planned new naval expeditions for the following spring, hoping for energetic coöperation of the French fleet. A quadruple alliance with Denmark, Brandenburg, and the Lüneburgers absolved them from all fear of Münster and Sweden. In England as well as in the Netherlands a new struggle was viewed with apprehension by reason of its financial burdens. The Dutch found it very difficult to pay the costs of war and were forced to issue loan after loan both for the provinces and for the admiralties. De Witt says that Holland was paying half of its income and more for the interest on its debt. In the war this province borrowed over twelve and one fourth million florins.² Sweden


¹ That he was the great instigator of the trial, and that he must thus be reproached with Buat's death is contested by Fruin upon convincing grounds. Fruin, p. 38.

² Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 400.



once more that the complete exhaustion attributed to the republic was far from having been reached. Even before the defeat of Lowestoft De Witt had formed the plan of entering the mouth of the Thames and of attacking the arsenals of the English fleet. This bold plan, considered also after the four days' battle but rejected by De Ruyter on account of insufficient acquaintance with the shoals of the Thames, was now at the instance of De Witt to be carried out by the fleet made ready in spring and again surpassing the former one in strength.¹ A small division of the fleet under the lieutenant admiral Van Ghent, which had escorted some merchantmen around the north of Scotland, attempted early in June to sail up the river of Edinburgh, but was quickly obliged to turn back. The rumour of a more dangerous plan against the Thames began to spread in England, and measures were taken to defend the river. These measures, however, were soon suspended, and De Witt saw a chance to execute his plan. Everything was prepared in deep secrecy. Cornelius de Witt, as the representative of the States, was sent to the fleet only a few days before its leaving Texel in order with De Ruyter to lead the expedition according to a commission put into their hands by the council pensionary on the departure of the fleet. The governor of Putten was not a little proud of the honourable mission given him. He and De Ruyter might indeed be "the best plenipotentiaries" for Breda. At the Meuse a considerable detachment of troops was taken on board. On June 14th the fleet sailed, over eighty vessels of all kinds and exclusively fitted out by Holland, to the British coast, where it arrived off the mouth of the Thames in the evening of the 17th. A squadron of seventeen smaller war vessels with advice boats, fire ships, and galiots under command of Van Ghent was intrusted with the real attack and sailed up

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 155.




Chatham was strongly fortified and fire ships were wanting. Six large English vessels were destroyed, several scuttled by the English themselves to block the river, two—the *Royal Charles* and the *Unity*—were taken away in triumph as memorials of the victory which was celebrated with solemn days of thanksgiving and bonfires. So ended the famous expedition which had cost the Dutch side only fifty sailors and some fire ships and in England had produced a great sensation, particularly in London, where people began to take to flight in panic. The brave victors received brilliant rewards and honours.

But the council pensionary considered the task as not yet finished. He urged new attacks on the Thames and elsewhere. The larger part of the fleet continued to blockade the Thames, and small squadrons cruised along the English coast to prevent the running out of merchant vessels. One of them made in July an attack on Harwich, which failed as did similar attacks upon other ports and a new attempt to go up the Thames, followed by a third in August under Van Nes, in which the English navy suffered heavy losses at Gravesend. The lack of fire ships and the vigorous defence of the English forced the Dutch this time to turn back after four days of fighting at Sheerness and on the Medway.

These last hostilities took place after peace was really concluded. On the 31st of July this occurred, being undoubtedly promoted by the glorious expedition, but operations did not cease before a month later, while the Dutch continued their mastery over the sea. The plans of France and complications with Sweden and Portugal made it desirable to hold a naval force in readiness. With the return of the fleet in October the war could be considered as ended.

In the peace the affairs of Pularoon and the captured ships were finally set aside, and the commercial regulations enacted in the last war to the detriment of the





CHAPTER XIII

SUMMIT OF THE REPUBLIC'S POWER


WITH the peace of Breda begins the most brilliant period of the republic. In a letter De Witt speaks with justifiable pride of the realisation of his prediction that the state "within the time of two years would be in a better condition, in greater reputation, and in higher credit than ever before."¹ "New Carthage," exclaimed the aged Vondel, is humiliated by the "maritime triumph of the Free Netherlands," now that "the sea lion on the Thames" caused the English standard to be struck. Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal dare not oppose the republic; France seeks its coöperation in the plans long formed against the Spanish Netherlands; Spain looks imploringly to its former rebels for protection; Germany's princes turn for help to the United Netherlands; even the emperor desires their friendship. Within the country Holland's will is law, while victory confirms the power of the magistrates, and prosperity and wealth everywhere awaken satisfaction with the rule of the council pensionary and his colleagues. But in the distance appears a cloud, much larger already than a man's hand, upon the southern horizon, where the armies of France are crossing the Spanish-Netherlandish frontier. And nearer at hand, in Holland's bosom, another danger threatens the ruling party. The young prince is growing up, sickly and weak of body indeed,

¹ See Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 409.




ated especially against the devolution law, the foundation of Louis's claims, and warned against French rapacity. Freedom or slavery of Europe was in question and to be decided by this first attack. How was feeble n to withstand the assault?

After the protest of the regent and her governor in sels, Louis marched on May 21st, and the French army more than 50,000 men under Turenne, inspired by the 's presence, easily made itself master of a series of esses, from Lille, Charleroi, and Armentières to Aalst Dendermonde, while the Spanish force, small and ly collected, was dispersed at Bruges. In September ly all Brabant, Flanders, and Hainaut were in French ls; Brussels, the capital, with Ghent and Mechlin alone ined under Spanish rule. Great was the terror in republic at the rapid progress of the French arms. Witt himself was surprised and complained of the en change in the French policy. Van Beuningen, th ambassador in Paris, endeavoured to satisfy Louis . by the offer of Franche Comté with Cambrai, Aire, St. Omer, but France asked for more with Spain's gnition of Louis's rights on the death of the young . De Witt was in great difficulty. The peace of a was not then signed and Sweden was unreliable. w war with France for the sake of Spain would be ness. When peace was concluded, the council pen-ry declared his inclination to help Spain, provided es, Ostend, Damme, Plesschendaele, and the forts ella and St. Donat were granted to the republic. The ish government would not hear to this, because it it then become entirely dependent on its old enemies. n England made a similar offer, the government at rid considered the price too high, now that winter was oaching and the French conquests were ending with ing's triumphal return to Versailles. But Spain fell antly lower. The emperor was persuaded into an .




treaty of the States with France concerning the Spanish Netherlands. England hesitated under the influence of French offers, and Charles II. was ready to join France in an attack on the republic.

The danger for the republic became great, and De Witt had to keep his eyes open. Fortunately popular opinion in England impelled the government in the direction of De Witt's policy. It was unwilling to see the Spanish Netherlands in French hands and remembered the loss of Dunkirk. Lisola's activity had much influence upon this disposition of the English people, and Parliament showed itself averse to any participation in French plans. The fall of the minister Clarendon and the elevation of Arlington, Beverweert's son-in-law, promoted the understanding with the republic, and Charles II. saw himself obliged to yield to this tendency. He had Sir William Temple, the English resident in Brussels and a well-known opponent of France, come to London at the end of December from his station by way of The Hague in order to prepare for coöperation with De Witt. Long an admirer of the council pensionary, Temple had little difficulty in agreeing with him, and when early in January he arrived in London from The Hague, he was able to say that the States, though disinclined for the moment to begin a joint war against France, were quite prepared to unite with England in a mediation. On the 13th of January, 1668, Temple left London to propose a joint mediation four days later in The Hague. De Witt hesitated a bit to enter into so close an alliance with the unreliable English government, but Temple overcame his scruples and even persuaded him to have the States-General conclude the treaty directly with England. Thus long discussions in the provincial Estates and the opposition of France would be avoided. In an audience of the States-General Temple easily secured the appointment of seven deputies in order, supported by the council



fortified places in the Netherlands already lost, which was least of all agreeable to the States. There was more difficulty with France and, while Sweden was only induced at the eleventh hour to keep its word by increasing the promised subsidies, it was found necessary to assemble troops to show Louis XIV. that matters were serious. Under John Maurice and the field marshal Wurtz the army of the States was collected on the Scheldt and the Yssel in order to move either upon the Spanish Netherlands or upon the bishop of Münster again gathering his troops. Lüneburg and Lorraine promised respectively 6000 and 8000 men, 48 ships were fitted out, and new levies were to add 12,000 men to the Dutch army, so that by spring 25 regiments and nearly 4000 cavalry were ready. Louis XIV., who had already seized Franche Comté, was not prepared to enter upon a great war and decided to comply with the demand of the three powers to the end that he might later break their resistance. The terms of peace were settled at St. Germain en Laye on the 15th of April between Lionne, Van Beuningen, and the English envoy Trevor. A congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, comprising representatives from the states interested and presided over by the papal nuncio, was to draw up the definitive treaty. Beverningh and Temple had little difficulty in persuading the French envoy, Colbert-Croissy, and the one from Brussels, Bergeyck, to sign the stipulations discussed at St. Germain. On May 2, 1668, peace was finally concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle. Louis kept Mons, Veurne, Armentières, Courtrai, Lille, Douay, Tournay, Oudenaarde, Ath, and Charleroi, and gave back Franche Comté; he had gained a firm footing in Brabant and Flanders, but his further progress was for the time blocked.¹ A guaranty treaty between the three powers and Spain, securing to the latter the inviolability of its remaining possessions, placed


¹ Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, i., p. 148.



ningh as treasurer-general in the following year, popular movements in different cities after the defeats of 1665, the activity of preachers and officers in the young prince's interest, the incessant vigilance of the princess dowager in advancing her grandson. There were traces also of a diminution in the personal influence of De Witt. His friend De Groot had to lay down the pensionaryship of Amsterdam, and was replaced by an antagonist in the town council, which more and more opposed De Witt. By securing for him the embassy to Sweden De Witt recompensed his friend, but the blow was felt by the council pensionary's internal policy. The death of Andries de Graeff removed his best support in the great city, where Gillis Valckenier, too independent to submit to De Witt's guidance, had now become the chief personage. A disagreement between the influential Van Beuningen, who imagined himself slighted by De Witt and was made burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1669, and the council pensionary estranged the latter still more from the city. Under these circumstances a speedy settlement of the attitude of the prince of Orange appeared necessary.

De Witt hoped to prevent the worst by taking into the council of state the young prince, with whose education in the "good maxims" he now earnestly busied himself, and, as soon as he should be eighteen years old, by investing him with a high military office under condition that no captain-general to be appointed should ever obtain or keep the stadtholdership in any province. Some members of his party desired to go further, and Caspar Fagel, pensionary of Haarlem, and Valckenier, burgomaster of Amsterdam, took the initiative¹ for the proclamation by the Estates of Holland of a Perpetual Edict for the "mortification" of the stadtholdership. De Witt hesitated, fearing that this extreme could not be

¹ Bontemantel, *De Regeeringe van Amsterdam, uitg. Kernkamp*, ii., pp. 17, 19.



party of the States, that it could not long maintain severe restrictions. Vivien, the pensionary of Dordrecht, interpreted undoubtedly the secret thought of his cousin, the council pensionary, when during the discussion of the Perpetual Edict he stuck his penknife into the resolution lying before him and replied to the question of what he was doing: "I am trying what steel can do against parchment." The young prince had listened to De Witt's communication of the proceedings in the Estates of Holland without any external marks of displeasure according to his custom, cautiously hiding his real feelings in the depths of his mind.


The course of these affairs seemed to have strengthened the existing government. At the end of July, 1668, the five-year period of the council pensionaryship expired again, and the high appreciation of De Witt was shown by his reelection with the doubling of his salary, 6000 guilders, over and above his compensation as governor of the fiefs and keeper of the great seal of Holland, which dignities had been his since 1660, and besides a gratuity of 45,000 guilders for his services, to which the nobles added 15,000 guilders more. The renewal of his act of indemnity and the promise of a place in one of the courts of justice on his retirement assured his future. Thus he found in the gratitude of his fellow-citizens a reward for his hard work, in the midst of which his faithful wife died on July 1st of this year, leaving him the care of a large family. The beautiful letter of his friend Temple, expressing sympathy with him in this loss, gives evidence of the great diplomatist's fine feeling, just as De Witt's own letters of this time testify to the sovereign calmness, with which the council pensionary received the favours as well as the blows of fortune. Thenceforth he espoused alone the good of his country, and though he might be struck deep in his soul, he remained outwardly what he was, the

¹ Scheltema, *Staatk, Nederland*, ii., p. 418.



their tyrannical power in City and Land, even in the city of Groningen. Here occurred all sorts of abuses at the "muster," the examination into the competence of the representatives elected from the country. At the request of Egbert Clant and Johan de Mepsche the States-General in 1667 sent delegates to reform the abuses. The city opposed the new regulations; dissensions between city and country sprang up again; but the anti-Holland party kept the upper hand in spite of the efforts of De Witt from The Hague to defeat it with the help of Jan Osebrand Rengers and his friends. To end the discord and secure the assent of City and Land to the Harmony De Witt late in May, 1670, went to the province with four other "arbiters" and remained several weeks settling matters without entire success, as the city continued to resist. The selfish interests of the great lords appeared stronger than the desire to improve, and the "reformation" of the provincial government could not be accomplished. These abuses are not astonishing in the remote northern provinces, where the States-General seldom interfered and the stadtholder's authority was not powerful enough to hold in check the landowners of noble birth. In Holland, in Amsterdam also according to Bontemantel's disclosures, terrible abuses prevailed in the government; family interests, personal ambition, and love of power often had free play; the purchase of votes by promises and favours, the distribution of fat offices to friends and relatives, the misuse of public money, were common occurrences. And De Witt himself was not entirely averse to them. His correspondence shows that he looked after the interests of his relatives and friends, that his power in Holland rested largely upon their occupation of the offices, that he and his friends upon occasion profited by speculations dubious in our eyes. But in Holland the abuses were confined to limits that did not have to be observed in the north.

More than two years passed before De Witt succeeded in



he wanted an understanding with the opposing party, and when Valckenier refused "for reasons" and Van Beuningen was elected burgomaster, the council pensionary hoped to end their hostility by ostentatiously asking their advice. Next year also the burgomaster's election went against him, and his recommendations for offices began to fail of their effect. This enmity to De Witt naturally brought a leaning to the prince's party. In the election of 1671, after all sorts of intrigues, Valckenier's party was unsuccessful, and none of its candidates became burgomaster. De Witt triumphed over the proud relative of the Pauws and Trips, who never forgave him this defeat. The choice of Fagel as secretary of the States-General (November, 1670) in place of the dead Ruysch relieved De Witt of the Haarlem pensionary so influential in the Estates of Holland. A new victory for him seemed the promotion of the ambassador De Groot after his return from Sweden to be pensionary of Rotterdam, the second commercial city of Holland. But the council pensionary still had powerful enemies among the magistrates who desired with the aid of the Orange partisans to overthrow the "minister." What they secretly prepared was forwarded by the course of foreign affairs in these years.

The excellent French diplomatists of the school of Richelieu and Mazarin had taken for the first object of their activity the annihilation of the Triple Alliance and of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.¹ They tried to accomplish this by working upon weak Spain and the two allies of the republic. Spain, ruled by a passionate and avaricious woman and her unworthy favourites and ministers, was in no condition to thwart the French intrigues. Many of its statesmen, like the aged Pefiaranda, regarded

¹ See concerning the diplomatic intrigues of these years especially—Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., Chapters ix. and x., where De Witt's manuscript correspondence and that of the French diplomats are very well employed.




cerning the southern Netherlands: one assigning Cambrai, Aire, and St. Omer to France, the other giving back the places ceded by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in exchange for these three lying on the French frontiers; the remainder of Belgium was then to become a separate republic. Neither these plans nor that of a division of the Spanish Netherlands between France and the emperor encountered approval at the French court. All De Witt's endeavours to come to an understanding with France failed. In June, 1671, Pomponne left The Hague to go again as ambassador to Sweden; shortly afterwards he replaced the deceased Lionne as minister of foreign affairs at Paris. Only a chargé d'affaires was left at The Hague. This attitude of France opened De Witt's eyes at last to the necessity of putting the republic into a condition to defend itself against all contingencies. Louis XIV.'s sudden attack upon the duchy of Lorraine in August, 1670, showed him that France had not given up its old plans, but his representations had as little success as those of the emperor. Lorraine, conquered within a month, remained in French hands. The real intentions of Louis XIV. continued to be hidden from the council pensionary, in consequence partly of the unsatisfactory arrangement of Dutch diplomacy, a fault that brought the most terrible evils over the country.

The principal ambassadorial positions remained in these years for a long time either unfilled or occupied by incompetent persons. After the death of the Dutch ambassador Van Reede at Madrid in September, 1669, it was more than a year before his place was taken by Van Beverningh, the first diplomatist of the States, who was there from January to July, 1671, and then returned home after preparing the way for a league between Spain and the republic in case of an attack by France upon either one. The arming of France was then generally known, and it was certain that with an attack from that side the



the French court from his father's days. But De Groot accomplished little and speedily urged the States to prepare for war. What he saw in France aroused his fears. He had reason for them, because at this time the secret league between England and France was actually effected. Set on by York and the war party in his court, who ardently longed to wipe out the disgrace of Chatham, won over by offers of money and wiles of women, finally influenced by his sister Henrietta, duchess of Orleans, Charles II. assented to the secret treaty of Dover (December 31, 1670), which detached him from the Triple Alliance and allied him with Louis XIV. against the republic under promise of three million francs of subsidy a year, and of the cession of Walcheren and the mouths of the Scheldt to England. Repeated warnings from Madrid, Berlin, and from Van Beverningh had been given De Witt, but, relying upon Temple and the alliance, he had disregarded them. He even hoped that France would return to the old friendship with the States, and from Charles II. he feared at the most a breaking away from the Triple Alliance, but not a new war. Van Beuningen, ridiculed by Lionne in January, 1671, as a "poor dupe," allowed himself to be misled regarding the real purpose of the equipment of the English fleet; "the end of the comedy" was to be a bitter disappointment to him and De Witt.

When Louis XIV. was ready with England, and in Sweden also the French money lavishly spent appeared more powerful than the anti-French policy, so that Sweden would not hold to its alliance with the republic, he turned to the emperor and the German princes to induce them to leave the republic to its fate. The Rhine princes and Münster, long under French influence and now gained further by French money and diplomacy, were quickly persuaded. Cologne and Münster, the former led by the Fürstenbergs in favour of France, displayed a readiness to declare war on the republic in the interests of Catholicism.



through the Liege territory. At the same time Münster and Cologne with 30,000 men¹ were to attack its eastern frontiers, and the united Anglo-French fleet was to assail Holland and Zealand. Thus the republic would be speedily destroyed. De Witt late in the autumn did not perceive the extent of the danger. De Groot had frequently mentioned rumours regarding an alliance between France and England, but not until November, 1671, did he write about it with certainty. England's refusal to enlarge the Triple Alliance, Charles II's indifference to the French attack on Lorraine, Arlington's conduct towards Van Beuningen troubled De Witt, but he relied upon the aversion of the English nation to France's plans of conquest and upon the anti-French attitude of Parliament. Temple had left The Hague, however, in August, 1670, and news came in the summer of the following year that he would not return. Then his wife, who had remained behind, also quitted The Hague. An English yacht, the *Merlin*, came for her in August, and Charles II. made use of the opportunity to create new difficulties. The yacht was to sail through the Dutch fleet cruising in the Channel and fire upon it immediately, if the flags were not struck. On the voyage out nothing was done, as a strong wind drove the yacht away from the fleet. During the return voyage, with the royal flag flying, it sailed among the Dutch fleet anchored off the coast of Zealand, fired a salute in the direction of De Ruyter's ship but received no reply, because his vessel careened very much to one side. The lieutenant admiral, Van Ghent, answered and finally De Ruyter himself, but the captain of the yacht fired back with shot, complaining that Van Ghent had not struck his flag "according to custom." Van Ghent paid a visit to Madame Temple and declared he was not obliged to salute in this way, whereupon the yacht sailed away unmolested. This affair occasioned very unpleasant negotiations concerning

¹ Knoop, *Willem de Derde*, i., p. 79.

than an agent. De Groot now asked for his recall but remained in Paris at the request of the States which still expected something from his embassy.¹ He had the arduous task of defending in Paris the Dutch policy of commercial war and peaceful assurances at the same time, of listening to the French complaints and of answering with counter-complaints. On the 1st of December the States addressed a solemn missive to the king to defend their conduct towards him and to justify their equipments on land and sea. De Groot was to deliver this in an audience and to accompany it with oral explanations. He did not get an opportunity to do so until January 4, 1672, but the king received the letter "with a look of indignation" and replied in threatening terms both orally and in writing, declaring he would go on with his preparations for war and had to give account of them to nobody.² All that remained possible was the adoption of "timely and vigorous resolutions" for war, but De Groot was left in Paris until the end of March, when he took leave of the French court in appropriate words and with an assertion of the good will of the States. He had no sooner departed than Louis XIV. declared war upon the republic (April 6, 1672), making his reasons known to the world in a violent manifesto. The device *evexi sed discutiam*, which he had placed on a medal struck for this occasion, testified to his purpose to destroy the ungrateful republic, once rescued by France in the great Spanish war from the dominion of mighty Spain.

Charles II. had preceded him by several days. Notwithstanding the opinion of his people strongly prejudiced against France, he had long been drifting towards war. Downing demanded, in lofty tone, satisfaction for


¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 121. See Combes in *Mélanges historiques*, i., p. 365, where is a letter from De Witt to Pomponne, dated September 25, 1671, with hope of a restoration of "the same confidence that the two nations formerly judged to be necessary to them."

² The two letters are in Mignet, iii., pp. 657 and 660.

princes to energetic coöperation. The alliance of Cologne, whose elector, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, was also bishop of Liege, had great value to France, because the French army secured across his Liege territory a road to the republic outside of Spanish lands, the neutrality of which did not have to be violated.¹ It was thought that the weakness of the eastern frontier of the States would speedily put the eastern provinces in the hands of Münster and Cologne.

¹ Huisman, *Maximilien Henri de Bavière* (Bruxelles, 1899), p. 84.





the Dutch officers ought to camp out for three months to learn what was required in time of war. De Witt quickly comprehended the danger. At the rumours of the French preparations, in October, 1669, urged a reënforcement of army and navy, the former 50,000 men, and the appointment of expert foreign officers, but not until a year later was the increase adopted to a tenth of what De Witt desired. He ceased not to for vigorous measures, by which he hoped to have fully 100,000 men in readiness. To simplify the payment he wished the maritime provinces to care for the fleet and the land provinces for the army. But the unwillingness to spend much money and domestic dissension, the difficulty of inducing most of the provinces to pay their arrears to Holland and the admiralties, and the opposition of Zealand long worked against any organisation, so that it was the spring of 1671 before the necessary money was granted. The fleet, which had been at sea in 1671, was dismantled for the winter, and the army remained in the garrisons. De Witt, now alarmed by the attitude of France and England both, proposed the fitting out of 120 vessels and a new enlistment of 20,000 men, but the Estates, slow as always and, so far as Zealand was concerned at least, little inclined to coöperate with the leaders of the ruling party, did not consent immediately, and when they at last took the matter in hand the proposal was cut down considerably. Great troubles arose over the payment of all these extraordinary armaments, which much exceeded the ordinary war budget of less than 4½ million guilders. The bad financial condition of several provinces brought everything down upon overburdened Holland, which groaned under a debt of 125 millions, and was unable to meet its obligations in spite of De Witt's admirable financial management. De Witt's attempts to impose new taxes failed owing to the opposition of commerce. Loans were thus the only means



should. It was too late to put the army, neglected for years and according to De Witt's system cut up between seven provinces, at one stroke into a condition to meet a formidable enemy. Furthermore, magistrates and people lacked enthusiasm, the conviction that the fight was for the fatherland and not for the preservation of a certain government; there was a want of the courage and desire to defend themselves and to exchange tranquil enjoyment and prosperity for privation and sacrifice. Men came from the cities in quite large numbers, but the peasants refused to take up arms; the States showed irresolution and slowness; and De Groot in February exclaimed indignantly—"is it possible that the descendants of a nation, which laid the foundations of our freedom, so feebly defend what their forefathers obtained with so much glory?"¹ Much had to occur to revive the heroic spirit.

The question of the command of the army was connected with that of the prince of Orange and occasioned great difficulties. The prince was now a member of the council of state, and the youth of barely twenty took his seat in it. He was already becoming a political personage of importance, and De Witt had cherished some hope of a good understanding with England at the time of the prince's journey there in the autumn of 1670; it was even contemplated to intrust a sort of mission to him with Van Beuningen, but the project was given up at De Witt's suggestion. The swiftly approaching danger of war directed attention to the heir of the military traditions of the famous family, however young and inexperienced he might be. But the Harmony provided that he was not to be proposed as captain-general before his twenty-second year, and he would not attain that age until November, 1672. A year earlier, however, Gelderland desired to designate him for that office, and one province after another expressed the same wish in spite of the stipulations of the


¹Wicquefort, iv., p. 354. See Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 232.



cavalry, the lord of Zuylesteyn as commander of the infantry, other moderately able officers as generals under them: Van Welderen and Nassau-Saarbrück with Montbas, De Groot's brother-in-law, as commissary general for the cavalry, the Swede Königsmark and the fiery Hans Willem van Aylva for the infantry, with the Scotchman Kirkpatrick and Van Styrum as sergeant-majors and the Frenchman Pain-et-Vin as quartermaster general, the count of Hoorn for the artillery. The army thus organised was collected on the Yssel after the detachment of a large number of garrisons to fortresses and forts, so that hardly 20,000 men remained under the command of an inexperienced youth, supported by old or incompetent subordinate commanders. Garrisons and forts were in poor condition. Trees on the ramparts were hastily cut down, gardens destroyed, houses in the firing zone demolished, rusted cannon brought out from the magazines, powder and ball scraped together, inundations prepared. What had been neglected for twenty-five years could not be restored in a moment. The results of De Witt's system, springing from fear of the military power of the Oranges, made themselves felt in the shape of general military helplessness.

In a much better condition was the fleet which had been at sea in the summer of 1671 and was kept in good order by De Ruyter with Banckers, Van Nes, and Van Ghent. But its equipment had suffered under De Witt's idea that the war would be against France only. When it appeared that England must again be fought, it was resolved in March to bring the fleet up to 120 ships with nearly 30,000 men. The closing of navigation to the Baltic, to the English and French coasts, and through the Channel, the prohibition of the exportation of munitions of war enabled the admiralties to fit out vessels speedily. A commis-sion,¹ of which John de Witt was once more the soul,

¹De Jonge, ii., p. 261.



action of this cause in the defeats suffered. After the peace of Münster the condition of the Catholics in the republic was little changed, although there was no longer any fear of secret relations with Spain and the Brussels government. Public worship continued to be prohibited for the Catholics, but, as before, worship in private was secured by money paid to the officials. And this privacy was public, while the Catholics themselves did not complain much of the state of affairs, knowing well that they were quite otherwise persecuted elsewhere in Protestant countries and that the Protestants in Catholic countries were in an infinitely worse condition, so that they had only to rejoice at the fact that the States gave no attention to the repeated exhortations of preachers and church councils to wreak vengeance on them for the violence done elsewhere to the Protestants. The apostolic vicar Jacobus de la Torre (1651-1661) complained in his *Relatio* of 1656 to the papal see about his diocese, but his second successor, Johannes van Neercassel (1663-1686), was more ready to submit to actual conditions.¹ Under the government of De Witt, who regarded it to the interest of the republic to allow different religious beliefs to live in peace, provided they respected the laws of the state, there was much less reason to complain, and Neercassel's relation of 1668 praises the freedom enjoyed in Holland, where the building of churches, divine worship, religious instruction were connived at. Foreign Catholics of the time testify to the same effect.

In the other provinces, except in Friesland where oppression was reported, the situation was about the same as in Holland, even in Utrecht, whose capital was inhabited by the violent Voetius, while in Groningen, Drenthe, and Zeeland the small number of Catholics constantly diminished under the now and then sharp persecution. Most

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Katholicken onder de Republiek*, i., pp. 227, 287.



then the large rivers would still be in the front. It seemed better to follow Alva's route of a hundred years earlier, to make Charleroi the base of operations, to go through Liege and a small section of Spanish territory into Cologne, masking Maestricht with a sufficient number of troops, then to cross the Yssel or the Rhine and to penetrate quickly to the heart of Holland, while the German allies were conquering the east and north and the united fleets were blockading the coasts, possibly landing troops here and there in Holland. The eight or nine thousand men in Maestricht would then be isolated, the army on the Yssel be compelled to retreat on penalty of being cut off, and the small garrisons be either overwhelmed or held in check.

Late in April Louis XIV. left his palace, and before the middle of May his troops moved northwards from Charleroi and Sedan. Turenne and Chamilly went with the main army along the Meuse to Visé, where the former crossed the river on the 24th and directed his course towards Burik; Chamilly surrounded Maestricht with a number of strong posts; Condé marched from Liege through Cologne territory to Kaiserswerth, where he crossed the Rhine in the direction of the Lippe. At the beginning of June, Turenne lay before Burik, Louis himself before Rijnberk and Orsoy, Condé before Wesel, all ready to commence the attack upon those "bulwarks of the state." De Witt had hoped to anticipate the enemy by securing possession of Cologne or Neuss before the French auxiliary troops arrived there. Towards the end of April, John Maurice, with cavalry and infantry, marched rapidly in that direction, but he came too late and had to return to the fortresses of Cleves. Those bulwarks appeared now quite unworthy of the name: they fell like card houses, badly garrisoned, miserably armed, and weakly defended as they were. Thus fell Rees and Emmerich, afterwards Doetinchem and Grol, and the country



Utrecht, where it arrived about the 15th. Condé's plan was given up on account of his wound and would have been difficult to execute. The prince's army, diminished to about 8000 men after the detachment of garrisons to the Yssel and Rhine cities, stood before Utrecht, which immediately shut its gates from fear of being exposed to a siege and of seeing its suburbs burned. It demanded, nevertheless, a vigorous defence from the prince, but after negotiation and the positive refusal of Utrecht to allow its suburbs to be burned the army left this position on the 18th by order of the States-General and fell back to the frontier of Holland, the famous old water line of Holland. Gelderland and Utrecht were thus given up within a month after the enemy had appeared on the border. In those provinces, outside of the great fortresses on the Rhine and Yssel, there was nothing to resist the enemy, who with 4000 cavalry occupied the chief places, on the 21st Utrecht, and even penetrated to Naarden, Leerdam, and Asperen. Muiden also was almost taken, important on account of its nearness to the sluices in the Vecht, but Count John Maurice put a garrison there in time.

Meanwhile Overijssel had fallen into the hands of the Münster and Cologne forces, which, with the help of a French corps under Luxembourg, captured the smaller fortified places and then attacked Deventer and Zwolle. The former, heavily bombarded, capitulated after a few days, and Zwolle and Kampen surrendered in a like cowardly manner. It quickly appeared that bribery and treason had here played a great part; the secretary of the Estates, many noblemen of Overijssel, many regents seem to have formed a plot for delivering the province up to the enemy. Early in July it was shamefully given over by treaty to Münster, which through an agreement with Louis XIV. and Cologne was assured of the undisturbed possession of the conquered province with Grol, Bredevoort, Borculo, and whatever should be taken in Fries-



his captains on board his ship, the *Seven Provinces*, and earnestly addressed them. The battle was chiefly between the Dutch and English fleets, as the French took little part in the fight. York, attacked by De Ruyter himself, was repeatedly compelled to change his ship; Montague, hard pushed by Van Brakel with a much smaller vessel, found death in the waves; the French were made to retreat by Banckers. The English fleet suffered severely and lost several ships. But there were heavy losses also on the Dutch side: Van Ghent perished, and the dead and wounded were numerous. The Hollanders fought like lions. De Ruyter was everywhere and everything: admiral, captain, steersman, sailor, soldier, all at once. De Witt stood with calm courage among his bodyguard of twelve halberdiers in the most dangerous place; Van Nes, Banckers, De Liefde, Sweers, Den Haen, surpassed one another in valour. Although greater advantages were won by the Dutch side, the victory remained doubtful, but on the following day the enemy declined battle and the Dutch fleet alone kept the sea, returning afterwards to the ports in order to repair damages. The danger of a landing from the combined fleets was averted. Of what help was this naval success in the hard trials of the war on land? The States-General resolved to reduce the fleet considerably, no less than one-third of the ships being unrigged, and to use some of the sailors and marines in the land war. Cornelius de Witt returned home sick with rheumatism and gout. De Ruyter continued in command of the sixty large ships, which were retained in service, but from now on had to be content with a more modest task than that of meeting the enemy on the open sea.

The French were meanwhile masters in Utrecht and Gelderland. Arnhem surrendered without a blow, the fort Knodsenburg after a short defence, Schenkenschans without any resistance, Doesburg after a weak opposition,



with difficulty brought to this sacrifice ; here and there force had to be used and the sluices were strongly guarded to prevent them from being secretly closed. By vigorous measures the prince overcame all opposition, and the enemy was checked. But the panic within the line was none the less. "Everybody stood stunned and dumb ; everybody found his house too small and fearsome and betook himself to the street, where he encountered for his consolation nothing but lamentation and misery ; everybody hung his head like a reed ; everybody seemed to have received his sentence of death ; the trades were at a stand ; the shops were shut ; the courts were closed ; colleges and schools took a vacation ; the churches, on the other hand, were too small for the troubled hearts that groaned with anguish more than they could pray."¹ People hid their valuables and shipped wife and child to neighbouring countries. The confusion grew worse as time went on. Disorder and defection were feared among the Romanists, who sometimes assisted the enemy in the provinces already conquered. Treason and cowardice were dreaded on all sides. "The government was without counsel, the people without reason, the country without rescue." The government securities suddenly dropped far below their value. A forced loan of uncoined gold and silver furnished money temporarily, but coin became ever scarcer. Holland's securities fell quickly from above par to 30 per cent., those of the East India Company from 572 to 250. There was a run upon the Amsterdam bank to withdraw deposits. In July the state's obligations were quite unsalable.

Under such conditions negotiation with the enemy was the only salvation, though it might occur merely to win time and perhaps to find alliances : with Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, Spain, the emperor, or even England. The chances for such connections were not entirely

¹ Valckenier, '*Verwerde Europa*, iii., p. 636.



Vijverberg to his home on the Kneuterdijk, when he was attacked by the brothers Van der Graeff, sons of the councillor, and two accomplices and was dangerously stabbed. One of the assassins, Jacob van der Graeff, was caught and beheaded on the 20th; the others escaped . . . to the prince's camp.¹ An assault on Cornelius de Witt at Dordrecht a few days later testified again to the popular hatred of the two brothers, who were regarded not only as the personal enemies of the beloved prince but as the artificers of the country's misfortune, and whose fall seemed the first condition of rescue. That fall was rapidly approaching, at least the overthrow of the government, of which they and their friends were the soul, but which had been unable to save the country from the disasters now ravaging it.

De Witt in these circumstances was not in a condition to rise from his bed, and his cousin Vivien had to lead the Estates of Holland, when De Groot appeared on the 25th with his message. Opinion favoured the continuation of the negotiation, but Amsterdam declared its opposition, unless the representatives made a tour to the towns to learn their feelings in this important matter. De Groot advised peace with an offer of Maestricht and the generality lands, besides payment of the costs of war. Amsterdam's deputies resisted firmly, and it was resolved, after asking instructions, to meet again in the evening of the 26th. Amsterdam and four other towns remained absent, while Enkhuizen alone objected to the resolution to sue for peace, urged by the pensionaries of Leyden and Gouda, Burgersdyck and Van der Tocht, and adopted by the members present, which resolution was at once referred to the States-General. Here also it was weighed in great haste and with waxing excitement. Zealand and Friesland wanted first to hear from their Estates; Utrecht could not do so and abstained; Overyssel desired peace

¹Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 395.



prince as stadtholder of Zealand, and the movement in this province spread speedily from one town to another; the magistrates yielded to the popular wish which saw no other salvation from the impending ruin but Orange. News of negotiations with the enemy kindled a flame also in Holland's towns. At Dordrecht, the bulwark of the De Witts, a movement of the people arose on the 28th against them and in favour of Orange. "Up with Orange!" accompanied by "Down with the De Witts!" resounded upon all the streets. The old council, menaced by the populace, assembled and invited the prince to come over. He arrived in the city on the following day, was received in princely fashion, and after brief opposition by the magistrates he was, at the demand of the people, declared stadtholder by the government. But the Perpetual Edict which he had sworn to! Cornelius de Witt refused at first to sign the document, even after the prince had been solemnly absolved by two preachers from his oath to the Edict, but he finally gave way to the supplications of his wife, alarmed at the raging multitude without. Vivien signed only "as pensionary," as the servant of the city's regents. What happened in Dordrecht was repeated elsewhere. The movement extended from one city to another, and in a few days the case was decided. The actual appointment by the States still remained, but what could they do, especially while De Witt was prevented by his wounds from appearing in the assembly?

Just then De Groot returned with the intelligence that Louis demanded part of Gelderland south of the Lek, for Cologne Rijnberk with some territory, for Münster the greater portion of Overijssel, for England Delfzijl with the environs; for himself he would be satisfied with the cession of a part of the generality lands, Crèvecœur, Bois-le-Duc, and Maestricht; finally he asked for complete freedom and equality for the Catholics, repeal of all commercial regulations against France, an advantageous



him the dignity, and after being relieved from his oath the prince accepted it. Zealand had come to the same resolution two days earlier. On the 8th the States-General also appointed him captain- and admiral-general of the Union. What a sudden change for the young prince! He received it with calm self-control and was installed on the 9th without much ceremony, returning then to the camp of Nieuwerbrug. His grandmother saw the aim of her life accomplished and wished him the patience and steadfastness of his renowned grandfather in the troublous days awaiting him.

Amidst these events the demands of Louis were received with vexation and exasperation. On motion of Amsterdam, which declared for breaking off the negotiation, Holland resolved to refer to the newly elected stadtholder, but he pronounced the terms unacceptable and himself ready to defend Holland's frontiers, provided reinforcements were sent him. The French conditions were then rejected unanimously, though it was desired to have De Groot continue the negotiation. He asked for new instructions, calling attention to the expiration of the time fixed by him at Zeist. Van Beuningen, proposed as his associate, refused to go and urged the continuation of the war, as after the prince's elevation a favourable disposition of the English court and help from Brandenburg and the emperor might be counted upon. Holland and afterwards the States-General resolved not to stop the negotiation, notwithstanding the terms offered were rejected, but De Groot declined to resume his task, and Van Ghent now obtained alone the mission. This was equivalent to breaking off the negotiation with France. That with England had little more success. Halewijn and Dijkveld on arriving there were treated almost like prisoners. But meanwhile the prince himself,¹ after discussing matters privately with Sylvius who was passing through, had sent

¹ See Fruin in *Nijk. Bijdr. N. R.*, iii., p. 287.



prince himself, who after this brief hesitation was determined to die in the last ditch rather than to purchase peace with dishonour.

The course of affairs in Holland and Zealand had removed the foundations of De Witt's system, but he was still council pensionary and his friends were everywhere in the government. During those July days in Holland the agitation manifested itself in popular risings against the adherents of the fallen system, and the prince took no vigorous measures to repress the turbulence. By request of the States he exhorted to peace, but he refused to punish the culprits, asserting that the leaders were in too high places, and that he needed his soldiers on the border. Evidently he wished the resignation of the chief statesmen and considered popular agitation as the best means of obtaining it. The publication of a letter to the prince from Charles II., in which the latter threw the whole blame of the war on the enemies of Orange, poured oil into the fire of popular passion.¹ Some facts already indicated the fate awaiting the partisans of the States. The severe punishment inflicted on Montbas, degradation and ineligibility for any command, was changed at the instance of the prince to imprisonment for fifteen years, but even this penalty appeared insufficient and Montbas's affair was again examined for the purpose of condemning him to death. He only escaped the scaffold by flight and sought safety with the enemy. His fate and the disturbances of every day alarmed De Witt's followers, and many of them prepared to fly. De Groot fearing arrest withdrew to the Spanish Netherlands. A report of De Witt's secret flight was spread, but the council pensionary was too proud to save himself in that way and remained quietly at home waiting for his complete recovery, surrounded by his family and ready to face the gathering storms, refraining from all opposition to the

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 465.



investigation had taken the precaution to warn his wife, and through her the secretary of the town, Muys van Holy, through him one of the burgomasters and the under-sheriff, while it would have been better to inform the competent authority immediately of Tichelaer's dangerous offer. This was, at the most, a blamable postponement. The Dort deputies, knowing the hostile disposition of the court towards the governor, who had many enemies on account of his undeniable pride and passion, found it necessary to ask the Estates to bring the matter before a judge of Dordrecht and at least to have Tichelaer arrested, which had been demanded also by Jacob de Witt, the aged father of the accused. The Estates did not venture to displease the prince by releasing immediately the accused and appointed commissioners to investigate. That the prince was ill-affected towards the governor appeared from his wishing to let the law take its course. The court imprisoned Tichelaer in the Gevangenpoort, where the governor was also transferred, while all efforts to secure his release failed. The council pensionary did his best to win advocates and to collect legal opinions in his brother's favour. De Ruyter declared there was not a word of truth in the accusations concerning the governor's conduct on the fleet. On the 1st of August, after appearing in church the preceding day to thank God for his recovery, the council pensionary visited the prince. The interview was cool, and to De Witt's offer of his resignation William III. replied with indifference that De Witt must take it to the Estates.

On the 4th the council pensionary made his last appearance in the Estates, understanding that he could no longer find a place in the government under the new system, and preferring to resign voluntarily rather than to play an insignificant part or to be dismissed. He announced his purpose in an appropriate speech, in which he alluded to his activity of nineteen years, his warnings,



The unfavourable disposition of some of them was not improved by this. Some obscure and conflicting answers of the governor, careless remarks of a political nature, notwithstanding his further explanations and his convincing attitude toward the accuser, gave the judges occasion to sentence De Witt to the rack in order by a "sharper examination" to bring the truth to light, as they said. On the 17th of August, by four votes to two, he was handed over to the executioner to be tortured. Horrible misdeed of these conscienceless judges! He was tortured fearfully on the 19th, but no screwing and beating, no stretching and bruising could break the steadfastness of the innocent victim, and amid the most excruciating pains he proclaimed his innocence to the judges according to some with the words of Horace about the just and persevering man, whose proud spirit the rage of his fellow-citizens and the tyrant's menacing visage cannot stir, according to others with expressions of faith in the righteousness of God. But early on the following day the judges, without using the word "guilty," pronounced upon the innocent man the sentence of deposition from all his offices and of banishment from the province—a sentence justifying Burnet's observation that the purpose was to remove him rather than to uphold the laws.¹

And upon the same day the terrible tragedy was ended.² The governor had asked his brother to come to him, and the former council pensionary hesitated not an instant to accept the invitation, although his family begged him to stay at home, because frightful reports had been circulating of new plans for murder, and mobs had repeatedly assembled before the prison, as the blinded populace firmly believed in the governor's guilt and in the com-

¹ De Bosch Kemper, *Staatkundige geschiedenis van Nederland*, p. 167.


² *History*, ii., p. 491; Wijnne, p. 256.

³ See Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 515 *et seq.*; Fruin, *De schuld van Willem III. en zijn vrienden aan den moord der gebroeders De Witt*, in *Gids*, 1867, i., p. 201; Wijnne, *Geschiedenis*, p. 258; Wagenaar, xiv., p. 157.



been done ; the brothers seemed saved, but the crowd remained and waited. Meanwhile the entire militia to the number of about 1000 men gathered in the neighbourhood of the prison according to orders. They showed a disposition very unfavourable to the brothers and mixed with the multitude ; some militiamen pushed into the prison to be sure that both were still there ; others climbed with muskets upon the nearest roofs to prevent their escape. Tilly, though separated from the prison by the militia, held the crowd in check merely by his presence, until a generally believed report of a troop of plundering peasants marching on The Hague from the Westland caused the deputy councillors to resolve to send the cavalry to the entrances of the city to repel this attack. Tilly refused at first, but then obeyed a written order from Van Asperen and went away with two of the companies. It was the death sentence of the brothers.

The field was now clear for the leaders of the turbulent throng, the goldsmith Verhoeff, the alderman Van Bankhem, the physician Van Baelen, and other citizens, in general persons unfavourably known. The frightened government of The Hague attempted to bring to reason Verhoeff, who played the chief part, but he declined to listen to requests to preserve order and declared that he wished for the death of the brothers. His company of militia pressed up to the prison, and the door was shot through with bullets. Verhoeff threatened to open it with hammers, when the jailer yielded. It was just four o'clock. The desperate band poured in and found the brothers calmly together, Cornelius in bed, John sitting at the foot of the bed and reading aloud from the Bible. The militia officers, who had joined them some hours before and now desired to defend them, were thrust aside, and amid great clamour John was led off by Verhoeff, Cornelius roughly thrown down the stairs, beaten on the way and wounded with blows of clubs and stabs of pikes. The






prince's purse and an under-sheriff's post. Van Bankhem became sheriff of The Hague and, in spite of all his later misdeeds, he was protected for years by the prince until finally, on account of the most disgraceful facts, he was prosecuted and condemned to death, which sentence remained unexecuted by reason of his death in prison. Verhoeff, afterwards a suspected innkeeper and highwayman, was recommended by Tromp for the enlistment of volunteers under John Maurice.¹ The stadtholder's hard mind could never forget the humiliation of his youth; never would he deny those who had wished to serve him in this way, although there can be no thought of any actual complicity upon his part or that of his friends. The "execrable deed," so characterised by Fagel, was assuredly no less disapproved of by William III., but political considerations induced him to let the matter rest, to guard the doers from punishment, even to reward them.


John de Witt thus fell with his system of government, his fine career, which embraces a splendid period of the Dutch people's existence, ended by one of the most horrible murders mentioned in history. With indignation the gentle philosopher Spinoza alluded to the *ultimi barbarorum* in the letter sent to Leibnitz and announcing the death of the great statesman and scholar who had also been his benefactor. Christiaan Huygens, hearing of the event, asked himself if the Epicureans had not been right in their bitter saying: *versari in republica non est sapientis*. In the memory of the nation the 20th of August, 1672, is joined as a second "black day" to the 13th of May, 1619, when another statesman fell a victim of his system. With sadness the nation remembers the fate of these two great statesmen, who came out from its midst. But not sadness alone, gratitude also—fervent gratitude—inspires it when thinking of what John of Old-

¹ Wagenaar, xiv., p. 180.



ders of Holland, restrained only by the water line. Zealand was not unmolested. A small French army under de Nancre attacked Aardenburg on June 26th, but the little town was so successfully defended by a handful of soldiers and a few hundred citizens commanded by the valiant ensign Beeckman that the enemy had to withdraw. Nimwegen, Grave, and Crèvecoeur were captured by the enemy; also Bommel fell, after which Turenne threw himself into the territory of Bois-le-Duc, while some of the French troops went to complete the surrounding of Maestricht. Steenwijk and other places in Overijssel were taken without much difficulty by the forces of Münster and Cologne, but they did not yet venture to push into Friesland, defended by Aylva with a few troops and his Frisian militia. The enemy first turned towards Groningen, where the frontier forts were captured without a blow besides the important Bourtange. Coevorden detained the enemy less than a fortnight, and on July 9th, guided by the traitor Schuylenburgh, he appeared before the gates of Groningen, which under command of the brave Rabenhaupt was prepared for a stubborn defence by inundations and excellent organisation of the troops, numbering with the inclusion of militia and students between four and five thousand men. The besieged held out over five weeks, and despite the incessant bombardment and reiterated assaults upon the outworks they so weakened the enemy that he was compelled to raise the siege on August 28th. The attacks of the Münster forces on the Frisian intrenchments at Heerenveen were repulsed and soon the enemy had to evacuate both provinces, being followed by the Dutch troops who made themselves masters once more of northwestern Overijssel and of a large part of Drenthe. The defender had here become an attacker.


The fleet on the Scheldt and Zuyder Zee prevented every attempt to disturb the security of these waters. The privateers, especially those of Zealand where 200 of



The prince took advantage of this to attack. A first attempt on Naarden failed, but he made a second on October 10th for the conquest of Woerden. This failed also, Zuylesteyn was killed in Luxembourg's unexpected attack on his rear, and the force retreated with heavy losses, but the enterprise proved that the new troops were not so easily vanquished by the enemy as formerly. Some days later in a council of war at Alfen the prince proposed a bold plan—to leave a force sufficient for the defence of the water line and to move rapidly southwards through Brabant to Maestricht with 10,000 infantry and almost all the cavalry, together about 23,000 men, in order with German and Spanish help to threaten the enemy's communications and to constrain him to retreat from these provinces. Early in November the troops gathered at Rozendaal, and on the 8th the army moved from there to the Meuse near Maestricht, which was relieved some days later, while the surprised French force under Duras, succeeding the deceased Chamilly, retreated to the Rhine at Andernach, where Turenne was awaiting the Brandenburg and imperial armies. The prince now moved northwards to the Roer, captured Valkenburg, and menaced Tongres. But the united German armies remained on the right bank of the Rhine, being constantly watched by Turenne. Thus left to himself and again threatened by Duras, the prince in the middle of December undertook an arduous expedition along the Meuse to the distant Charleroi, the repository of the French army stores. Including Spanish auxiliary troops he had about 30,000 men, but the enterprise was a failure. The commander of the city, Montal, who was in Tongres, threw himself with a small troop of cavalry into his important fortress and greatly increased its power of resistance, so that the siege lasted longer than the prince had expected. A sudden frost prevented the continuation of the siege works. The prince took Binche, but then moved away and appeared again on December




confidence under the lead of the young Orange prince and Waldeck, and it was numerous enough to assume the offensive. Besides weak Spain there were allies, who indeed did not yet accomplish much but kept a part of the hostile troops busy far away on the Rhine. And the people plucked up courage, though complaining bitterly of the heavy taxes, the flooding of their lands, the stoppage of commerce and industry. That half-year was a time of storm and stress for Holland. The murder of the De Witts had given the signal for tumults elsewhere, directed against the adherents of the fallen government and under the watchword "Up with Orange," which was often shamefully abused. Rotterdam, Delft, Leyden, Gouda, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Amsterdam were not free from them. The council pensionary Fagel called for measures against such disturbances, and deputy councillors proposed authority for the prince to investigate the relations between people and regents and to maintain or change the municipal governments "without violation of the privileges." A resolution to this effect was taken on August 28th. The prince acted and replaced various regents by others of his party. There were great difficulties in Amsterdam. Some of the magistrates had desired to make the prince sovereign. Excitement among the people seemed about to lead to a riot on September 6th, when the house of the popular De Ruyter, now suspected as a friend of the De Witts, ran great danger of being plundered. A meeting of citizens next day demanded the removal of the suspected regents, restoration of the "ancient rights" of the citizens in the election of magistrates, maintenance of the privileges of the guilds, reform in the government of the city and militia, all comprised in twelve articles, which were spread through the city in the form of a petition. This attempt to introduce a more democratic style of government was a dismal failure. The city government finally requested help from the prince and offered its res-



upon France for the preservation of the strongest Protestant power. The elector of Brandenburg, disappointed at the course of the previous campaign, withdrew from the alliance and concluded peace with France in June. The prince had consequently the greatest difficulty in holding the peace party of Holland in check, now that the allies were showing themselves so little reliable.¹

The chances of a peaceful solution later, however, became greater. Holland's peace party was supported by the entreaties of the three provinces still groaning under the enemy's occupation. Sweden endeavoured to bring about a peace congress and was listened to by both parties, so that Cologne was chosen as the place of meeting. In England also the party of peace urged negotiation with the States. France saw that the German princes had not been entirely won over and mistrust of its real purposes must be removed. The war party, as whose chiefs the prince and Fagel in the republic, Monterey at Brussels, and Lisola might be considered, was compelled to yield something to the universal desire for peace. Though nothing came of a proposed truce, negotiations were opened in Cologne at the end of June under the mediation of Sweden. Van Beuningen for Holland, De Mauregnault for Zealand, Van Haren for Friesland, Ysbrands for City and Land, Odijk in the name of the prince himself, soon appeared there as ambassadors of the States-General. The three provinces occupied by the enemy could not be admitted to the negotiation, as they were not free. The prince naturally had the chief management of the affair, together with the council pensionary, and nearly all the envoys were their trusted friends. At Cologne appeared also Pieter de Groot, who had been at Antwerp in the winter with De la Court and other exiled partisans of De Witt, and in the negotiations he played a certain part in

¹ Pribram, p. 606; Muller, p. 47; Wagenaar, *xiv.*, p. 247.



army of 28,000 men, while in the north John Maurice had the general management of affairs. The militia of the cities and bands of armed peasants helped to occupy the principal points of Holland's water line, while similar lines were formed on the borders of Friesland and Groningen. From fear of a landing of the Anglo-French fleet the coast was provided with troops. A small force under Wurtz was stationed in Zealand to defend this province from attack by sea or land. After the improvements of the water lines not only Holland and Zealand but Friesland and Groningen also were converted into almost impregnable strongholds. Outside of the lines Coevorden in the summer had to sustain a vigorous assault of the Münster forces, which were obliged to break off the siege. A cavalry combat at Staphorst in July ended in a complete defeat of the Münster troops, and they also surrendered the intrenchments east of Groningen to Rabenhaupt and accomplished little after the relief of Coevorden which fell in October.

Against the water line of Holland Condé could do no more than Luxembourg before him. He tried in vain to drain off the floods and to capture Muiden, but the water let in from the sea increased the inundation and the heavy Dutch artillery compelled him to give up the attack on Muiden. Better success attended the siege of Maestricht, which was undertaken by Louis XIV. himself with his main force of 45,000 men, supported by a part of Turenne's army, and lasted over three weeks (June 6th–July 1st). This siege of the city, defended by 6000 men, was unquestionably one of the most remarkable events of the whole war, and in it the talented engineer Vauban distinguished himself by an excellent use of trenches. After the loss of the chief outworks the gallant defender Fariaux was compelled to capitulate to superior force by the citizens, who expected restoration of the Catholic religion from the French rule. It now seemed the turn of Bois-le-Duc,



ardently desired end, after the king had recalled his measures of toleration of the Catholics, though secretly converted to their faith, and after he had assented to the Test Act which excluded all Catholics and nearly all dissenters from public offices. Now these guarantees were given against the dreaded predominance of Catholicism, Parliament saw no harm in the alliance with France, although popular opinion was opposed to war with the republic, the bulwark of Protestantism in Europe. The duke of York, openly professing Catholicism, could not command the fleet, so Prince Rupert replaced him, but, lacking his experience, the English naval force was not so well equipped as in the preceding year. The Dutch fleet was brought up by great exertion to about 120 ships, and crews for all of them were found by prohibiting privateering again and navigation to the Baltic and the north, so that in May twenty sail could go out under command of De Ruyter, raised to the rank of lieutenant admiral general of Holland, and of lieutenant admiral Banckerts. Cornelis Tromp, restored by the prince to his dignity of lieutenant admiral and reconciled with De Ruyter, was soon to join the fleet with some large vessels. The purpose was neither more nor less than a new expedition to the Thames, before the English fleet could run out to unite with the French. A squadron under Van Nes and Vlugh was already sailing for the Thames to close the mouth of the river by sinking ships, when it was observed that the English fleet was on its guard and had detached vessels to defend the approaches of the river. The squadron returned and the fleet was ready to receive the enemy, when Tromp arrived at the end of May. It was near the banks of Schooneveld, on the coast of Zealand, when the Anglo-French fleet of nearly 150 sail came to attack the small force of 100 sail. On the anniversary of the battle of Solebay, June 7th, there was a battle, in which De Ruyter himself dispersed the French squadron



rived off Scheveningen, where the prince excited indescribable enthusiasm by visiting the fleet and considering with the council of war whether the enemy should be attacked notwithstanding the inferiority in strength of the Dutch force. It was resolved to make the venture, and the visitor departed from the fleet amid shouts of — “Long live the prince!” So De Ruyter followed the enemy north and encountered him early in the morning of August 21st at Kijkduin, where with 90 large and small vessels and 22 fire ships he valiantly assailed the allied fleets of over 140 sail, commanded again by Prince Rupert, Spragge, and d'Estrées.¹ The French van gave way speedily before the violent attack of Banckerts; De Ruyter threw himself on Prince Rupert, who, fighting stoutly, was forced back and sought to join the rear division under Spragge. Attacked by Tromp and severely damaged by his admirably served guns, Spragge also resisted bravely but lost his life in a boat on leaving his sinking ship, while Prince Rupert himself was in great danger of being destroyed by the united Dutch squadrons. A general attack seemed to offer some chance of dispersing the Dutch fleet by superior force, but the attack failed, as the French squadron paid no attention to the repeated signals of the English commander and did not venture again into the fight. After sunset the enemy retreated, being pursued by the Dutch, who returned to the coast a few hours later, while Prince Rupert went back to the English ports with great losses in killed and wounded and complaining loudly of the treacherous behaviour of d'Estrées. The losses were severe also on the Dutch side, including the vice admirals De Liefde and Sweers among the dead. There was no more talk of a landing, and the harbours were opened for the returning merchantmen, so that the battle of Kijkduin may be regarded as a victory. It was celebrated as such, though this did not prevent Prince Rupert from claiming

south

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 412.



domestic affairs. Charles II. was playing a desperate game. He hoped with the booty obtained from Dutch merchantmen and with Louis XIV.'s aid to find the money necessary for the war outside of Parliament. The government's adversaries were assailed in their positions and incomes. Even the chancellor Shaftesbury, to whom York ascribed the movement against his marriage, was forced to give up his office. The violent opposition of all classes of the population brought the king to reflection. He determined to yield somewhat and to appease the nation by making public the treaties with France and renewing the edicts against the Catholics. Then he called Parliament together in January. But it did not favour the governmental policy and, vigorously incited by Shaftesbury, it demanded stronger guarantees against Catholicism, complained of the king's ministers, and desired maintenance of English liberties and the disbanding of the army standing since 1664. Many eyes were already directed to the prince of Orange, after York the nearest male blood relative of the king, as the proper successor to the throne in case the childless king died and the duke of York as a Catholic had to be excluded from the succession. Everywhere in England the conviction gained ground that peace with the republic must be restored, and the sooner the better.

These events in England made the prince and the States believe that the dangerous alliance of England and France was drawing to an end. The prince was in secret communication with Shaftesbury and other influential members of the opposition and watched English complications. The States supported the peace party by a letter to the king in October affirming that they were ready for a fair peace and by similar declarations. Under these circumstances negotiations for peace at Cologne naturally advanced but little, so long as the republic's allied enemies persisted in their high demands. But the republic had more reason to



Roermond and Venloo.¹ This November campaign had great results. It discouraged wavering Cologne; the influence of the Fürstenbergs on the elector diminished, now that the latter lost his residence Brühl and had to seek refuge in his capital Cologne, which had resisted him so often. The last stroke was Prince William's arrest of Count Fürstenberg, the elector's first minister, though he was taking part in the congress of Cologne. The elector and his Münster ally soon showed themselves ready for peace. The French commanders saw that they must face this sudden attack. Condé's army moved largely from Brabant into Jülich; Luxembourg left garrisons in the Utrecht fortresses and stationed himself with 8,000 men at Mook to defend Gelderland; Turenne was on the Moselle to oppose Montecuculi. In November and December, for fear of being cut off from the distant French frontier, by command of Louvois, though against the opinion of Condé and to the disappointment of all France, one fortress after another in Utrecht and on the Lek and Yssel was evacuated and immediately occupied by Waldeck. By the middle of December only the places on the Meuse and Rhine were in French hands, while Luxembourg with 16,000 men was hoping to reach the French border. The prince, whose army now was nearly twice as strong as that of the French general, endeavoured to oppose him and succeeded twice in making him return to the protection of Maestricht's cannon. On the approach of winter, however, the prince broke up his army, and early in January, 1674, Luxembourg moved for the third time, and this time unmolested, southwards to the vicinity of Charleroi. The last French garrisons left Gelderland in the spring and fell back upon Grave and Maestricht. Thus after a year and a half the siege of the "fortress Holland" was given up, and before the end of the year the enemy had evacuated the greater part of the republic's territory.

¹ Knoop, i., p. 290.



return of all the conquered territory and under guarantee of Spain and the emperor, and on May 11th Cologne followed. Thus the east of the republic was entirely delivered from the enemy in May, 1674, and France alone had to be dealt with, possessing still only a few fortresses in Dutch territory. After a struggle of two years people breathed again and hoped that those fortresses also might be recaptured. What a result after the dangers which in the summer of 1672 had brought the republic to the verge of destruction, and what sacrifices had been necessary! With gratitude men thought of the fortunate course of affairs, freeing them without noteworthy loss of territory from the enemies who had assailed the republic on all sides. <

This success was due largely to the young general and statesman, who now had the management of the republic in his hands. In reorganising the disordered state the definitive regulation of his attitude to the state would naturally be considered anew. Was the prince now finally to receive the sovereignty desired by him and the republic to be changed, wholly or partially, into a monarchy? The subject came up in connection with the settlement of affairs in the three provinces which for a year and a half had been in the enemy's possession and had ceased to take part in the common government. The danger of the entire country in 1672 had lessened the love for the republican form of government and had raised the question whether it was not better to bestow upon the real ruler the title as such.¹ It was no secret that many of the chief statesmen were not averse to such a reform, among others the council pensionary Fagel, the influential Valckenier, and Van Beverningh. The districts occupied by the enemy were terribly treated. The support of the hostile army and garrisons had ruined cities and country, cattle were killed, agriculture suffered, requisitions were carried to the extreme under threat of plundering and burning. The inten-

¹ Basnage, *Annales des Provinces Unies*, ii., p. 564.



ment in the three provinces. A few days later the prince, upon whom Utrecht had conferred the stadtholdership in November, made his stately entrance into the city, where he was welcomed with great enthusiasm, and on the 25th he filled the government of city and province with persons agreeable to himself. A new settlement of the government was sworn to on the following day by the new administration. Arranged by the prince with the chief men of Utrecht, it put all power into the stadtholder's hands. His representative there was Van Reede van Renswoude, whom he selected for the presidency of the Estates. A similar fate was appointed for the two other provinces, but the prince confined himself at first to setting up a "provisional" government in expectation of the opportunity to make here also radical changes.

In Holland itself Haarlem on January 23d brought up the matter of having the stadtholdership hereditary, incited, as is supposed, by the council pensionary.¹ It pointed out the desirability of being sure of the presence of an "eminent chief" in the state, which could not otherwise be properly governed. *Vox populi, vox Dei*: without opposition the resolution was on February 2d adopted to make the prince hereditary stadtholder, captain and admiral general; the right of inheritance was confined to the "male descendants" of the prince.² It was a Perpetual Edict, so Delft and Rotterdam affirmed, but of perpetual "inclusion" of the stadtholdership. Zealand adopted the same resolution on the same day. The States-General also made the office of captain and admiral general of the union hereditary. The prince furthermore was urged to marry. His income was increased. Amsterdam proposed to take over for Holland Prince William II.'s debt to Amsterdam, amounting to two millions, and it


¹ *Lettres de De Groot*, ed. Krämer, p. 289.

² See Simon van Leeuwen, *Bedenkingen over de stadhouderlijke magt*, ed. Fruin, in *Bijdr. en Meded. Hist. Gen.*, xviii., p. 442.



hardest. Both parties claimed the victory. Among the allies the stadtholder of twenty-four years of age received the highest praise for his spirited conduct and undisturbed composure, and with him the faithful Waldeck, who was here severely wounded, Prince Henry Casimir of Nassau, aged seventeen, Nassau-Ouwerkerk, Beverweert's son, and a number of other officers distinguished themselves greatly. The heavy losses of the Dutch showed how bravely the soldiers formed by the prince fought against the best army of Europe. The battle of Seneffe established the young stadtholder's fame as a general, and it also restored the good name of the Dutch army. Although the prince's enterprise against Oudenarde failed in September in consequence again of the attitude of the imperial troops, Condé had found in him a worthy adversary.

The navy was energetically managed. De Ruyter endeavoured in vain to capture Martinique in the Antilles. More important was another expedition connected with plans for a Huguenot uprising in France, especially on the western coast and in Languedoc and Provence. Tromp was to support these plans with a fleet carrying a small landing army. The conspiracy formed by the adventurer de Sardan and some young Huguenots was less extensive than was pretended. It was betrayed and resulted in nothing but a weak naval demonstration on the French coasts. Tromp landed troops on Belle Isle and Noirmoutiers and alarmed the entire west coast of France and later also the Mediterranean coast. That France regarded the prince as the soul of the alliance was proved by the peace proposals it made to him after Seneffe for ending the war on the basis of the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Münster and with recognition of his supreme place in the republic. These proposals caused a negotiation at Maestricht, where d'Estrades, the old friend of the republic, appeared, and where the prince sent the secretary of Utrecht, De Pesters, to listen to the enemy's offers. From



of Zutphen. The manner of the prince's reception of the offer showed that he was not averse to it, but he declared he could not accept without hearing from the other provinces. He expected to be received as sovereign by them also, or otherwise to have the offer withdrawn. His court was already talking of the "count of Holland." Utrecht strongly favoured the plan, but Holland and Zeeland did not answer his expectations. Some towns of Holland were for it, but others, notably Haarlem and Leyden, opposed it, though not very vigorously. In Zeeland attachment was manifested to the republican form of government, and the example of Gideon was cited to point out the right way to the prince. Now, however, the prince decided finally to give up the plan, and on February 20th he declared in the provisional assembly of Gelderland that, thankful for the confidence reposed in him, he declined the offer. His vehement letter to Zeeland showed his resentment at the way the proposal was received there, and the distrust displayed had insulted him. Without a sovereign title his influence was great enough for him in the different provinces, and he feared to displease some of his own partisans, in particular to anger the Zealanders jealous of the old freedom by pushing through the affair, which would have cost him little trouble. Even among the greatest champions of the house of Orange there were many who saw no salvation in the prince's elevation to sovereignty and were devoted to the old form of the state, under which their fathers had lived. The allies had watched the affair uneasily, fearing internal dissensions in the republic and a consequent relaxation of military operations. Later generations have regretted that at this favourable moment William III. did not make an end of the indisputably ambiguous condition of the form of government of the United Provinces, causing the greatest difficulties even during the rule of the prince himself.

Reforms were now to be made in Gelderland and



adornment, Voetius mounted the pulpit of Utrecht again, and the Catholics were everywhere reminded of the laws against them. But the alliance with Austria and Spain prevented vengeance being taken for the "popish boldness" of the time of the occupation, as these two Catholic powers were known to be interested in the lot of their co-religionists. In 1675 Neercassel could truthfully testify that freedom for his church was then greater than before.¹ But in the Reformed church itself, both in Holland and elsewhere, the changes of 1672 to 1675 had important results. The moderate, Cocceian or Cartesian, even libertine regents of De Witt's time were replaced by the more Voetian partisans of Orange, who, like the prince, adhered more closely to the principles of Dort. Here and there in Holland and Zealand there soon arose between the two tendencies violent dissension which had also some political influence.

Thus three provinces had become entirely dependent upon the prince, and two, Holland and Zealand, were now more than ever subject to the stadtholder's authority. In City and Land and Drenthe the young prince of Nassau was in February raised to the dignity of hereditary stadtholder, but Friesland hesitated to take this step. The northern provinces remained apart as before, and the arbitrary, passionate character of the young Henry Casimir, who could not easily submit to the strong will of his cousin of Orange, was later to occasion great difficulties. At the siege of Grave the Frisian prince complained of the way in which William III. treated his quarrel with Rabenhaupt about the chief command of the Groningen and Drenthe troops,² and soon various matters increased the personal estrangement between the two young princes.

The English government meanwhile did not give up the hope of persuading the warring powers to peace.

¹ *Arch. aartsb. Utrecht*, xviii., p. 278.

² See Van Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige Bijdragen*, iii., p. 13.






ous for his family, succeeded with the aid of the Spanish troops in saving Brabant. A deep impression was made in France by Turenne's death at the battle of Sasbach against the imperialists, who were now opposed by Condé on the Rhine, while popular tumults in Brittany and Guyenne showed the disposition of the country. At the same time war was kindled in the Baltic lands. Brandenburg fell out with Sweden and renewed its alliance with the States which now also declared war on Sweden. Then Denmark joined them and attacked the duke of Holstein, who was in league with Sweden, while Münster, now on the side of the allies, invaded the Swedish territory of Bremen. A general war on land and sea began to be developed, which stirred up all Europe but did not seem in the north to be advantageous to France and its allies.


The French government, even before the campaign, showed a readiness to open negotiations; the English government offered its services again, and it was soon agreed that a general peace congress of greater importance than that of Cologne should be held. Nimwegen was chosen as the place of the congress, and, after some difficulties owing to the refusal of the States to allow there the free exercise of the Catholic religion, the first ambassadors of the different powers assembled in the spring of 1676. The Dutch negotiators were the same as at Cologne; Temple and Berkeley represented the English; the chief personages on the French side were the aged d'Estrades, Colbert-Croissy, and the able Jean Antoine de Mesmes, count d'Avaux; the place of imperial ambassador, Lisola having died in December, 1674, was taken by a less skilful diplomat. But it was some time before all the ambassadors, after questions concerning etiquette, titles, and passports, reached Nimwegen, and it was still longer before the bases of a general peace could be agreed upon. The city of the negotiation with its environs was declared neutral territory.





from the republic, now assumed command and, the promised great Spanish fleet not appearing, he left these waters in October to return first to Spain and then to the fatherland, arriving there in February, 1677.

More fortunate was Almonde in command of the fleet aiding Denmark against the Swedes in the Baltic, later also the lieutenant admiral Bastiaense Schepers, while Tromp repeatedly led to victory the Danish fleet which he had reformed and manned largely with Dutch crews under Dutch captains, until the Danish king, weary of the war, dismissed the valiant admiral from his service. With the small Brandenburg fleet Tromp now endeavoured to injure the Swedes and served the elector at the conquest of Rügen, after which he returned to the republic in August, 1678. A sharp contest was waged also in the North Sea, where the French privateer Jean Bart, who had long been in the Dutch service, from the old pirates' nest Dunkirk inflicted great losses on the mercantile marine and the fishery. Squadrons under Schepers, Van Nes, Cornelis Evertsen, Vlugh, were often fitted out to hold him and other privateers in check, but they did not always succeed. Other squadrons helped protect Dutch and Spanish commerce on the ocean and the Mediterranean, one of them being commanded by the rear admiral Engel de Ruyter, son of the admiral. Brave deeds were done by many a captain in this guerrilla warfare against the rising naval power of France in all parts of the world. After the battle of Kijkduin the Dutch fleet engaged in no great battles owing to the increasing difficulty of manœuvring with so many heavy ships and because the enemy would not risk its young navy in one great battle. Small mobile squadrons were used, and it was easier to find commanders for them. Notable was the expedition of commander Jacob Binckes with a squadron to the West Indies, where he took Cayenne and some of the French Antilles, and directed his course to Tobago, the Dutch colony planted



prises. Weary of endless war, people longed eagerly for peace even without the allies. Heavy war expenses, defeats in the Spanish Netherlands, losses at sea, the impossibility of raising up commerce and industry excited a universal desire for peace, and Amsterdam especially demanded it. Fearing a general European coalition under the lead of the republic, Louis XIV. showed a readiness to offer favourable conditions, if it would leave the allies to their fate. In 1676 he consented to send his ambassadors to Nimwegen and seemed inclined to renounce any extension of territory at the republic's expense, provided the stipulations of the peace of the Pyrenees regarding Spain were not insisted upon, but those of Aix-la-Chapelle were accepted.¹ The French ambassadors at Nimwegen did their best to convince the Dutch representatives of their peaceful disposition, declared a willingness to recognise the prince in all his dignities, affirming the bad policy of De Witt alone had brought on the war, and promised to give back to the prince his principality, again seized upon by Louis XIV., and the property of his family in Franche Comté. The prince, however, would not hear to all this. He would only work for peace in coöperation with the allies and on the basis of the peace of the Pyrenees, while he thought a middle course had been found in the proposal to marry the young king of Spain to the daughter of the duke of Orleans, the conquered fortresses of the southern Netherlands becoming her dowry. The French declined this and the wrangling continued.

In the republic people began to be dissatisfied with the prince and his thirst for military glory. In Amsterdam Van den Bosch, formerly secretary of De Witt, became pensionary in 1677. Some pamphlets already appeared against William III., especially those of the half-crazy visionary Rothé, who had long assailed him, had sought refuge


¹ See concerning these negotiations Temple's reports and those of d'Estrades in vol. viii. of his *Négociations*.



himself less stiff on the subject of the war. Charles II. and York now assented to his coming, and on October 19th the prince appeared in London, where he speedily asked for the hand of his cousin. The application was favourably received by Charles and his brother, and some days later the marriage was concluded—an important affair for the future of the English and Dutch people.

But the prince came not merely for this political marriage. He hoped also to bring about a rupture between the English court and France. Soon he convinced Charles II. of the necessity of acting against France and of compelling it to revert to the peace of the Pyrenees, though some fortresses might have to be given it on account of its victories. The prince returned to the republic in December, and on January 26th Charles II. made a treaty with it, after the terms of peace agreed upon with William III. had been rejected by France. A fleet and an army were to coöperate with those of the republic as speedily as possible. In England the king's plans were mistrusted, and it was feared that the prince had been won over to his policy. In the republic peace was wanted and not a continuation of the war. Distrust of the prince's plans arose there also, and the consequences of the previous English marriage in the house of Orange were remembered with terror, the complications of 1650 being attributed to it. The mutual lack of confidence hindered the desired coöperation, and it was late in the summer before the chance of it improved. Meanwhile the French armies were again approaching the Dutch frontiers, and Maestricht was still occupied by French troops.¹ Must the territory of the state endure another attack? Faith in the prince's prudence began to waver. The best statesmen, even the prince's friends, had moments of discouragement. Fagel spoke for a separate peace; Van Beverningh and Van Beuningen wished

¹ Knoop and Fruin, *De slag van St. Denis* ('s Gravenhage, 1881), p. 58.



support of William III., who on his side moved to the relief of Mons. Mutual distrust between Parliament and the crown opposed the accomplishment of these promises. Ghent's capture produced a deep impression in the Netherlands, and the repeated faithlessness of the English government caused little reliance to be placed on English help. The old party of the States coming up again determined to avail itself of this feeling; some of its leaders met privately in March and opened communication with d'Estrades, who advised they should refuse to the prince to raise any more taxes for war and should emphatically inform him that France was quite ready for an advantageous separate peace.¹ The prince yielded somewhat to the storm and offered to consult with England. But the French negotiators at Nimwegen declined the English mediation and applied directly to the States with the offer to give back Maestricht, to conclude a commercial treaty, and to leave Spain a fortified line on the borders of the Spanish Netherlands. Favourable terms were put in prospect for the allies also, though France thought of holding conquered Franche Comté and bringing Lorraine entirely under its sovereignty. These advantageous conditions for the republic excited lively satisfaction there, and the strong peace party called for their immediate acceptance, but the slow course of such affairs and the prince's evident unwillingness made matters drag through the whole spring. Finally the States asked Louis XIV. for a truce of six weeks, and it was granted.

The Dutch ambassadors at Nimwegen now endeavoured to persuade the allies, succeeding readily with Spain which was dependent upon the republic's aid. The emperor, however, and the German princes, Brandenburg foremost, and Denmark, which latter would have to give up their conquests to Sweden at the peace, refused and complained bitterly of the faithlessness of the States. Sure of Spain,

¹ Fruin, *De slag van St. Denis*, p. 65.



England and the States that peace might be postponed and Mons be played into Luxembourg's possession. The States realised that this must be prevented at any price, and the prince, with Waldeck as chief of his staff, moved up on the 10th in order to attack the enemy on the following day, the end of the time allowed to France.

At the last moment French diplomacy made a masterly move at Nimwegen. It yielded to the demand for evacuation and persuaded the Dutch ambassadors on the 10th to sign the peace just before midnight, while that with Spain could not be made ready, some points requiring to be formulated. Thus the republic had peace, but next day the French began making all sorts of difficulties for Spain in the hope that Mons might fall and be exchanged for something else. Meanwhile the prince moved closer to Luxembourg's position. The report of the conclusion of peace was already noised about the camp. No official letters came to confirm the rumour, but on the 13th news was shown in print around the prince giving Van Beverningh's report of the 10th to the States that he was to sign the peace that same evening. Luxembourg had heard similar rumours, and on the morning of the 14th d'Estrades appeared in his camp with the official intelligence. The French general was on the point of informing the prince of Orange, who had still no report from his government, and thus of avoiding the battle already offered him, but he hesitated and believed that the honour of war obliged him to fight the battle. At St. Denis, an hour's distance from Mons, the prince attacked him, and the battle, in which the prince gave proofs of uncommon personal courage and of a reckless contempt for death, ended indecisively, but was not renewed on the following day. Towards noon of the 15th the prince received the report from the council pensionary and from the Spanish side and gave up further strife as useless. The enemy moved away from the neighbourhood of Mons a few days later and




CHAPTER XVI

PREPARATION OF THE GREAT COALITION

PEACE was now concluded, but from the first moment the prince understood that this peace was really nothing more than a truce. There was no sign of an appearance that France had given up its plans in the Spanish Netherlands and the German empire or its desire to extend its frontiers to the Rhine. Plainly it had wished for peace merely to avert the threatened European coalition and to be able to wait for a more favourable time. The prince was resolved to seek the task of his life in the frustration of those plans, in the maintenance of what was beginning to be called the "European balance of power." William III. considered himself called by God to this task for religious as well as political reasons, because Louis XIV's course in religious matters showed that the victory of France would be likewise that of Catholicism. William regarded himself as appointed by God to defend the political and religious liberty of Europe and of the civilised world.¹ And he was determined in this struggle for freedom and faith to prove himself the worthy scion of the great founder of his house, whose device—*je maintiendrai*—was also his cherished motto, his aspirations being best represented by the—*pro religione et libertate*. This high ideal has given to his person and government a peculiar character, by which his time is distinguished in Dutch history from the period immediately preceding. The

¹ Fruin, *Prins Willem III. in zijn verhouding tot Engeland*, p. 115. See P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und G. F. von Waldeck*, ii., p. 17.



him were the actions of his second cousin and favourite Odijk,¹ the rapacious prodigal, whom he appointed in 1668 to the influential dignity of first noble in Zeeland. William knew that his cousin trafficked in the offices of Zeeland in shameless fashion, but he did not end this business, because he recognised Odijk's personal attachment to himself and Odijk by his brilliant life at The Hague enhanced the splendour of the court. Under the patronage of this adventurer, considered by his guests as a rogue and cheat, official corruption flourished,² and the governing cabals in the towns of Zeeland, suppressed after the fall of the De Witt party, were restored in favour of the other party. Affairs went elsewhere as in Zeeland. At Amsterdam the government of before 1672 was replaced by Valckenier's clique, which had great influence³ on the appointments and regarded in the beginning as a law the recommendation of those who the most "are in favour with His Highness." The "resolution for harmony" of May, 1676, offered by Valckenier to the other burgomasters, was nothing but a combination aiming to win over the opposite party in order together to resist the prince. It was not fully accepted, but, when Hooft became burgomaster again in 1677, he and Valckenier ruled over the city until the latter's death three years later. In smaller cities also men entered the government by influence, intrigue, or gifts, through the favour of His Highness, just as earlier through De Witt or his friends. At Rotterdam a candidate for the town council had to promise to obey the prince "blindly." In the East India Company, in church consistories, in all governing boards, similar abuses were very common at this time, all the profitable offices being played into the hands of friends and relatives, and under the prince's protection such

¹ See Fruin, *Aanteekeningen op Droste*, ii., p. 470.


² De Witte van Citters, *Contracten van Correspondentie*, p. xviii.

³ See Bontemantel, ii., p. 208.



account of the discovery of his correspondence with the condemned De Wicquefort during the negotiations at Cologne but was acquitted in December, 1676, to the vexation of the prince; he died two years later at his country house near Haarlem. Van Beuningen, the brilliant diplomatist, and man of the world, for some years after the peace of Westminster occupied the important post of ambassador in London, where he was until 1682 the faithful servant of the new ruler's policy. Then he began to oppose the prince, resigned his ambassadorship, was unable to maintain himself as burgomaster in Amsterdam, and in a fit of dejection withdrew from politics to become absorbed in the mystical ideas that had attracted him of old. Soon he showed signs of mental derangement, especially after his singular marriage in his old age; a few years later he became quite insane and died so in 1693 almost forgotten. Their place was taken by eminent noblemen like Godard van Rheede, lord of Amerongen, who won reputation by negotiating with Brandenburg, like Everhard van Weede, lord of Dijkveld, one of the trustiest servants of the prince's policy. Like them the council pensionary Fagel adhered unconditionally to the prince's views. With Waldeck, who besides his military talent possessed that also of the diplomatist, these men were the excellent instruments disposed of by the prince in conducting foreign affairs, and they could stand comparison with the diplomatists of De Witt's time. But they were the tools of the prince's policy much more than De Witt's statesmen had been his tools, and this was even more true of such men as the prince's gentleman of the bedchamber and confidential friend, Hans Willem baron Bentinck, now and then used in delicate negotiations to reach the great end of a European coalition against France.

If this end was to be attained, the prince must first of all have to fear no opposition in the republic itself. Since






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plained still of the peace of Nimwegen and demanded its unpaid subsidies of the States as did the emperor himself, and it was even persuaded into a secret league and subsidy treaty with France. The rising Hanover showed the same disposition. Notwithstanding Waldeck's efforts the Rhenish union was very slow in extending over north Germany and becoming a union of the upper imperial circles against France.

This was all in process, when France threw off the mask by establishing the *chambres de réunion*, destined to ascertain what parts of the German empire had formerly belonged to the fortresses and lands now become French possessions, while it immediately occupied the duchy of Luxemburg and moved its troops far into Brabant and Flanders ostensibly to maintain its rights obtained at Nimwegen. Great was the indignation on all sides at these sudden demands. Poor Spain, paralysed by court cabals and intrigues, looked up anxiously to the republic. The chief princes of northern and central Germany, including some of those "armed" princes who always had troops ready to sell for subsidies, joined the union owing to Waldeck's exertions and thus formed the alliance of the upper imperial circles. But Brandenburg opposed this movement and tried to keep the emperor out of the league. The alarm became greater, when France seized upon Strasburg August 30, 1681, and began to force Luxemburg to surrender by a blockade. In October Sweden concluded an alliance with the republic for the maintenance of the peace of Münster and Nimwegen, and it was hoped that England, the emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, and the minor German potentates would join, so that France must finally come to it. William III. and Waldeck endeavoured to obtain a union of all the interested princes in the German empire under the emperor's lead. This resulted in the treaty of Laxenburg in June, 1682, and then there was a beginning of armed resistance



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
soon appear "whose head was firmest on his shoulders." Neither remonstrances nor deputations could induce Amsterdam to yield. It declined after Spain had declared war on France and affirmed that it was justified in negotiating with a foreign ambassador like d'Avaux. Civil war seemed to be threatened as in 1650. There was talk of possible military measures against the great commercial city and of its plan to transfer the supreme command within its walls to the Frisian stadtholder, who was opposed to his cousin in the affair of raising more troops. It was thought that Amsterdam would be supported by France and Brandenburg, whose ambassador was on good terms with d'Avaux and was soon aided in his diplomacy by a special envoy, Paul von Fuchs. But the prince went to work in another way. On January 31, 1684, he had the increase of the army adopted in the Estates of Holland by a majority of votes despite the protests of Amsterdam and Schiedam. The resolution was offered to the States-General as coming from Holland. Then arrived the report that the Spanish government of Brussels had intercepted a packet from d'Avaux, in which a cipher letter from him to his king mentioned several members of De Witt's old party as "well-disposed" and seemed especially to compromise the Amsterdam regents. The letter was sent from Brussels to the prince, who communicated it (February 16) to the Estates of Holland in secret session with closed doors. A violent scene ensued; Amsterdam's attitude was sharply disapproved of, while the papers in its office at the Hague were sealed and a copy of the intercepted letter was sent to the other municipal governments. A translation of the letter appeared a few days later in print. The affair excited great alarm now that the chance of a war with France seemed so near. But d'Avaux and Amsterdam protested against these things. It rained little blue books again, some for, others against the prince and his policy. One of them,



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James, duke of Monmouth, and many English noblemen were implicated, caused a persecution of the enemies of York and the Romish church. Monmouth fled to Holland and sought refuge at the prince's court in The Hague, where he was readily received in spite of the suspicion of a secret understanding with the conspirators thus incurred by the prince and princess, already in disfavour with York and his party. Both prince and States did their best to please Charles II., and his anger was soon appeased; but he continued to act secretly with France. The willingness, with which the sheriff of Leyden, Cornelis Paets, delivered up Thomas Armstrong, one of Monmouth's fugitive friends, to be soon afterwards beheaded in London, excited resentment at this deviation from the custom of receiving political exiles here. There seemed to be no possibility of a good understanding between England and the States and of joint action against France. The only thing left to do was to make some arrangement with France, which did not seem disinclined now it had what it wanted. William III. was beaten and endeavoured to save whatever was possible. A truce of twenty years on the basis of the *status quo* was concluded in Ratisbon on August 15, 1684, and it put temporarily into France's hands everything conquered but opened an opportunity, before the definitive cession of these lands and cities, of organising opposition to the "general monarchy" desired by France.¹ Time won was well won. But France wanted more than the "general monarchy," the "supreme power" in Europe, everywhere spoken of: it wanted also a "general religion," Catholicism. The Edict of Nantes "perpetual and irrevocable," which from 1598 assured a large measure of freedom to the Huguenots in France, was a thorn in the eye of the strict Catholics under Louis XIV. Rude hands were

¹ On the significance of this treaty see P. L. Muller, in *Verh. an Meded. Kon. Akademie, 4^{te} R.*, iv., p. 78, in opposition to the opinion of Fester in his book: *Die armirten Stände und die Reichskriegsverfassung*.




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pointed commissioners to apply these ideas, to remove Protestant officials, close shops and inns owned by Protestants, demolish churches, and prevent religious worship. The commissioners obtained soldiers to complete their task. Hundreds of families were reduced to beggary, hundreds fled to Switzerland, to the republic, to the Protestant sections of northern Germany, to England to escape imprisonment and corporal punishment. It became even worse with the beginning of 1685. A last protest of the persecuted was answered by a demand from the clergy for the abrogation of the Edict, because it could no longer serve as a general law on account of the modifications gradually made in it. The king, now under the influence of Madame de Maintenon and the Jesuits, desired nothing better. The terrible dragonnades of Béarn were imitated in all the provinces; dragoons invaded the houses, plundered, abused, tortured the poor Protestants to convert them on the spot. Hundreds fled, other hundreds submitted, others gave up their lives for their faith or atoned for their constancy as galley slaves. Every day reports reached the court of "conversion" by the sword, and the clergy dared to speak of this "road strewn with flowers," of its aversion to the executions necessary "to destroy this hydra."

The revocation of the Edict on October 17, 1685, was the crown of the work. Not a single right remained to the "pretended reformed religion"; its adherents might still dwell in France, but their children must be brought up as Catholics, and the property of emigrants was confiscated and they themselves were condemned to the galleys for life. Thus Louis earned the praises of his clergy, the approval of Pope Innocent XI., though the pope had scruples against the mingling of political and religious motives and against the conversions by violence in France and later disapproved often of the persecutions there.¹


¹ See Fruin, *Willem III.*, p. 145. Also the brief of December 13, 1685,



tion the mingling with the original Dutch people was so thorough that the influence of the French element seems to vanish from the investigator's eye. The descendants of the French immigrants are now only to be distinguished from the Netherlanders of older ancestry by their names and family traditions.

The treatment of the Protestants in Catholic France had an irritating effect upon the feeling in the Netherlands against the Catholics.¹ The eagerly read stories of the dragonnades and other abuses; the poverty of many refugees; alarming reports of renewed persecutions of the Waldenses in Savoy, of the Catholic government in England, now that Charles II. had been succeeded in 1685 by the Catholic York as James II., of the appearance of a Catholic branch of the princely house in the Palatinate; sensational conversions of German Protestants, the emperor's victories over the Turks, and the restoration of Catholicism in Hungary—all this made people believe in a general Catholic activity in Europe, in a "Great council of Rome," of which the Jesuits were the soul and Louis XIV., James II., and Fürstenberg were the most powerful tools. Violent pamphlets stirred up the agitation, and it was not quieted by the circumstance that the Catholics under the guidance of Neercassel refrained from giving offence and even contributed money for the poor refugees. The States-General discussed a revival of strict regulations against the Catholics, but Holland managed to postpone the matter, as the merchants were opposed to any such severity and the imperial ambassador at The Hague, Cramprich, who interested himself in the faith of his co-religionists, had to be favoured on account of the prince's plans for the great coalition, into which even the pope was gradually drawn from fear of the predominance of France. Late in 1687 the expulsion of Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc., was proposed in Holland, but the proposal

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Katholieken*, i., p. 290.



Henry and mother-in-law of Henry Casimir from 1683, peace was brought about in March between the two cousins, and Henry Casimir pledged himself in writing no longer to oppose but to support the policy of William III. "in relation to other kingdoms and commonwealths."¹ This reconciliation weakened the Amsterdam party, and the efforts of d'Avaux to bind Amsterdam to France became less effectual. Just at this time Fuchs appeared as mediator and in the course of the summer succeeded in bringing the prince and the burgomasters of Amsterdam together. Amsterdam agreed that the army should not be reduced during the current year, assented to the alliance with Brandenburg and the accompanying financial sacrifice in favour of the elector, and only secured a regulation of the tariff of convoys and licenses to suit itself. D'Avaux did his best to break this understanding, but his "artifices" could no longer disturb the "good harmony." The retirement of Van Beuningen from the burgomastership established peace more solidly, for Witsen, Hudde, and the other rulers of Amsterdam were more tractable, especially since the pensionary Hop had been gained to the prince's views. The prince triumphed here also, and the point was found, about which the great coalition could be formed. No city in Holland would now venture to resist his will, and nothing was to be feared from the other provinces.

There was for a time some hope that England would play an important part in the coalition. The new king, James II., was an ardent Catholic, but also a defender of the balance of power in Europe. He manifested an inclination to coöperate with his son-in-law, the prince of Orange, who was likewise the presumptive successor to the throne of England. James II. had a much stronger character than his deceased brother, and England could be depended upon, if he were once won over to William

¹ Sypsteyn, *Geschiedk. Bijdr.* iii., p. 27.



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attitude of the republic. Waldeck went to Vienna in July, 1685, to take part in the campaign against the Turks on the Danube and to induce the German princes to persist in their union with the emperor for the empire's defence. He succeeded in the latter and supported the endeavours of the imperial court in place of the expiring Laxenburg treaty to bring about the Augsburg alliance (1686), a treaty of less general importance than is attributed to it and only serving to keep together what had been brought together. Spain and Sweden as members of the empire joined the nucleus of the Franco-nian-Rhenish princes, and Waldeck, under the elector of Bavaria and the margrave of Baireuth, was to be field marshal of the army which might be used against France. This was far from a coalition centred around the maritime powers, such as William III. and Waldeck had imagined. The French understood this, as was shown by their conduct on the Rhine in occupying several important fortresses without any impediment from the side of the allies. It was often a hard task for the aged Waldeck, now approaching seventy, but he continued working with the prince to strengthen the bond between the German princes and to oppose the French influence in the empire.

In 1688 the crisis suddenly came which was to transform long preparation into vigorous action. It was brought about by the course of affairs in England, and Prince William took advantage of them at the right moment. Strife there between sovereign and people became ever more violent both in religious and political matters, while James II.'s attitude towards France indicated secret coöperation between the two courts, more dangerous now than under Charles II. on account of the more obstinate character of the new monarch, of whom his sceptical brother had prophesied that he would not sit four years

¹ See Fester, *Die Augsburger Allianz von 1686*, and P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. und Waldeck*, ii., p. 11.



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efforts of James and his partisans to show that the prince and princess approved of his measures. Fagel's noted letter to the Scottish dissenter Stewart served this purpose, the council pensionary announcing that prince and princess favoured abolishing penalties for deviation from the Anglican church, but by no means the admission of Roman Catholics to all offices. The letter was immediately printed and thousand of copies¹ were distributed over England, so that it acquired the character of a manifesto to the English people against the king's policy.

Meanwhile James persisted in his measures to assist the Catholics and confirm his sovereign authority. He was treading the path that had led his father to the scaffold and that was to bring him also to ruin. In May, 1688, he had seven refractory bishops of the Anglican church imprisoned in the Tower and proclaimed anew his "declaration of indulgence." Amid the consequent exasperation a son was born to him on June 10th, an event which seemed to assure the future of his dynasty. In the preceding fall the expected birth had been announced here and there, and the report was received with great joy by the Catholics, with dismay and suspicion by the Protestants. When the birth took place a month before the designated time and was managed at court in a very mysterious fashion, the presumption gained ground that the young "prince of Wales" was a supposititious child procured by the Jesuits, but modern researches have shown this hypothesis to be baseless. The prince and princess, who had at first found no reason to doubt and had sent over Zuylesteyn with their congratulations, were soon of another opinion, especially when Anne, the only sister of the princess, wrote to them that she did not consider the so-called prince of Wales as genuine.² An end was speedily made in the

¹ Extracts in Wagenaar, xv., p. 361, printed among other places in *Holl. Mercurius 1687*, p. 92.

² See relating to the genuineness :Fruin, pp. 171, 177 ; Krämer, p. 159.



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Bastiaensze Schepers at Rotterdam, and of Odijk in Zealand it was resolved in December to fit out 21 ships of medium size ostensibly against the Algerine corsairs and on account of complications between Sweden and Denmark. From July work went on vigorously in the yards, while 4000 sailors were enlisted and transports sufficient for the troops were hired. In October a fleet of 43 war ships and some fire ships, besides smaller vessels and about 350 transports, was ready under command of the lieutenant admiral Cornelis Evertsen and the vice admiral Philips Almonde. Cornelis Tromp, succeeding De Ruyter as lieutenant admiral general, had dropped into the background for some years past in consequence of dissensions with the prince; besides he would not easily have consented to yield the chief command to the admiral Herbert as lieutenant admiral general of the common fleet, an arrangement made to satisfy English popular feeling. Naturally one thing and another could not be kept secret from d'Avaux, and he did not fail to warn Louis XIV. and James II. of the republic's great armaments, but always without finding a hearing, though he could now declare that England was aimed at. Measures concerning the army to go over were taken in deep secrecy and with great care. In July and August Bentinck on behalf of the prince hired several regiments from the princes of northern Germany; the English and Scotch regiments in the Dutch service and some of the best Dutch troops were brought into readiness; the command under the prince was given to the marshal Schomberg; the whole army of 14,000 men was collected at Mook, supposedly to defend the frontier against an attack from the side of Cologne. To avoid publicity the necessary money was scraped together privately from everywhere. Dijkveld and Fagel in July applied to the Amsterdam government, particularly to Witsen and Hudde, about it, but the latter hesitated at first to comply with the prince's




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English demand for explanation was answered by declaring that the armament was not directed against king and people, but that it was hoped to see the troubles in England end through the removal of just grievances. The States desired not to wage open war with the English government, but to assist the prince with the power of the state in his enterprise begun on account of those grievances. Some of the regents looked on with anxiety but did not venture to oppose.


The prince's diplomacy took all possible precautions with the European powers. The Great Elector had lately been working in harmony with the policy of the prince, but he had died in April and been replaced by his son Frederick III., who speedily manifested his disposition to support the United Netherlands.¹ Bentinck had a secret meeting with Fuchs, and the latter in the elector's name promised troops for the prince's expedition. Brunswick Lüneburg also joined in it secretly as well as Wolfenbüttel and Hesse. Waldeck directed Bentinck's cautious and well concealed steps. Everything was arranged in treaties by the beginning of August. Würtemberg furnished three regiments of cavalry, and Hanover declared its readiness to help repel any attack by France upon the German empire. In September Prince William went from Het Loo to Minden and Rinteln to meet the elector and the landgrave of Hesse. Waldeck sounded the court of Vienna and secured the assurance that the emperor would watch the English expedition with approval. The elector of Saxony and other German princes were ready to follow Hanover's example. In September the prince had an interview with Spain's representative in the southern Netherlands between Breda and Antwerp and learned of Spanish satisfaction with the plan. Even the papal government, though viewing with apprehension the defeat of

¹ Ranke, *Englische Geschichte*, vi., p. 134; Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Waldeck*, ii., p. 25.



him on his journey to Briel. The same earnest feeling pervaded the whole country on the day of prayer after the prince's arrival at Hellevoetsluis. On the 25th he had a serious talk with his wife, the memory of which is preserved to us in the journal of the princess,¹ the most beautiful page written by the pious, loving woman, who saw her husband depart to war against her father. He intimated to her the possibility of his death during the expedition and the desirability of her marrying again in that case, but not with a Catholic. Trembling at the thought of his going away, she said that she hoped not to survive him, but, if this happened now that she had no child by him, she wished for none, though it was by an angel. The departure of the prince was postponed on account of slowness in the preparations for the fleet. When, on the 30th, he set sail for northern England or Scotland, a severe storm drove him back with great damage to Hellevoetsluis. There was general alarm, lest this delay of a few days might awaken James II. from his dream and cause him to take vigorous measures for defence. Summoned to Briel, the princess could once more see her hero, but only during a few hours and in deep anxiety, for which she sought and found consolation in solitude and prayer. On the next day, November 11th, the fleet put to sea again, Herbert commanding the van, Bastiaensze Schepers the middle division, and Evertsen the rear guard, followed by the loving glances of the princess, who stood gazing from the tower of Briel until the masts of the ships had disappeared, followed by the prayers of the whole republic, united now as seldom before in wishes for the success of the enterprise. The prince's flag bore the words *Pro religione et libertate* and under them the proud *Je maintiendray*, the motto of his fathers. The aim and spirit of the expedition were embodied in these watchwords. Anxiety regarding the issue lasted

¹ *Lettres et mémoires*, p. 80. From them Fruin, p. 192, and Krämer, p. 169.



ous revolution" was finished, and "Dutch William" had saved the religion and liberties of England.

Louis XIV. had contemplated all this with deep vexation at the conduct of James II., who, disregarding French warnings and offers of help, had gone on the road to destruction in his usual stubborn fashion and was now a fugitive on French soil. The consequences of events in England were immediately felt by France. Against Louis XIV. all the powers were now united that had any reason to complain of him. It was a period of great importance in the history of the world, when pope, emperor, and empire, in league with the two Protestant maritime powers, "opposed the concentrated might of the furious Cock" in order to rescue Europe's freedom.¹ That period of the world's history dawned when the prince, starting from the republic and relying upon its fleet and army, mounted the throne of the Stuarts. At Vienna under the influence of the Jesuits there had been some reluctance to unite with the maritime powers, but after the expedition to England Louis in November had finally declared war upon the States, professedly on account of the support given his enemies in the affairs of Cologne. The declaration of war was accepted by the States early in March, 1689, in a manifesto "for the defence of religion and liberty" against French violence. Spain followed this example in May, and somewhat later England also declared war on France, as d' Avaux had long before predicted would happen whenever the prince's expedition succeeded. All this at last turned the scale in Vienna to the side of the allies. Jacob Hop, pensionary of Amsterdam, sent to Vienna in April, was able on May 12th to sign there the treaty, by which the emperor pledged himself to the States to aid in restoring the peace of Münster and that of the Pyrenees and made an agreement with them respecting the future of the Spanish monarchy.

¹ Ranke, *Französische Geschichte*, iv., p. 30.





CHAPTER XVII

THE COALITION WAR

IN the time of William III. the history of the Dutch people starts from a different point than in that of De Witt. The leaders of the state in De Witt's period aimed first at the preservation of peace. They hoped, through peace after the long war for independence, to keep the prosperity obtained and to open new paths to commerce and industry; in the wars forced upon them, and occupying a third of their administration, the idea of restoring peace was constantly active with them; their domestic policy was chiefly directed to the establishment of the system of government, from which they expected happiness for the nation; abroad they had in view the nearest material interests of their state and people. It was otherwise with William III. and his adherents. Although their end too was not war but peace, they were not ready to purchase this peace at the price of material profit offered them by France. They put the powers of the state in the service of a high ideal and subordinated to it the state's interests; at home they were content with upholding the predominant influence of their master; outside of the country their exertions sought the abasement of the power striving for supremacy. This abasement could only be secured by a general European war. Consequently William III.'s period is one of war. The peace treaties, both that of Nimwegen and that of Rys-




December, 1688, in the midst of the English complications, was a great loss to William III.¹ His place was taken by Van Hove, pensionary of Haarlem, and, after his speedy death in May, 1689, and a temporary occupation, by the pensionary of Delft, Antonie Heinsius, who had been pensionary since 1670 and had attracted attention by his sagacity, though he did not at first belong to the Orange party. The prince had employed him in 1683 on a mission to London to defend the interests of the principality against French attacks, and Heinsius returned from there and later from a mission to London pronounced adherent of the prince's policy against France.² He soon became the friend of Fagel, and when the latter's health began to fail, the prince looked to the Delft pensionary as his helper in treating foreign affairs. Fagel was not unwilling, and offered him in 1686 the office of pensionary of Dordrecht, whose pensionary usually replaced the council pensionary. But Heinsius, already forty-five years old, declined, believing that the employment suited "neither with his humour, nor with his knowledge, nor with his health." After reiterated entreaty, the modest man accepted and soon proved himself an excellent aid to William III., less independent and vigorous, much less enthusiastic and ardent than Fagel, but exact, zealous, honest, able, clear-sighted, docile, an invaluable tool in the prince's hand. With Dijkveld and Hop, he belonged to the best statesmen of the last period of William III.'s reign.

This period was characterised in domestic affairs by a strong maintenance of the Orange prince's supremacy in the republic, where his power was much greater than it could be in England with the limitations imposed upon the royal authority after the "glorious revolution." His elevation was heard of here with great joy; bonfires were


¹ Burnet, *History*, i., p. 559.

² *Archief Heinsius*, ed. Van der Heim, i., p. lxxiv.



was commissioned further to congratulate the king and queen of England and to discuss an offensive and defensive alliance. This last encountered opposition from the Dutch side. Men hesitated "to exhaust themselves for Great Britain's sake." Witsen and Van Citters were little inclined to use "the money and people of the States" on behalf of England. After long delay they gave way under strong pressure from the king and signed the treaty of September 3, 1689, for the prevention of commerce with France and for carrying on war together. For the time not even the repeal of the Navigation Act could be obtained, and everything showed that the commercial jealousy between the two nations had not disappeared. Witsen, returning home with the others in November, complained that all had been decided in accordance with the king's opinion and with the desire of England. Laughingly and insisently William III. had pushed his will through, regarding everything as subordinate to the great aim of the coöperation of England with the coalition, which, through the mediation of Hop going over to England, was really brought about before the end of the year by England's official accession to the Grand League of Vienna.


The residence of the stadtholder in England caused troubles in the government of the republic, which had as a consequence violent popular movements and no less violent pamphlets. In the usual election of sheriffs in Amsterdam at the end of January the nomination, on account of the absence of the stadtholder, who had to make the choice, was sent to the court of Holland for its selection. The court, fearing the prince, sent the nomination over to him, and he chose from those nominated, but expressed his displeasure at Amsterdam's action. Next year the city would not consent to this treatment of the affair and appealed to the Estates of Holland for authority to give the nomination to the court according to its privileges, as



death of Cocceius in 1669 and of Voetius in 1676. The former did not rest until they had removed from his professorship the venerable Heydanus, who had long taught his moderate Cartesian principles at Leyden, just as they had driven the moderate Van der Waeyen from Middelburg. But Van der Waeyen was taken under the protection of the Frisian stadtholder and in 1677 became professor in Franeker, from where he succeeded in defending the Cocceians against their enemies. William III. showed himself less and less inclined to side with the Voetians in all respects and endeavoured by a conciliatory attitude to bring the parties together, which was finally accomplished. The resolution of the Estates of Holland of 1694, exhorting to "brotherly harmony," to the choice of preachers "of a moderate and peaceful disposition," to the treatment of religious matters at the university not according to "the rules of philosophy" but according to the "usual doctrine of the Reformed Churches, contained in the Catechism, the Confessions, and the rules of the National Synod of Dordrecht,"¹ did much to appease the strife, which otherwise in the opinion of the violent Voetians must inevitably have led to the new national synod desired by them. Neither the States nor the prince wanted such a synod, dreading a repetition of the discords of the time of the truce. Although here and there traces might appear of a revival of the ideas of the old party of the States, William III.'s authority was in the long run energetically upheld, and there was no more opposition to his foreign policy, which he held firmly in hand with the aid of Heinsius and other trusted leaders of the state, much better than was possible in England.

The instruments of that policy, the army and navy, were carefully prepared for their difficult task. The army, trained with the help of Waldeck, Hoorne, Aylva, Ouwerkerk, Slangenburgh, Van Rhee de Ghinckel, and other

¹ *Res. Holl.* 18 December, 1694.



active service—the former died in 1691 and the latter in 1704—but Almonde, the two younger Evertsens and Callenburgh, formed in the school of De Ruyter, may be named among the best. Coöperation with the British fleets and squadrons, always under command of a British admiral in accordance with the treaty of 1689, did not increase the fame of the Dutch navy.

At first an attack of the French upon Maestricht was feared, even during the prince's expedition to England, but Louis XIV. turned to Germany and had the Palatinate devastated for the second time in a terrible manner, while the French army in the Spanish Netherlands under the marshal d'Humières acted only defensively against Waldeck. With the coalition army composed of Spanish, English, and Dutch troops the latter moved late in the summer to the vicinity of Charleroi, where the French were driven back in a bloody skirmish at Walcourt on August 25th. The advantage secured was not followed up, and both sides confined themselves to border raids, with which the far from brilliant campaign of this year ended. More profit was derived from the campaign in Cleves and the Rhine district, Dutch troops under Aylva acting with the Brandenburgers, and Neuss and Bonn were taken there besides a number of smaller places. Dutch troops under Van Rheede Ghinckel fought also in Ireland against King James together with English and Danes.

Of more importance was the campaign of the following year, when Luxembourg again took command of the French forces in the Spanish Netherlands and by superior strength inflicted a serious defeat upon the aged Waldeck at Fleurus on July 1st in spite of the exemplary conduct of the infantry of Holland and Friesland.¹ That defeat did not injure the good name of the Dutch troops, whose leaders, Aylva, Wibbenum, and others, won renown not-

¹ Knoop, *Willem III.*, iii., p. 35; Muller, *Wilhelm III. und Waldeck*, ii., p. 74.



the city's fall and was content with the protection of Brabant, where meanwhile the French troops had plundered terribly, especially at Hal, destroyed by Luxembourg in barbarous fashion at the command of Louvois, as Boufflers did some days later at Liege, where over 3000 houses were burned and pillaged to take vengeance for the support given to Spain. Even Brussels was threatened, when William III. left there with his army for Louvain. These were the last acts of the inhuman French minister of war, who died soon afterwards. The large armies arrayed against one another in the southern Netherlands, each about 60,000 men, accomplished finally but little, and they went into winter quarters in October.

The two following years furnished more important military results. On both sides great preparations were made for 1692. William III. crossed over to the Netherlands with numerous English troops to carry on the war energetically. Louis XIV. planned an attack upon England with army and fleet to restore James II. to the throne, while a large part of the English army was absent in the Netherlands and was to be kept busy there by a vigorous assault on Namur. The coasts of Normandy swarmed with troops, and 20,000 to 30,000 of them were to be conveyed over to England under escort of the fleet from Toulon and Brest commanded by Tourville and d'Estrées, while there must be a rising of the still numerous adherents of James II. The threatening danger made the English nation stand up as one man in defence of the fatherland. A conspiracy against the existing government was discovered and frustrated; a large force was brought together on the southern coast; the Anglo-Dutch fleet gathered in the Channel under Russell and Almonde; other English and Dutch forces were held ready in the Netherlands to cross over the North Sea at the first sign. But the French army did not go over the Channel. Tourville was detained in Brest by slowness in



destruction. Almost half of the French fleet, including its best ships, was lost. For a long time after the battle of La Hogue France ceased to be a naval power of the first rank.

The war on the sea dropped into the background after this battle. Danger was threatened in June, 1693, by the disaster of Lagos in Portugal, where a large fleet of merchantmen, escorted by an Anglo-Dutch squadron of 23 war ships under Rooke and Van der Goes, sailed unexpectedly into the midst of a numerous French fleet commanded by Tourville and suffered heavy losses. An attack on Brest in 1694 failed; a bombardment of Dieppe and Havre de Grâce, later of St. Malo, did much damage. From Dunkirk the brave privateering captain Jean Bart, now in the royal service, inflicted serious injury upon Dutch and English commerce and became the terror of the North Sea. As late as 1697 the waters of Zealand were far from safe. The great fleets of the allies had for their chief task to guard the merchantmen against the French squadrons and privateers but found no opportunity to attack the enemy in naval battles of importance. The lieutenant admiral Almonde, the vice admiral Callenburgh, Cornelis and Geleyn Evertsen, and other intrepid leaders upheld the good name of the Dutch navy in these small fights and expeditions.


The result of the long contest depended upon the war on land. It was carried on with varying fortunes, and the large armies did not succeed in winning decisive advantages. In June, 1692, Louis XIV. captured the important Namur, and its citadel after a sturdy resistance was forced to yield to Vauban's brilliant siege, though it was cleverly defended by Coehoorn. The battle of Steenkerke (August 3d), where Luxembourg, fighting against William III., changed defeat into a victory, altered but little the situation. The death of Waldeck at the age of 72, after he had taken part in the battle and had later departed for



death of Queen Mary (January 7, 1695), although it struck William III. personally and made him sit down for weeks in sad despair, brought no change to the state of affairs, but this loss threatened to diminish the king's influence in England. Luxembourg's death at this time was a serious harm to Louis XIV., as he was the last of the great commanders who had won victories. His successor, Villeroy, was more of a courtier than a general.

In 1695 also the French army in the Netherlands remained over 100,000 men strong, but that of William III. reached about the same figure and enabled him to operate offensively, with the aid of the excellent leaders formed in the long war, among whom may be named the cavalry general Nassau-Ouwerkerk, son of Beverweerd, the noted Van Rheede Ghinckel, after his Irish victories earl of Athlone, the generals Fagel, Nassau-Weilburg, Von Dopff, Van Ittersum, Noyelles. Early in July he laid siege to Namur, "a hard nut to crack," as he said, now a fortress of the first rank, fortified by Vauban and defended by the brave Boufflers. Coehoorn, now general of infantry, was soon the leader of the famous siege, which ended a month later in the surrender of the city.¹ The citadel, where the garrison had taken refuge after the capitulation, had to be separately besieged, while Villeroy's army was kept at a distance by that of the allies under the prince of Vaudemont. The bombardment of Brussels, by which Villeroy had hoped to break off the siege of the citadel, could not save the important point, and on September 5th the citadel of Namur fell before William III. A large share of the glory of the exploit was due to Coehoorn and to his admirable use of artillery. From this time he was regarded as the equal of Vauban, and even superior to him as a besieger. The garrison stipulated for marching out with arms and the honours of war, yet Boufflers remained for some time a prisoner on

¹ *Leven van Coehoorn*, ed. Van Sypsteyn (Leeuwarden, 1860), p. 12.





announce there Louis XIV.'s willingness to negotiate and by bribery and persuasion to aim at mediation by Sweden. Evidently France needed peace and sought to enter into relations with the court of Vienna, hoping to break the harmony of the allies and win some of them over to peace, as had been secretly done with Savoy. France wished this peace on the basis of the truce of 1684 or of the Nimwegen peace, while William III. wanted to go back to that of Münster, Spain to that of the Pyrenees, and the German empire hoped at least to recover Strasburg. The recognition of William as king of England, the return of imperial lands seized by France, the fate of Luxemburg, the settlement in Italy were the chief points discussed. Sweden assumed the part of mediator and submitted proposals to the representatives of the allies meeting in congress for the common war at The Hague in the spring, while France remained privately in touch with each of the allies. All this did not tend to promote a vigorous prosecution of the war. A plot against the life of the Orange prince, betrayed in time to Portland, with more Jacobite disturbances and a new attempt of France to effect a landing in England, threatened in the spring of 1696 to break off negotiations between France and the two maritime nations. A severe financial crisis in England brought further complications; the defection of Savoy gave an unfavourable look to affairs in Italy for the allies. But France with Pomponne now in charge of foreign relations began to strive earnestly for a treaty, with an eye especially to the reports about the feeble health of Charles II. of Spain. In August, 1696, it gave way on different points, and there was talk of appointing envoys to a peace congress under the mediation of Sweden. The only opposition came from the imperial government, which in case of Charles II.'s death wished to use the war as a support against French claims to the Spanish inheritance.

William III. was convinced of the absolute necessity of



The imperialists still refused. The time set by France, September 1st, expired, and peace was uncertain to the deep anxiety of William III., who expected that France would again take advantage of the opportunity to separate the allies from one another. He endeavoured without success to intimidate Louis by threatening resumption of the war. Louis knew that the English Parliament and the States both longed ardently for peace. The inducement of commercial gains sufficed to strengthen this feeling and was held out liberally by France. Thus the maritime powers and Spain resolved on September 20th to sign the peace; the emperor, being allowed until November 1st to accede to it, consented at the last moment. The peace was based upon that of Münster. The treaty with the States stipulated that Pondicherry should be given back to the French by the East India Company, and an advantageous commercial treaty for 25 years was concluded, as it had existed before the war. In the treaty with England William III. was recognised as king; the principality of Orange was returned to him. In that with Spain Luxemburg was given back besides all the places and districts appropriated for France by the *chambres de réunion* with the exception of 82 cities and villages mentioned by name. The empire received back the *réunions* excepting Strasburg, which remained to France in exchange for the cession of some small places. Thus peace was concluded. But William III. after the end of the negotiations in September spoke the prophetic word: "I confess that the manner of it troubles me not a little for the future." Louis XIV. gave way to England and the republic and the empire largely on account of the existence of secret plans concerning the Spanish succession, which were soon to agitate Europe anew. In the treaty of peace, however, that succession was not even mentioned, and this assuredly did not tranquillise the diplomats on this point, because that both the French and imperial governments constantly





CHAPTER XVIII

WILLIAM III.'S LAST YEARS

THE history of the last years of the king-stadtholder is dominated by a great political affair, which had long busied the heads of the statesmen of the seventeenth century: the affair of the Spanish succession that, with the sharp antagonism between France and the other powers, might easily lead to a general European war. It was not conceivable that the republic could keep out of such a war. In its close connection with England, embodied, as it were, in the person of William III., lay the only chance of breaking the supremacy of France. It was not to be doubted that Louis XIV. would try to seize the Spanish Netherlands or in any case to make them dependent upon France, the aim of his policy during his entire reign, the political aim of France for more than two centuries. The unfortunate "battlefield of Europe," twice trodden during years by the armies of both sides, its cities in ruins, its villages in ashes, its roads unprotected, its fields uncultivated, its impoverished population in despair under Spanish misgovernment,¹ would then once more witness the atrocities of war. Happily Belgium had now in Maximilian Emanuel, elector of Bavaria, from 1692 a governor who revived the good times of Aytona and Castel-Rodrigo. He rebuilt the desolated Brussels, consulted the States and municipal governments


¹ See Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, p. 340.



prince secured the succession, provided he did not depend upon the emperor or Louis XIV., one of whom might thus obtain such an increase of power as to enable him to lay down the law for them and their commerce.


The heirs to be considered at the speedily expected demise of Charles II. of Spain were: the Hapsburgs of Vienna, not only on account of their old relationship to the Spanish royal house, but also on account of the marriage of the emperor Leopold with Charles's youngest sister, from which two sons were born; then the elector of Bavaria, the son of this sister's only daughter, consequently the emperor's grandson; finally, the Bourbons, by reason of the marriage of Louis XIV. to the oldest sister of the Spanish king, from which marriage the dauphin and his three sons were descended.¹ Louis XIV., furthermore, the son of Philip III.'s oldest daughter, was undoubtedly the nearest heir in the blood, but both his mother and his wife had renounced their hereditary rights; he appealed to the fact, however, that the Spanish Cortes had never ratified this renunciation and that the dowry stipulated in the last renunciation was never paid. The mother of the electoral prince had also made a renunciation. The emperor's wife alone had not given any such promise, so that her two sons could without dispute enter legally into their rights. At the court of Madrid the French and Austrian parties were in sharp opposition, but the proud Spanish people and Charles II. wanted the unity of the kingdom to be preserved, and the king thought this assured by appointing in 1698 by will his grandnephew, the young electoral prince, as his heir. The maritime powers desired to break this unity, in order that the great power of Spain, over whose territory "the sun never set," might not rise again under an energetic

¹ See concerning all these matters Legrelle's work, which treats fully the diplomacy of the Spanish succession.



possessions and the increase of French influence in Italy, refused roundly to recognise the treaty and prepared for war. Both parties intrigued at Madrid, where the Austrians in particular were hated and the unity of the kingdom seemed best attained by the elevation of a French prince. Theologians and jurists and even the pope recommended this last to the king, and early in October, 1700, Charles II. signed a secret will, making Duke Philip of Anjou, the dauphin's second son, his only heir. Four weeks later (November 1st) he died, the last scion of the old Burgundian race, once raised high and proudly, but during a century shrinking to a fragile reed that was bent by every breath in the political atmosphere. Louis XIV. hesitated whether he should hold to the treaty of March or recognise the will. The fear of another great war stood opposite the hope of an extraordinary augmentation of power for the royal house, not for France itself, which would profit more by the partition treaty. Who could say that the new branch of royalty might not oppose France, as the Burgundians had done despite their descent from the French royal family? But the king's resolution was taken on November 16th, and he informed the Spanish ambassador at Paris that his grandson, now Philip V., accepted the crown. "There are no longer any Pyrenees," remarked the French *Mercur*e in announcing this important resolution.

French diplomacy had the task of appeasing the maritime powers. It was not what it had been under Richelieu, Mazarin, Lionne, Pomponne, and d'Avaux. Tallard and Torcy could not compare with those great diplomatists, just as Chamillart, the leader of war and finance, was not the equal of Louvois, and the new generals, Vendôme and Villars, were inferior to Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg. William III. and Heinsius were not convinced of the good faith of France or that both crowns of France and Spain might not be united, especially when Louis XIV. recog-



nant influence of France was dreaded, whenever Spanish America and the entrance to the Mediterranean should come into hands so closely connected with France, and commerce would thus be menaced. Was it not better to venture upon a war with weakened France, which must now defend also Spain, while the sea powers could count on the aid of emperor and empire, of the anti-French elements in Italy? Others asked if England could be brought to this, now that the Tories had so much to say there. It was determined to negotiate. The Dutch ambassador in Paris, Coenraad van Heemskerck, was instructed to declare that the States hoped the king would adhere to the last partition treaty and give the emperor an opportunity to join in it. England presented a similar declaration. But France seemed averse to upholding the treaty. Louis XIV. endeavoured to justify his actions, and Philip V. announced to the States officially his accession to the throne. A direct answer to both was avoided from the Dutch side. An agreement seemed not inconceivable, even after France had made itself master of Milan and with the Bavarian elector had secured the Spanish Netherlands by suddenly throwing French garrisons into the farther fortresses, some of them having had Dutch garrisons since the peace of Ryswick, so that two sorts of troops were now there together. The States, fearing their garrisons would be attacked, withdrew them. They even recognised Philip V., and this example was followed by England in April, 1701. In negotiations at The Hague, to which the aged d'Avaux came and from England the earl of Stanhope appeared, the States and England formulated their demands for an agreement: evacuation of the Spanish Netherlands by the French garrisons; placing of Dutch garrisons in a series of fortresses there; no cession of any part of the Spanish inheritance to France; Ostend and Nieuwpoort in English hands; territorial indemnity for the emperor; no reduction of commercial advan-



appearing in the emperor's name. The conquest of Milan and the other Italian territories of Spain was to satisfy the emperor; Belgium was to become a "dike, rampart, and barrier" for the republic, while the Spanish colonies were indicated as spoils for the republic and England. Frederick of Brandenburg, now king of Prussia, joined with the emperor, as did also the dukes of Hanover and Lüneburg and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, of whom the former, closely related to the English royal family and the future successor to the throne of the United Kingdom after Princess Anne, obtained the long-coveted electoral dignity. Frederick IV. of Denmark also consented to a subsidy treaty with the powers. Sweden was too busy with its northern plans to think seriously of acting against France. The maritime powers renewed their alliance with one another. On the other side Louis XIV. could count upon the coöperation of Spain, of avaricious Savoy, of Bavaria with a member of its ruling family as bishop of Cologne, besides upon the benevolent attitude of weak Portugal and of the neutral Italian states.

The war was already breaking out in Italy, and English and Dutch fleets were putting to sea to protect the merchantmen from French privateers and war ships. The French troops occupied Liege, Rijnberk, Neuss, Bonn, and other places, while the States sent theirs to Jülich and Cologne; Dutch forces moved to the generality lands to protect the frontiers. The actual war was not yet begun, not even when Louis XIV. saluted as king of England, as James III., the son of James II. who died in September at St. Germain. Indignation seized upon the English people; they demanded vengeance for this affront, and the Whigs in Parliament, the party of the Protestant succession in England, showed inclination to as close a league as possible with the republic. When William III. returned to England in November as usual, after settling the state of war for 1702 in the Netherlands,



tained, he reluctantly let the matter drop, warning that it might some day be too late. He seems really to have felt very feeble, but this was kept secret by his desire, in order that political affairs might not suffer from fear of his death.¹ Those nearest him, his best friends, were very anxious about his condition, and he himself was accurately acquainted with it. There seemed to be some improvement in the spring. He took to his beloved pastime of hunting in the vicinity of his palace of Hampton Court and to horseback riding usually in the company of his favourite of these last years, the young baron of Keppel-Pallandt, now Lord Albemarle, who had more and more acquired the place of his old friend Bentinck-Portland, to the latter's vexation. The improvement was only in appearance. William III. knew from his physicians that his malady was incurable and that he had not long to live, a certainty that tormented him at the thought of the troublous times speedily approaching. He had never felt any fear of death, but now he expressed a wish to live a little longer for the sake of the high aim of his life which he hoped finally to reach by this last great war: the establishment of the European balance of power and of freedom of worship in Protestant countries.

Then an accident came suddenly to hasten the long-dreaded crisis and to strike him down, while he was still restlessly busy with preparation for the war and with regulation of the domestic conditions of England. Letters to Heinsius, arrangements with Marlborough, Ouwerkerk, and Athlone concerning military matters, a message to Parliament relative to a closer union of England and Scotland are the last documents bearing his signature, precious memorials of the activity of a great mind. On the morning of March 4, 1702, he was riding in the park of his castle, when his horse stumbled over a molehill. The king fell and broke his collar bone. The bone was immediately set,

¹ See on his last days the conclusion of Macaulay's masterly work.




good of their countrymen, both with firm hand steering the ship of state through the breakers of political life, along the rocks of domestic and foreign politics. John de Witt and William III., the man of the aristocratic form of government and the man of the monarchy in fact, the man of the narrower political interest of the republic and the man of world-embracing political and religious ideals, have both the highest claim to the gratitude of the Dutch people, which fought with one for the interests of commerce and prosperity, with the other for the higher interests of political and religious liberty, and in both recognises the representatives of genuine Dutch principles and ideas, the great statesmen of the most brilliant days it has ever known. Politics set them against one another as personal enemies, making one after a fine career fall in the vigour of his years as the victim of a furious mob, raising the other to the highest dignities his childhood could have dreamed of. More than two centuries have passed away, the parties led by them have disappeared, and the people of the Netherlands places in its memory the great council pensionary and the great Orange prince as the representatives of the most glorious portion of its history. What Prince William, his two excellent sons, and Oldenbarnevelt prepared was brought to maturity under De Witt and William III., and the whole world has shown unfeigned admiration for both. Among the great men of history a place is allotted to them without hesitation, because they are notable representatives of a grand period in the history of their people.





enjoy his own without troubling himself much about increasing or retaining it. What people does not yield to such a temptation? What people does not involuntarily see its energy, its strength, formerly tempered by daily conflict, decline in days of victory and enjoyment?

Some decadence may be remarked in art, literature, science, morals. Every period of course cannot be expected to furnish men like Rembrandt and Hals, Vondel and Hooft, Huygens and Heinsius. But how far below the pupils of Rembrandt and Hals stand De Baen, the protégé of Prince John Maurice and the Great Elector, and Arnold Boonen, that of various German princes, the much patronised and admired portrait painters of the fine people of the century's last years? How far is Dusart from his master Ostade and the academic Gerard de Lairesse, the head of a numerous school of painters, the once esteemed painter of chimney-pieces and ceilings, from the talented representatives of the previous generation? Yet there are some great names to be mentioned. Ludolf Backhuysen recalls in his pictures of the sea the Van de Veldes, the youngest of whom was his famous contemporary and perhaps the greatest of this family of marine painters; Huchtenburgh imitates Wouwerman in delineating happily the battle scenes of the French wars; Rachel Ruysch excels as a painter of flowers and reproduces admirably the soft tints of native fruits. But Willem van Mieris, refining the fine art of his father Frans, attains an affected style, from which all soul has disappeared, just as Godfried Schalcken seeks to surpass Dou's artful lights by still more exaggerated effects, and Gaspar Netscher's sons also fail to equal their father. In engraving as in painting it is a time of epigones. Jan Luyken, as engraver and etcher, is quite the equal of the preceding period's great artists with the burin and etching needle; his numerous drawings and etchings, his exquisite illustrations for books give evidence of his charming talent.



the lead of Pels and Meijer, "building up the language" according to "rules found after long deliberation" and striving after "sweetly flowing" verses, "polishing" what seemed to suffer from roughness. "Every word may be many times improved and scraped, forged, changed, and the superfluous scratched out," became the rule in prose and poetry. The drama must exclusively "lead up" to the virtue of common life and be arranged after the French model, "edifying, artificial, according to rule"; the "path found" by the French must show the way. No "original invention," no "Bible subjects" or modern situations were to be presented, so that the province of the church would not be encroached upon, and the old enemy was reconciled to what took place on the boards.¹ Vondel and Hooft are out of date, Bredero and Jan Vos are considered "too wild," Oudaen and Antonides van der Goes find as little favour in the eyes of the conceited critics and presumptuous pedants. The French drama was victorious also over the spectacular pieces of recent times; the stage in the capital and elsewhere lived upon translations and imitations of the much admired plays of Corneille, Racine, and their followers. It was little better with comedy, although this, of course, preserved more of the national colour.² Asselijn's depictions of manners, among which his *Jan Klaaszen* still attracts audiences, rise above the ordinary standard of the "ingenious" imitations of Molière and other French authors approved by the "academy." It was all over with lyric and epic poetry after the artificial extinction of independent talent, though rhymesters shot up like mushrooms from the ground in the shadow of the poetical societies, which—successors of the ancient chambers of rhetoric and infected with all their faults—were formed

¹ Jonckbloet, *Gesch. der nederl. letterk., XVII^{de} eeuw*, ii., p. 416.

² Kalff, *Litteratuur en toneel te Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*, p. 268.



from De Groot to Graswinckel. In theology A Marck, the author of the comprehensive handbook *Merck der Godgeleerdheid*, and the gentle middlemen, Vitringa at Franeker and Witsius, were prominent. The noted jurist, Gerard Noodt, received the praise of being the only literary man among the jurists of the fatherland. The famous commentator on the Pandects, Johannes Voet, was little more than an excellent collector of "what was thought and said before him." Above them both stood indisputably the distinguished Franeker professor, Ulric Huber, dying in 1694, after De Groot the man best informed in political and international law, which he treated admirably in his work, *De jure civitatis*. Antonius Matthæus, the third of the name from an erudite legal family, was mainly a collector and editor of documents and chronicles, a compiler. Jacobus Perizonius, the great authority on ancient history, to which he adapted an intelligent criticism, had given up acute textual criticism. Leeuwenhoek, the simple usher of the Delft justices, prosecuted late in life his studies of the "mysteries of nature" and excited the astonishment of Europe by his surprising discoveries about the "invisible created truths" of the minute animal, vegetable, and mineral world, which his microscope, the successor of spectacle glasses, enabled him to make. Christiaan Huygens, *summus Hugenius*, saw the last years before his death in 1695 clouded by melancholy. In general, however, the time of original geniuses was past, and that of collectors,¹ compilers and, handbook writers had dawned. This was true also of history, where Gerard Brandt found his successors in the restlessly collecting antiquarians Cornelis van Alkemade and Pieter van der Schelling, and the story of the great deeds of earlier generations gave place to topographical, genealogical, and archæological treatises. The learned Huguenot

¹ See concerning the Dutch collectors of this time the numerous data in the *Merkwürdige Reyzen* of the German traveller Uffenbach, Bd. ii. and iii.



tional strength, although prosperity still remained at a considerable height. That it so remained was due largely to the flourishing commerce and industry, in which no falling off was to be observed. A very unfavourable symptom was the growing traffic in stocks, especially in the shares of the East and West India Companies, which were more subject to fluctuations than others by reason of the varying cargoes brought to Europe. Since the first quarter of the century speculation had been common in Amsterdam, and the sharp differences in the prices of government bonds in 1672 and the following years had much promoted this. The "Portuguese Jewish nation" at Amsterdam engaged extensively in this bond and stock business, but other residents and many foreigners also took part in it. The stocks went from hand to hand, often for delivery months afterwards, and every day was to be seen the evil of speculation in the rapid vicissitudes of fortune, which in great measure had the same pernicious consequences as in later times. This stock speculation in Amsterdam was far from having driven away mercantile trade. A French writer¹ of the last years of the century gives a survey of the Dutch navigation and commerce of the period, which shows the immense development it could still boast of in those years. It might still be said that Dutch commerce "embraced the whole earth" and formed the basis of the republic's importance as a power, so disproportionate to the area of its territory and the number of its citizens. Only a relatively small part of Dutch commerce consisted of the direct exportation of Dutch products. In this time too the Hollanders had the carrying trade for northern and southern Europe, for South America, western Africa, southern Asia, and Japan. An English economist of the

¹ (P. D. Huet), *Mémoires sur le commerce des hollandais* (published in 1716, but written before the peace of Ryswick). This remarkable little book is based upon official documents and communications from experienced Dutch merchants.



the importance of their commerce. They carried there whatever the poor country needed and brought away wood, iron, copper, pitch, skins of animals, potash, fat, dried fish. Over 300 ships of 400 to 500 tons each with ten to twelve sailors were employed in this trade, of which the cities and villages of northern Holland and Friesland were the chief seats, Bergen and Trondhjem being the Norwegian ports. Denmark's foreign commerce was not great, but the Hollanders had a considerable trade in corn on Laaland and in cattle on Jutland, whence the animals were brought to the fertile pastures of Holland to be fattened. Seeland's former cultivation of rye had almost entirely ceased, and the island furnished scarcely grain enough to support its inhabitants. Much more important was the commerce with Sweden, where the Hollanders conveyed spices, salt, wines, cloths and silks, sugar, etc., and exported excellent copper, iron, steel, arms, lead, tar, pitch, wood for masts, especially fine timber. The Hollanders were quite the masters of the exportation of copper and advanced money to the owners of the mines, Amsterdam coming to the fore in this business. The commercial treaty of 1679 secured the rule ever desired by the Dutch in their intercourse with other nations: free ships, free goods, even in time of war. The other Baltic coasts, from Pomerania to Livonia, supplied grain, wood, wax, honey, potash, leather, furs, hemp, saltpetre, fat, wool, linen, etc., which were transported there along the large rivers, also from Brandenburg, Silesia, Poland, and Lithuania. All the Baltic ports shared in this commerce, carried on by the English and Dutch, but Dantzic, Königsberg, and Pillau had the most, particularly the first with its enormous grain storehouses which made it the "granary" of the north. Paper, oil, logwood, salt, etc., were imported here besides the articles mentioned above. Twenty to twenty-five vessels served annually for the Courland trade; the grain commerce in



dustry. Cologne and Frankfort were still the chief markets here, where imports and exports met along the Main and Moselle as far as Franconia and Lorraine. Trade went by the Meuse to Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, where metallic wares and coal formed the chief articles of exportation and spices with silks and woollen goods were imported. The Spanish Netherlands were commercially quite dependent upon the republic in consequence of the closing of the Scheldt and the waters leading to Ghent and Bruges. These two places with Antwerp and Mechlin were the principal marts for the trade in the articles required by the south; the exportation, also entirely in Dutch hands, was confined to lace, yarns, hemp, tapestry, and Lille cambric. A small independent commerce between Ostend and Cadiz was the pitiful remnant of the former great commercial movement of this impoverished region.

Since the Navigation Act England had its export and import trade wholly in its own hands, also that of its American colonies. Spices alone, of which the East India Company possessed the monopoly, were still imported through connivance in Dutch vessels. On the other hand the English had their cloth and wool staple at Dordrecht and exported to Amsterdam much lead, tin, and corn besides English colonial goods. The Scotch had their staple at Veere and brought there coal, wool, and hides. The Dutch could not change this, because their situation obliged them to keep friends with the English who dominated the Channel, but the friendly relations of recent times occasioned some improvement, particularly during war, when England needed the help of the Hollanders more than ever. Exports to England amounted in these years to about 6 millions, imports from England to about 18 millions, and considerable smuggling must be taken into account.

Trade with France once so important had much diminished since the obstacles placed in its way after 1648 on



of Ryswick was concluded, it seemed even less easy than formerly to renew the old relations, particularly when new difficulties soon increased the chances of a third great war. Commerce with France consequently was about 1700 of slight significance.

Spain after the peace of Münster favoured Dutch commerce greatly, and the hostile political attitude of this power towards France made a large part of the Franco-Spanish trade go into Dutch hands. There were no ports on the Spanish coast where Dutch ships were not to be found, while English competition alone had to be contended with. Cadiz was the great commercial port, where Indian and American goods were imported and immediately transferred to Dutch and English vessels lying ready. Gold and silver, pearls and precious stones, dyestuffs and cinchona, vanilla, tobacco, cochineal, leather, fine wood from America, were exported from there to all Europe. Moreover Spain itself furnished fine wool, the fruits of Malaga, the wines of Jerez, Malaga, and Alicante, the oils of Seville and Majorca, salt from Cadiz and Iviza, iron and steel from Biscay and Navarre, soap from Alicante and Cartagena. How large the interest of the Hollanders in Spanish trade had become, appears from the fact that before 1688 only 3000, but in 1691 about 16,000 casks of Spanish brandy were exported on account of the lack of French brandy. Navigation to Cadiz and back employed every year thirty large ships. Negroes for the American colonies were an important merchandise; this trade, though really prohibited to other nations as well as all commerce with the Spanish colonies, was almost entirely in Dutch hands and gave considerable profits. The importation into Spain of spices, cloth, clothing, silks, cutlery, wood, medicinal herbs, cordage, tar, pitch, paper, herrings, butter, grain, was likewise accomplished by the Dutch. After the peace with Portugal in 1661 commerce with that country became considerable, and the Hollanders quite crowded out the



accustomed to do in the Baltic ports; then they returned home with a new cargo from those coasts. The Hollanders in fact shared the Levant commerce only with the English. The trade of these two nations was very notable in the woollen and linen fabrics universally used there for clothing, also that in spices and dyestuffs monopolised by the Dutch, and that in metals, lead and tin in particular, of which the English had as good as a monopoly. The "capitulations" concluded with the Grand Seignior, the oldest of which dated from the time of Haga, regulated trade in the Levant and were administered with liberality. The duties imposed on commerce by the Turks were moderate—three per cent. for exports, five per cent. for imports, and they had to be paid once only for all Turkish ports.

Outside of Europe the commerce of the East India Company is first worthy of mention. Its power in the Indies had much increased since Maetsuycker, notwithstanding the loss of Formosa so well situated for trade with China and Japan. The conquests from the Portuguese in Hither India, the subjection of Macassar in 1669, the capture of St. Thomé in 1675, the cession of Japara and Cheribon by the prince of Mataram in 1680, established its authority at the chief points of trade and communication. The occupation of Bantam in 1682, where a serious competition with Batavia had come up gradually under England's protection, procured for it important advantages. It now possessed the monopoly in the entire archipelago, and Batavia flourished greatly as the centre of the extensive commercial territory exploited by the company. This territory was not limited to the archipelago but stretched out along the whole southern coast of Asia to Japan. As in the Baltic and Mediterranean the Hollanders had here also, though not to the same extent and not at all in China and Japan, the carrying trade in these regions from Socotra to Tongking. The Arabic gums,




the capital of populous Siam, carried on a large independent trade with the Arabic merchants in Hither India and even with Japan. From Tongking came fine Chinese silk and musk, but the company's commerce here was of little consequence. Commerce with China, the land of the best white silk and fine silken fabrics, was ardently desired by the Dutch and English, and both at this time took much trouble to get access to it by money and fair words, as the Portuguese had long had it through their fort at Macao, but so far these exertions brought slight success,¹ while the Chinese themselves had but a small foreign trade, mostly the inhabitants of the province of Fokien, who showed themselves much at Batavia and appeared there to be born tradesmen. Chinese trade might have been very important for the company, because thereby it could have supplied Japan, which obtained nearly all its commodities from China and had allowed the company a small factory on the little island of Desima. The restrictions and humiliations, to which the company's representatives there had to submit, seemed about to be made good by large profits, and these profits would have risen incomparably higher, if the trade from China to Japan could have been secured. An official of the company estimated for that case that the profit on silk alone would amount to five millions a year, representing eighty per cent. of the capital to be invested. Hitherto silk and silken stuffs, cloth, deerskins, hemp, linen, wool, quicksilver, spices, sugar, musk, camphor, fine wood, porcelain, ivory, coral, and all sorts of small wares were the chief commodities imported into Japan, which in exchange exported only silver, excellent copper, and lacquer work, but strictly prohibited the exportation of the here abundant gold. Tea was brought from here and China to

¹ Just at this time, however, there was repeatedly some talk of opening the Chinese ports to all foreigners. English and Portuguese carried on a considerable secret trade with China, but the company in this business had little success in its efforts.



Moluccas," of which Ternate and Tidor are the chief, were also artificially restricted to the trade in tortoises, while the spice trees there were destroyed by agreement with the small princes who received an annual allowance. The company would not permit free trade with the inhabitants of these islands from fear for its spice monopoly. But the rooting out of the spice trees, regarded as superfluous for the company's commerce, was not continued as regularly and energetically as it had been in the middle of the century by the ruthless governor De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, and sometimes it was quite neglected. When at the end of the century orders came from the fatherland to take up this work again with vigour, because the production of cloves increased to an alarming extent, it even happened that the governor Schagen refused outright to obey this command, and his successor also hesitated to rob the poor population in this manner of its chief means of existence. The conquest of Macassar, inhabited by an energetic and enterprising people, was of great importance for the undisturbed possession and control of commerce in the Moluccas, which previously maintained often secret relations with English and Portuguese from there. So the monopoly of the spice trade for the entire world was indisputably in the hands of the Dutch, especially since, at the peace of Breda, Pularoon, frequently coveted by the English and occupied by them in 1665, was finally ceded to the company and the English were thus driven out of the Moluccas.


The centre of the company's Asiatic commerce was the now populous and flourishing Batavia. To this capital of the pepper and rice-cultivating Java flowed the commodities of the Orient; from there in December or January the returning fleets sailed through the strait of Sunda to the Cape of Good Hope, usually about six large ships, which were joined at the Cape by some vessels from the coast of Coromandel, Ceylon, and Bengal. The com-



better under him. After him came the able but no more vigorous Willem van Outhoorn, in whose administration the coffee plant was introduced into Java and the cultivation of sugar increased very much. But under Outhoorn also the company's internal condition appeared much less favourable than it looked superficially. Even on Java its authority seemed lax; neither by stratagem nor by violence could it overcome its former slave Soerapati, who after the Bantam war with some revolted Balinese soldiers had first made the environs of Batavia unsafe, then had found a refuge with the emperor of Mataram, and soon established his own kingdom in eastern Java.¹ The weakness of the higher government had the result, that the company's servants, particularly in the remote offices, could more than formerly enrich themselves with its possessions and revenues, an evil often complained of in the reports of the commanders of the returning fleets to the States-General.² Investigation of such abuses, like that of the commissioner-general Van Rheede van Mijdracht, who in 1684 was sent from Europe to Hither India and the Cape, amounted as a rule to little, because under Van Outhoorn and his son-in-law, the director-general Van Hoorn, corruption prevailed even in the highest governmental circles. Prohibited trade of the officials, smuggling, extortion from the natives, bribery of judges, arbitrariness, faithlessness in the care of the company's property increased to a dangerous extent, so that Van Outhoorn in 1701 had to be dismissed. But his son-in-law was named as his successor and refused for a long time to accept the appointment; not until three years later did the dismissed governor really step out, a proof again of the degeneration and inner weakness of the company, however rich were its returns, however high

¹ Busken Huet, *Land van Rembrand*, ii., 1, p. 223.


² See especially the important report of the former bookkeeper-general, Daniël Braems, of 1688 to the States-General (*Rijksarchief*).



company at 30 per cent., while the original capital went to it for 15 per cent. with all that remained of the possessions.¹ The working capital of the new company, with a charter for twenty-five years and a board of ten directors, amounted to over 600,000 guilders. It obtained the commercial monopoly over only a part of the territory assigned to the old company: Africa's coast from the Tropic of Cancer to 30° south latitude, Essequibo with St. Eustatius and Curaçao, besides the slave monopoly for Surinam and Berbice. It had offices at Cape Verde, where it possessed Goree, and on the Gold Coast, where St. George del Mina was its chief settlement; gold, ivory, hides, gum, wax, but slaves above all, were its most important commodities. In the slave trade the Hollanders were at this time the first, indeed almost without competition; the coasts of Guinea and Angola furnished them thousands of slaves for the American plantations, mainly in the Spanish possessions, and the island of Curaçao might be called the staple, although trade with those possessions was really prohibited. The profit on these commodities, which the coast negroes bartered for articles of slight value such as kraals, glass, lace, half-worn clothes, and brandy, was great, so that the company in 1687 could declare a dividend of 10 per cent., but usually one of 3 to 5 per cent., and its shares stood at par.² Its trade in the other Dutch possessions of the West Indies was of small consequence, except that in Surinam, where the Dutch authority at first reached little farther than the cannon on the fort, which had to protect the fifty plantations. This last territory, in 1667 conquered from the English by Crijssen for Zealand and retained at the peace of Breda, was bought in 1682 by the new West India Company, but in the following year a third of it was made over to Amsterdam and a third to the family of Aerssen van Sommels-

¹ *Groot Placcaatboek*, iii., col. 1333.

² Netscher, *Geschiedenis van Essequibo, Demerary en Berbice*, p. 86.



brandies, and with vexation the French saw the considerable diminution of their sales, of which the causes were the wars against the republic and the hostile commercial policy with the intolerance towards the Huguenots. While the French manufacturing cities languished and their population suffered from want of work and hunger, the Dutch cities could not find hands enough to do the work. The hat, silk, gauze, velvet, fine leather, and trimmings factories in Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht, and other places, the paper works on the Zaan and in the Veluwe increased every year, and native Hollanders also took part in this industrial development. The distilleries, where brandy and in the last years of the century gin too were distilled, belonged among the new industries that had arisen in the first war against France. About 1700 the Dutch silk factories were the first in the world and were helped as much as possible by protective measures. The growing wholesale industry soon experienced, however, the obstruction of the mediæval guild regulations, to which it remained subject. It seems to have attained its highest point around 1700, and it is not to be described how many hands, also of women and children, it kept busy, how much prosperity it diffused in the cities among the people as well as among the manufacturers themselves, what large sums in taxes it poured into the treasuries, though it might be at the cost of its own future owing to the high wages and imposts which were finally to make difficult its competition with foreign countries. It was later believed that the silk industry alone at this time gave work to more hands than the East India Company itself.

The republic of the seventeenth century was no less a land of industry than of commerce; as of old they both supported one another and stood in the closest connection. And the land and city governments endeavoured in regulating taxation according to circumstances, giving and

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
needs, and the end of the seventeenth century was both for the Catholic and the Protestant portion of the population rich in every species of movements that went to the heart of the Netherlanders. Among the Protestants the Voetian and Cocceian opinions in the reformed church occasioned trouble on both sides, but William III., though personally favourably inclined to the Voetians, took good care not to estrange the opposing party and at last turned to the policy of toleration, which had been followed by Frederick Henry, and would not consent to the new national synod desired by the Voetians, as he feared a revival of the old dissensions of the early part of the century. Van der Waayen, having retired to Friesland under the protection of his cousin, now professor at Franeker, was by him in 1685 also restored to honour and continued to be the influential leader of the Cocceians with Van Giffen, the preacher of Leeuwarden and afterwards of Dordrecht. Both Cocceians and Voetians, however, gradually laid aside some of the old dogmatic asperity and devoted themselves more to the care of the spiritual necessities of their congregations than to mutual strife which was still far from being settled. The progress of dissension was restrained by the Holland resolution "for the preservation of quiet and peace in the churches" (1694), which recommended moderation in preaching and the calling of ministers of "moderate and peaceful disposition," although it recalled vividly the resolutions of Arminian times. The learned and moderate Franeker professor, Campegius Vitringa, the conciliatory Hermanus Witsius, the mystical Voetian A. Brakel, and his erudite colleague, A. Marck of Leyden, were the principal theologians of this time, who fixed the attention of their followers more upon Christian life than upon dogmatic differences.¹ Remarkable too was the

¹ See Reitsma, *Geschiedenis van de Hervorming en de Hervormde Kerk*, 2^{de} druk, p. 294.



cities furnished the strongest type with their spirit of Christian brotherhood. Related to them was the gentle Pontiaan van Hattem, preacher at St. Philipsland on Tholen, deposed in 1683 on account of his unorthodoxy, who could not escape the accusation of Spinozism. Until his death he continued to exhort his followers found also in Holland, the "Hattemists," and to persuade them to a fervent religious life. He and other "freethinkers," such as the plain Amsterdam citizen Deurhof, had always to contend with the persecution of the ruling church, which endeavoured with a heavy hand to suppress these "sectarian" movements but succeeded only incompletely. The genuine Protestant feeling for free research was here too deeply rooted.

Cartesian and Spinozistic opinions, the former particularly, had not lost their importance in spite of all the controversial writing, refutation, and opposition. Van der Waayen and the disputatious Hermanus Alexander Roëll, both professors at Franeker, were in this period the foremost champions of the Cartesian doctrine, which was sharply condemned by various provincial synods, in orthodox Zealand especially, where their propositions had to be abjured with "detestation" by all preachers. Roëll, pupil of Burman and Heydanus, who vigorously upheld the right of speech in religious matters, aroused the most violent indignation but was able to retain his place under the protection of the noble Albertina Agnes of Orange and the stadtholder's court at Leeuwarden, although the Frisian Estates often wanted to end his dispute with Huber and Vitringa. Much more stir was caused by the Cartesian principles of the learned and many-sided Frisian preacher, Dr. Balthasar Bekker, whose *Vaste spyze der volmaakten* in 1670 gave rise to sharp complaints of the ecclesiastical authorities, to prohibitive measures of the secular magistrates, to many pamphlets. Finally he had to leave Friesland in consequence of the agitation, and he became



church, this was no less the case with the Catholics of this time, among whom the dissension of almost a century between regulars and seculars, between brothers of the orders and secular priests, finally came to a crisis. In other respects it was a restless time for them. The persecutions of the Huguenots and of the Waldenses in Piedmont, later the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the arrival in the country of hundreds of refugees had occasioned a strong anti-Catholic movement among the Protestants of the republic; the important events in England, the dreaded Catholic propaganda in the Palatinate caused new uneasiness. Riots against the Catholics, vehement complaints of synods and consistories, calls in different provinces for the enforcement of the placards, were the unavoidable consequences of the aroused hostility. For a time the condition of the Catholics in 1685 began to be threatening; their meetings were dispersed, their houses menaced with pillage, their priests imprisoned. But the moderation of the regents, no less that of Neercassel and his friends,¹ the caution of the Catholics themselves, who collected money to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees, soon made the agitation diminish, and although there was repeatedly talk of the expulsion of the Jesuits, who were regarded as the instigators, the leaders of the persecutions in France and elsewhere, and the States-General deliberated upon it seriously, it was not brought about in order also not to embitter the allies Austria and Spain. The internal disturbances in the Catholic Church were no less serious and of more lasting effect. The gentle Neercassel, who by the publication of his *Amor poenitens* had incurred an accusation of heterodoxy and had seen his book prohibited by the Inquisition, died in June, 1686, and now the question was who was to obtain the office of apostolic vicar. The chapters of Utrecht and Haarlem, the only ones still in existence, although the government did not recognise

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Nederl. Katholieken*, i., p. 289.








APPENDIX

SOURCES OF NETHERLAND HISTORY, 1621-1702

FOR the period after the Truce we possess the *Gedenkschriften* of the Gelderland nobleman Alexander van der Capellen (2 vols., Utrecht, 1777), beginning with 1621 and continued to 1632, the second volume containing notes on important events, in which the author took part to 1654, and fragmentary observations on other happenings. Constantly in the highest governmental bodies, he had an opportunity to hear and see much; as a trusted counsellor of Frederick Henry his information is of great value. Of more importance is the extensive work of the Frisian statesman Lieuwe (Leo) van Aitzema, born in 1600 at Dokkum of a good family, which had already given to the state an excellent diplomat in his uncle Foppe van Aitzema, through whose influence the nephew became resident of the Hanse cities at The Hague. As such he had occasion to watch the political development of the young republic, while his relations with French and English statesmen and the small courts of northern Germany afforded him a deeper insight into the secret ways of European politics. Little scrupulous in his methods of securing important documents,¹ he collected a very considerable number of them and incorporated them in his great compilation, the *Saeken van Staet en Oorlogh in ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (15 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1655; 7 vols., *ibid.*, 1669-71), an inestimable authority for Dutch history from 1621 to 1668, a magazine of important documents and information. The work, like that of Bor, is more a loosely

¹ See Fruin in *Nijh. Bijdr.*, *N. R.*, iii., p. 218.



The collections of them in the Royal Museum and elsewhere have hitherto been used more for the history of art than from the point of view of general history. Among the later publications in this department deserve mention that on *Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*¹ and in a more popular form P. L. Muller's *Gouden Eeuw* (3 vols., Leiden, 1896-98), both works of general importance. Further there are historic medals, among other places contained in the Royal Cabinet of Coins and Medals at The Hague and admirably described in Van Loon's standard work: *Beschrijving der Nederlandsche Historipenningen* (4 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1723-31; continuation, Amsterdam, 1821-69), from 1555 to 1714, afterwards continued by the Royal Academy of Sciences. The awakening of interest in Dutch art during the last quarter of the nineteenth century caused the publication of many contributions to the history of art, particularly in the magazine *Oud-Holland* (Amsterdam, 1882-), in other periodicals of local and provincial character, and in larger works.² Publications relating to the history of economics and law for this period are less numerous. In economics there are only small productions, notably in the last volumes of the *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht*, in the journals of provincial societies, and appended to other works.³ The history of law is limited principally to the older books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The interest of the present generation is confined almost entirely to the history of the political law of this period, though some activity is shown by the new issue of De Groot's *Inleiding tot de rechtsgeleerdheid* (ed. Fockema Andreae, 2 vols., Arnhem, 1895), the *Bijdragen tot de Nederl. rechts-*

¹ By Meijer, Kernkamp, Brugmans, Kalff, Rogge, etc. ('s Gravenh., 1897, etc.).

² See Galland, *Geschichte der holl. Baukunst und Bildneri* (Frankf., 1890); Bredius, *Meisterwerke des Rijksmuseums und der Kön. Gemäldegallerie* (München, 1890); Bode, *Rembrandt* (Paris, 1897); Michel, *Rembrandt* (Paris, 1895).


³ See Luzac, *Holland's Rijkdom*, 4 vols., 1780; Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Geschichte der Nederl.* (Leipzig, 1893); Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Geschichte der O. I. Comp.* (Bat., 1894); Van Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staatshuishoudkunde in Nederland*; etc.

at this time. Various publications have called attention to the importance of the French and English archives.¹ The carefully edited catalogues of the pamphlets in several great collections give an opportunity to learn of the wealth of the pamphlet literature. *

Among the printed sources the publications of official documents deserve first to be mentioned. Of the great publication of the *Resolutiën en Secrete Resolutiën der Staten van Holland en Westfriesland* there exist for a part of this time (1653-1668) separate editions, also of the *Resolutions* of 1672 and 1709, of the *Secret Resolutions* of 1717; furthermore the *Resolutions* "of consideration" of John de Witt's time (1653-1668) have been published in one volume, 1672, at The Hague, and in 1706 at Utrecht. The *Resolutions* of the States-General for this period have only very incompletely survived in print; they remain in manuscript in the Royal Archives. To these collections may be joined the *Letters exchanged between John de Witt and the plenipotentiaries of the state abroad* (6 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1723-1725), which are not complete but afford a good view of the foreign policy in De Witt's time. A complement to them is to be found in Combes, *Correspondance française de Jean de Witt*, in the first volume of his *Mélanges historiques* (Paris, 1873). The ponderous tomes of Aitzema may be regarded as semi-official works for this period also, filled as they are with official documents, the questionable way in which they often came into his possession appearing only after his death in 1669. The Dordrecht conrector Lambert van den Bos (Silvius) continued his book with much less talent; the passion, with which in his *Historiën onses tijds behelzende Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, 1669-1679 (3 vols., Amst., 1685) he comes out against the De Witts, particularly against Cornelius de Witt, diminishes very

¹ Besides in my *Verslagen over archivalia betreffende de geschiedenis van Nederland in Engeland en te Parijs*, and other places, in the dissertations of Japikse, *De verwickelingen tusschen de Republiek en Engeland*, 1660-1665 (Leiden, 1900) and Haye, *De geheime correspondentie van Abraham de Wicquefort* ('s Gravenhage, 1901).


² See especially the *Catalogus van de pampfletten der Kon. Bib.*, ed. Knuttel, vols. 2 and 3.



carefully revised by De Witt and Van Wimmenum, but was not yet printed, though partly in press, when the events of 1672 caused the plan to be suspended. Three years later (March, 1675) he was incarcerated for treason, first in the Voorpoort at The Hague, then in Loevestein; sentenced to imprisonment for life with confiscation of his property, he escaped in February, 1679, and fled to Celle in Brunswick, where he died in 1682. He continued his book in prison and later. He wrote also the noted work, *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, an important handbook for the diplomats of the time, and later the *Mémoire touchant les ambassadeurs*, in which are communicated many details of diplomacy as then practised. His confiscated papers, including the proofs of his book, remained in the custody of the court of Holland, until the publishers after much difficulty were able in 1719 to print the first four books, but the printing was suspended with the tenth book in 1745 not to be resumed before our own time. Long after Wicquefort's death the completion of his work was committed to another person, to the French preacher Jacques Basnage of The Hague, exiled to the republic in 1684, who was to continue the work to the peace of Utrecht. After seeing Wicquefort's manuscript Basnage advised against its publication. Basnage himself, a fine scholar and a great friend of the council pensionary Heinsius, who employed him as a mediator in the peace negotiations of Utrecht, was now in his turn entrusted with the task, and wrote his *Annales des Provinces Unies, 1648-1667* (2 vols., La Haye, 1719-1726), a production in many respects to be praised, which in form and impartiality stands far above Wicquefort's book but not in insight and knowledge of affairs. Less high stands the work of the celebrated and voluminous writer Jean Leclerc of Geneva, who in 1684 had become a professor in the Remonstrant seminary at Amsterdam, and died there at an advanced age in 1734. His immense literary output includes the *Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, 1560-1716*,¹ a meritorious compilation illustrated with reproductions of medals.

¹ Three vols. Amst., 1723-1728; also translated into Dutch, *ib.*, 1730 and





eyewitnesses contained in them. Donselaer's work found a continuer in Brandt's younger son, also named Geraert, for the years 1674 and 1675, covered by his *Tweejarige geschiedenis*. For style and contents these works are little superior to the journalistic production, the *Hollantse Mercurius*, the continuation of the old chronicles of the time and collected in 40 volumes from 1650 to 1690, originally appearing weekly and composed of exchange and newspaper reports of general interest. This *Mercurius*, followed in 1690 by the *Europische Mercurius*, gives a good picture of the immediate impression of events upon the public and is therefore indispensable for the history of the time. In the seventeenth as well as in the eighteenth century the republic was the seat of journalism, which in French translation spread the fruits of the pen over a large part of Europe and was a formidable power in the world.¹ The *Gazette de Hollande* was the proverbial political newspaper of those days, the *Gazette d'Amsterdam*, the translated Amsterdam journal, was with the Leyden, Haarlem, and Utrecht journals the source of all kinds of newspapers even in Paris. The writers hid themselves under the mask of anonymity, which led frequently to great abuses and diplomatic difficulties. The French government in the years of peace after 1679 complained repeatedly of the utterances of the French press in the republic often inspired by French refugees; but the States themselves sometimes had to act vigorously against mendacious, indecent, or indiscreet newspaper reports.² The *Mercurie historique et politique*, founded in 1686 by Sandras de Courtilz and appearing every month, was during almost a century the most widely circulated of these newspapers.

In the way of memoirs, sources for the Dutch history of this time appear in the letters and writings of the foreign ambassadors and agents at The Hague, particularly those of France and England. D'Estrades and d'Avaux with Temple and Burnet are prominent among them. D'Estrades' *Lettres, mémoires et négociations*³ give a good insight into the relations be-

¹ Hatin, *Les Gazettes de Hollande*, Paris, 1865.

² Sautijn Kluit, *Nagelaten geschriften*, i., p. 108.

³ First edition, 5 vols., Brux., 1709, better that of 1743 in 9 vols., London.



the difficulties with which he had to contend, in his domestic and foreign policy as well as in his military career, are shown in his correspondence with his faithful friend Waldeck¹ and in the valuable papers of the council pensionary Heinsius,² both his trusted helpers in the work of his life.

Mignet's important work, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne* (4 vols., Paris, 1835-1842), is of great service for the study of foreign politics in this entire period, and with it now goes Legrelle's book, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*.³ The great treaties are to be found in the *Corps universel diplomatique* of Du Mont (8 vols., Amst. and La Haye, 1726-1731). For the internal political conditions the notes of the Amsterdam justice Bontemantel⁴ are of great value. Not without weight for domestic and foreign politics are the letters of Pieter de Groot to Abraham de Wicquefort of the later time⁵ and the correspondence between the Van der Goes brothers,⁶ but the latter gives little else than the impression of known events upon a respectable citizen of the republic not holding office. The rhymed *Geheugchenis* of the former official Coenraet Droste derives its interest mainly from the notes added to it by Fruin.⁷ Smaller sections of this period are treated in Wijnne's book, *De geschillen over de afdanking van het krijgsvolk, 1649-1650*⁸; in Gardiner's *Documents on the First Dutch War* (London, 1899), notable for the history of the Dutch navy, which has also found an admirable historian for this time in De Jonge; in vols. 1 and 2 of Van Sypesteyn's

¹ P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Fr. von Waldeck*, 2 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1873-1880.

² *Archief van den raadpensionaris Heinsius*, ed. Van der Heim, 3 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1867-1880.

³ Two vols., Paris, 1891. See also Sirtema de Grovestins, *Guillaume III. et Louis XIV.* 8 vols., Paris, 1868.

⁴ *De regeeringe van Amsterdam*, ed. Kernkamp, in *Werken Hist. Gen., Derde Serie*, No. 7 and 8.


⁵ *Lettres*, ed. Krämer, *ib.*, No. 5.

⁶ Ed. Gonnet, *ib.*, No. 13.

⁷ Ed. Fruin, 2 vols., Leiden, 1879.

⁸ *Werken Hist. Gen.*, N. S., No. 41.











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





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
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


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
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
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